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Chapter 1 Betting on Development:  Complexity of Contemporary Commodity 
Production 
  
          In 2000, the government of the Mexican state of Veracruz responded to a 
grassroots initiative in the town of Papantla by setting up an extension program to 
revive vanilla production. Reviving the industry would be difficult, since production 
had been decimated over the course of the 20th Century; where there had been around 
30,000 producers in the early 1900s, there were now in the neighborhood of 3,000. 
Galvanized into action, government agents and grassroots organizers founded an 
agricultural extension agency called the Consejo de Vainilla Veracruzano (COVER). 
Given the state of Mexican vanilla production, they charged COVER with organizing 
Totonac vanilla farmers, providing them with technical support, and teaching them to 
intensify production.     
          One of the unfortunate outcomes of the program is that small producers (like 
the Totonac farmers) would come to view COVER as one more self-serving 
government program, ill-attuned to their needs to balance vanilla production with 
subsistence farming. The members of the grassroots movement that had called for its 
creation had taken the interest of the small producers to heart –in contrast to the state 
agronomists in Jalapa (the capital) who were driven by the idea of large-scale 
intensification. As I would came to learn through my interactions with them, most 
small-scale vanilla producers do not expect to make a living off of the crop. The 
cornerstone of their livelihood is subsistence farming and diversified entrepreneurial 
endeavors.  COVER originally represented an alternative to previous development 
projects, primarily because the founding of COVER was initiated at the local level 
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and proposed a development agenda with concern for small producer interests and 
needs.  
      I went to Mexico in the fall of 2005 to study this effort to help vanilla farmers 
increase their production.  I started out interviewing members of the COVER, and 
then moved on to the small farmers themselves.  Fieldwork with both the agents of 
the program and many of the farmers led to a first-hand knowledge of the role of 
government programs in building commodity production. But it also led to an 
understanding of the role of economic diversity and household strategies in 
maintaining sustainable communities --in the face of changing global markets, price 
fluctuations and the incomprehension of those pushing the idea of a more large-scale 
cash crop. My fieldwork led to an understanding of the pragmatic economic strategies 
that small-scale producers adopt –with or without government help.   
 Farmers have managed to maintain subsistence-based agriculture alongside 
commodity crops for three hundred years --in spite of centuries of government 
corruption, local exploitation and environmental degradation.  Farmers involved in 
the government initiative to increase vanilla production have traditionally been 
Totonac families.  Although their current lifestyle is not as traditionally-indigenous as 
in the past, they nevertheless remain in the traditional sense small-scale subsistence 
producers.  These farmers may drive to town in a pickup truck, watch soap operas on 
a television set at night and dress in store-bought clothes, but they also grow most of 
the corn their extended families eat, grow many of the beans and vegetables they 
consume, gather their water from a communal well, wash their clothes by hand, and 
maintain important community ties through political and religious institutions.   
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          In this dissertation I argue that COVER, though initially founded to reflect the 
interests of the small-scale producer/subsistence farmer as an alternative to traditional 
development scheme had failed due to long-established political structures that 
ultimately corrupted the agency.  Conventional development projects (of which 
COVER has become one more example) have shown a preference for large-scale 
production and expensive agricultural techniques –at the expense of local culture and 
knowledge.  In light of this shift in COVER’s mission, I argue that these small 
producers have become the new protagonists of a newer alternative development, one 
that looks to the global economy for support. I will describe the response of small-
scale producers and their pragmatic approach to the situation: how they maintain 
economic diversification, and participate in government-sponsored vanilla projects, 
without becoming over-dependent on the crop. Their pragmatism (leavened with 
mistrust) is indicative of the fact that the program is no longer designed around their 
interests. I describe how they balance the need to produce and distribute cash crops 
with subsistence production, entrepreneurship, and community obligations, and how 
their ability to maintain this balance enables them to weather economic difficulties 
faced by urban residents.  At the same time that they remain skeptical of COVER 
programs, they are hopeful that intensifying their production of vanilla while creating 
new markets and more direct access to those markets will provide them a consistent 
source of cash income to support one more generation in the countryside.  These 
producers and their families are “betting” on vanilla to be that crop that provides their 
families and communities with sustainability.   
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Fieldwork 
 When I began my doctoral studies, I had worked in the United States for many 
years with non-profit organizations dealing with homelessness and poverty.  Given 
this interest in poverty and development projects, I wanted to do research that would 
incorporate economic issues, especially those pertinent to global markets and small 
farmers.  A professor I worked with previously had mentioned to me that no one had 
done any work on vanilla and that I should look into a project in Papantla.  When I 
looked into the literature on vanilla production, I found that to some extent he was 
right.  In the U.S. literature about the vanilla industry is limited to an excellent recent 
history of the impact of vanilla on land tenure (Kouri 2004), to a journalistic account 
of the contemporary vanilla industry (Ecott 2004) and to a cultural history of vanilla 
(Rain 2004).  But there were no contemporary ethnographic studies of this region. 
Among Mexican academics, studies on vanilla are primarily focused on issues 
of agricultural inputs and techniques.  When I asked about previous studies at 
COVER, employees told me that there are many students that have done studies but 
that none of the students has returned to report on their findings or sent final reports.  
Most of this work was focused on technical issues and had been done by students at 
the National Autonomous University (UNAM) in Mexico City.  A local agronomist 
compared different production systems (Sanchez 1997).  In this study and in my 
conversations with him, Mr. Sanchez was critical of the emphasis on shadehouse 
production at that point in time.  There are also two Mexican anthropologists that 
have worked with historical data and documents about Totonac families.  They 
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provide a look at Totonac social, political and economic systems during the 20th 
century (Chenaut 1995, Ramirez 2002). 
 In contrast to the more technical studies --and to update the cultural studies-- I 
set out a more comprehensive approach: one that took the experience of government 
agents and small-scale producers as its starting point. Given that COVER was 
relatively new, I was able to talk to government workers and producers involved from 
the beginning of the initiative, and came to understand how the institution’s approach 
has changed since its inception.  I was interested in the fact that the case of vanilla is 
one of industry-revitalization rather than introduction of a new cash crop.   I was 
interested in the dynamics behind the decline in production.  I assumed that given 
compelling rationales to stop production, producers would require equally rational 
incentives to take up production again.   
  Though it was officially a government organization, COVER was the result 
of a grassroots effort of local producers and businessmen to get government support 
for the vanilla industry.  Nevertheless, in the short time that the agency had been 
working with producers, it had begun to lose a certain amount of local autonomy.  
Some of its founding members would complain that orders were being taken from the 
state government bureaucrats in the capital city of Jalapa, not producers themselves.  
After several initial interviews, I received permission to travel with the extension 
workers into the field.  I told the workers that I wanted to see what the agency did, 
how they worked with producers, and how their time was spent.  The goal was to 
travel with them to as many different projects as possible, to better understand the 
goals of the agency and the structure of the vanilla industry.  
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  Several of the chapters of this dissertation begin with a bus journey. This is in 
keeping with the nature of multi-sited ethnographic research, and the need to access a 
wide variety of producers and institutions.  The first morning I met an agency worker 
at the bus stop before the sun had risen.  The air was humid, sticky but not yet 
stifling, as we climbed onto a bus that would take us to a larger town to make 
connections.  This became our mode of operation most days for the next six months.  
As we traveled further into the countryside, we might find ourselves switching to a 
variety of smaller vehicles, or walking. I used this travel time with the agency 
workers to learn more about the projects we were visiting, to ask questions about 
larger goals and to share information about how our lives differed.  They were 
interested in learning about American holidays and curious about our political system.  
I arrived during the U.S. hurricane Katrina and fielded questions about the ways in 
which Americans build houses and help victims.  They thought it was a bit strange 
that I wanted to watch them work and ask questions.  They often asked about my 
goals for the project and what I would do with all the notes and interviews.  I was 
impressed with their resolve to stay in the countryside, and their belief that rural 
workers just needed access to programs and to make a viable living.  When I asked 
them about their desire to migrate in the future, they were adamant that there was too 
much work to be done for them to think about leaving.   
 Once we arrived at a project, I would be introduced as someone interested in 
vanilla, and the agency workers would quickly get involved in the projects for the day 
--whether they were marking off a new orchard/shade house, talking about problems 
with an existing crop, discussing details on the next step of a project, or reporting on 
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the progress of a group.  I followed the groups and listened in on conversations.  
Usually, toward the end of the visit, I would have time to talk with several of the 
group members.  At this point, I often found out that they were a bit confused about 
my presence; they wondered if I was from the university in Mexico City or from the 
government in Jalapa.  I would explain that I was an anthropologist from the United 
States, interested in rural economy.  Often, when they found out I was from the U.S., 
they would tell me about their experience as a migrant.  And, more times than not, 
their response to my question about whether they would return to the U.S. in the 
future was “No, as long as this project with vanilla works out.”   
 One of my earliest trips with a field agent led to a humorous ice-breaking 
situation that created rapport and an unofficial acceptance in the group.  The scene 
was a remote community to which we had arrived early, to meet with a group that 
was ready to begin setting out the posts for their shadehouse (a vanilla-producing 
greenhouse that uses a dark fabric to filter sunlight).  Eight of the group members 
showed up in the empty field that had been donated by one of the families for the 
project.  The sun had reached the top of the trees at the end of the field and everyone 
was anxious to get the measurements made and the stakes pounded into rows, before 
returning to their other jobs of the day.  After I was introduced, I joined in helping to 
find straight sticks to use as stakes, measuring and counting rows.  After several 
hours, the grid for their shadehouse was laid out.    
          One of the members jumped over the fence of the orange grove next to the field 
and came back with his satchel full of large, green oranges.  Most of the men had 
machetes attached to their belts, and began to peel the oranges and hand them around 
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for everyone to eat.  We all stood back and enjoyed the juicy oranges, which were 
well-deserved and much-needed.  I was on my second orange, enjoying the unreal 
taste and sublime experience of eating fruit ten minutes from harvest, when I choked.  
In the midst of a long-drawn-out-air-sucking fit, I looked out at the circle of men that 
were now watching me with intense interest and horror.  What would these poor men 
do if this gringa died in their field from orange exposure?  Fortunately, for myself 
and the group, I eventually stopped choking.  I told the men that oranges where I 
come from are not as juicy.  They were relieved that I was standing upright again and 
breathing normally.  When it was time to go, we said our goodbyes and they handed 
me a large bag of oranges to take to my family.   
          This experience had two results:  first, it made me grateful to the people that 
allowed me to look into their lives.  This situation was symbolic of the potential 
danger in which anthropologists place their informants.  I imagine those men worried 
about my safety but also worried about their community if a stranger choked to death 
in their fields.  What kind of a liability would that imply for them?  The second result 
was that it solidified my acceptance by COVER workers.  It was the topic of 
conversation at the office for some time after.  They would tease me and I brought 
orange flavored treats for the workers in the office.  When I met these men in town or 
at meetings, they all teased me.  The choking in the field made an odd anthropologist 
look normal. 
 On the days that the workers stayed in the office, I spent time observing 
visiting individuals and groups, the operation of programs, meetings and informal 
interviews.  It was by traveling with workers to different projects and communities 
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that I began to formulate a picture of the industry as a whole and to understand the 
variation in the types of producers that the agency was helping.  My goal was to not 
only understand the objectives of the government program but to understand the lives 
of the households involved in the programs.  I began to visit several different families 
in order to develop a more focused investigation.  After six months with the agency, I 
began to visit these families on a regular basis.  One day a week I continued to spend 
time at the agency office, and the other days I traveled out into the countryside to 
work with two families involved with agency projects.   
 When the agency first began working with producers in 2001, it estimated that 
90 percent of the producers in the area were small-scale indigenous producers (those 
owning less than 5 hectares).  These households most likely integrated vanilla into 
stands of rainforest that were left to fallow according to their agricultural cycle.  
These traditional orchards were attended to by household members usually at the end 
of a day, so the labor was always taken up within the family and were fairly low 
yield.  These households maintained a variety of subsistence crops --balancing their 
economy with other cash crop production and at times wage-labor. The first projects 
initiated by the agency were directed towards these producers, at times providing 
plants and compost or helping with the installation of irrigation systems.   
 In 2005, COVER’s projects were evenly divided between irrigation systems 
and relatively-expensive shadehouses, and in 2006 all projects selected for funding 
were shadehouses.  Given this trend, I decided to focus my research on two families: 
one that was adopting the agency’s shadehouse technique, and a more traditional one 
that had chosen to receive assistance only with irrigation techniques. The differences 
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between these families, I surmised, would be representative of the general differences 
between producers in the industry.   I hoped to get a concrete picture of the different 
types of economic strategies adopted by different types of producers.  Making this 
more focused case study of small farmers and their households is important because 
my overall goal with this research was to make connections between micro level 
experiences and macro level structures, whether at the level of state programs or 
global markets.  The everyday experience of these farmers is important for the 
purpose of creating development projects that best serve their needs.     
          Differences aside, both families that I chose have much in common: they see 
vanilla as an ingredient (though not the sole ingredient) of their economic strategies. 
Both also have a keen awareness of the history of the vanilla industry and understand 
that their success is dependent on creating direct access to the market. One of the 
families lives in a more or less traditional community an hour’s bus ride from 
Papantla.  They have an extended household, produce all the corn their family eats 
and work with vanilla both in a traditional orchard and in their orange groves.  The 
second family is part of a group that has been organized to build a shadehouse to 
grow vanilla.  This household consists of one nuclear family and is oriented toward 
capitalist production.   
 For six months, I spent my days between these COVER-affiliated families, 
walking with them in the fields and talking to them in their homes.  I collected the life 
histories of the male and female heads of households and made formal and informal 
interviews with each member of the family about daily life and their involvement 
with vanilla production.  At first, my presence was hard for them to understand.  One 
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family planned interesting outings, wanting me to see every aspect of their 
community and experience their life fully, while the other family was worried that 
they were too busy to entertain me and had a hard time understanding that I wanted to 
watch them work.  With both families, I was able to settle into a pattern of participant 
observation, though I am sure it was never easy for them to have me asking questions. 
          In the final months of my fieldwork (May 2006), I conducted two surveys at 
the First International Vanilla Producers Conference, held in Papantla.  Though 
COVER had conducted a census during the first year, this survey would provide a 
look into those producers that were attempting to access COVER programs.  The first 
survey drew on a random sample of 100 conference participants and collected 
demographic information --along with information about the role of household labor, 
migration experiences and the overall plans each family has made in regard to vanilla 
production.  The second survey was much more open-ended and was conducted with 
an equal number of male and female producers.  The goal of this survey was to ask 
more questions focused on the perceptions of producers, especially in regard to the 
government agency and re-vitalization of production.  After compiling the surveys 
and analyzing the data in general terms, I presented a synopsis to the agency.  The 
response to this was positive and resulted in the agency calling a meeting with their 
board of directors.  They used this report as a stepping- off point for the following 
years strategic planning.  They were interested in the cultural descriptions of these 
farmers, though they did not seem to have the power to formulate programs in the 
best interests of these farmers.   
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 An important outcome of this conference was a new movement to organize 
vanilla farmers, the International Tropical Farmer’s Network (ITFN).  This internet 
group was organized by Patricia Rain, one of the most important advocates for these 
farmers.  Given the problems experienced with COVER and in response to 
complaints by farmers concerning corruption, Ms. Rain created the ITFN to organize 
vanilla farmers outside of Mexico.  The goal of this group is to create a network 
among farmers internationally, to develop long-term goals for the vanilla industry and 
to create more equitable markets for small-scale farmers.  At present, this group is 
organizing a meeting for the fall of 2007 to develop a strategy.  I have been invited to 
attend and will use data from this study to help Ms. Rain to apply for funding to 
implement the strategy developed by the group.  
 
 Vanilla’s History: A Brief Overview 
The pre-conquest history of vanilla trade has not been documented at this 
point.  However, it is known that when Cortez was given a chocolate in the palace of 
Montezuma, vanilla was one of the flavorings added to the cold frothy gruel.  It is 
assumed that vanilla was a tribute item, a product that the conquered tribes were 
required to provide to the empire each year. (Ecott 2004, Rain 2004)  There is also 
evidence that Montezuma grew vanilla vines along with cacao plants in his gardens in 
Huaxtepec, though there is no mention of whether he was successful at harvesting 
vanilla pods. (Nuttall 1923)  Vanilla must have been gathered in the wild at that point, 
somewhere along the Gulf Coast.  Though vanilla does not self-pollinate, there was a 
wild bee in abundance that served the plant.  The pod was collected after it had 
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ripened and fermented on the vine. (Rain 2004) This process made the vanilla pod 
scarce and may have contributed to it being an elite trading item.  There is not a great 
deal of folklore about the vanilla pod, but it may have had medicinal use and there is 
evidence it was used as a fragrance on copal incense.  (Bruman 1948)     
There was a decline in the use of vanilla during the early colonial period 
because of its relationship to chocolate.  During this time, chocolate was used as a 
currency, closely guarded by elite and government alike.  Once chocolate was 
imported to Europe as a commodity the demand for vanilla increased.  By the late 
1600s, chocolate houses were popular throughout Europe. (Coe 1996)  There is not a 
great deal of historiography concerning the production or cultivation of vanilla, but 
the increase in demand for chocolate likely created a need to control vanilla.  In 1697, 
William Dampier wrote about “beans drying in the sun in Copalita and Huatulco” on 
the Atlantic coast.  (Sauer 1993)  This seems to imply the recognition of the 
importance of the crop and the need to control the process in some manner.  At first, 
this may have been accomplished by planting the vines close together in the forest to 
control the proximity of the crop to households and facilitate tending and harvesting 
the crop.  Initially in the state of Veracruz, the towns of Misantla and Colipa were the 
first to capitalize on the new trend and were the first producers to provide a steady 
source of vanilla for export.  (Kouri  2004) 
From the beginning of contact, vanilla vines were sent back to the Old World 
in an attempt to understand the plant more fully.  However, it was not until the mid 
1800s that anyone outside of Mexico was successful in producing the pod.  Until that 
time, Mexico (and some parts of Central America) was the only source of vanilla.  
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Once the French were successful in cultivating the vine and producing fruit, they 
introduced the crop to Comoros, Madagascar and the Reunion Islands off the coast of 
Africa.  In 1850, all of the world’s vanilla came from the New World.  By 1920, over 
60% of the world’s vanilla came from these French colonies.  While this figure may 
imply a downturn in the Mexican vanilla economy, this time period also corresponds 
to a steady increase in Mexican production and the development of a robust industry.  
At that point in history, it was not a problem that Madagascar out produced Mexico in 
sheer number, as vanilla was a valuable commodity, with no substitute.  (Bruman 
1948, Kouri 2004, Rain 2004) 
While competition from other growers may not have effected Mexican 
production initially, the invention of artificial vanilla had significant results.  
Artificial vanilla, a by-product of the wood pulp industry, today holds about 95% of 
the market. (Menz and Fleming 1989)  Mexico has to compete for a smaller market 
and since the late 1900s, has not been able to keep up with Madagascar and 
Indonesia.  Today, this continues to be true.  Mexico will never be able to compete 
with the amount of vanilla produced in Madagascar and Indonesia, where labor is 
even cheaper. However, producers are beginning to look for smaller niche markets for 
high quality Mexican vanilla. 
Papantla Vanilla 
During the colonial period, the region in which I did my fieldwork (around 
Papantla, Veracruz, the region known as the Tecolutla Basin) was relatively 
autonomous since it did not lend itself to the formation of large haciendas. But with 
the growth of vanilla as a cash crop around the time of independence, layers of social 
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stratification emerged. These occurred not along the lines of land ownership, but 
through the division of labor and access to international markets.  The traditional 
division of labor was that Totonacs produced the green vanilla beans and non-
indigenous merchants processed and marketed the product.  This differentiation 
sharpened as merchants began to acquire land, both high in quality and quantity, and 
monopolize the market from production to distribution (Kouri 2004). 
By the early 1900s, the basin had been reorganized both economically and 
socially.  The relationship between Totonac farmers and the land had changed 
drastically.  In less than a hundred years, the basin had moved from a subsistence 
oriented economy to a market economy.  Farmers that maintained right/ownership of 
land were caught in a dependency cycle of debt.  Privatization of land had created 
new obligations to the state, especially in terms of capital and taxes.  Farmers were 
faced with the need to intensify to pay for consumer goods and taxes.  Intensification 
required capital, which created new debt obligations and obstacles to subsistence.  
Many Totonacs had lost the right to land and inherited instead a new relationship to 
wage labor (Kouri 2004). 
After the Revolution (1910-1920), the area experienced several cycles of 
economic growth and government support and abandonment.  Ejidos (communal 
landholdings) organized under the Cardenas era (1934-40) provided land for many 
landless Totonacs.  However, this initiative was under-funded once classically-liberal 
economic policies were implemented in the 1940s.  Another cycle of state investment 
in infrastructure (1970-1982) revived the industry until a repeat of neo-liberal policy 
led to the abandonment of government support of smallholder producers.  This shift 
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led to a reduction of producers, from 30,000 smallholders to 3,000 producers today 
(Cano 1997). 
 These historic shifts (from subsistence to a cash-crop market economy, from 
the re-establishment of communal landholdings to waves of neo-liberal privatization)   
have forced small farmers to be flexible and make use of diversified economic 
strategies. The balancing of cash-cropping, subsistence farming and entrepreneurship 
is nothing new. To account for the various ways in which this balancing act occurs, I 
realized that I would need a multi-sited ethnographic approach –one that would allow 
me to compare at least two different producer households. And making contact with 
the farmers through COVER would also allow me to see how a government extension 
program dealt with different types of clients.  
Dissertation Organization 
     In Chapter 2, I introduce the debate within anthropology concerning development.  
This debate is important for creating a more critically engaged study of contemporary 
development projects, but must be integrated into larger debates about the role of 
globalization in local economic development.  I use a political economy framework to 
examine the goals of producers in regard to economic development.  
          In Chapter 3, I situate the movement to revitalize vanilla production within its 
historical, political and social context, in order to show how small producers in the 
region have long been active and well-informed protagonists. Their active and 
pragmatic response to their disappointment with COVER, therefore, has strong 
historical precedent.  For the last three hundred years, they have challenged the 
traditional division of labor that privileges curers and industrialists over small-scale 
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producers.  Through it all, these farmers survived as a culture with autonomous 
household networks, and today struggle to preserve a subsistence oriented system 
against large-scale cash cropping schemes.  Though vanilla had provided an 
important income that allowed them to balance subsistence production with cash 
needs, by the end of the 1990s --given low prices, environmental changes, 
exploitation and corruption-- producers were willing to move into other crops.  
Understanding the tension between producers and local elites explains why COVER’s 
founders hoped to address these injustices.  In order to get producers to bet on vanilla 
again, COVER had to provide some kind of incentive.  Development needed to be on 
their terms.   
       In Chapter 4, I describe COVER’s beginnings as a grassroots social movement 
and the tenure of its first president, Victor Vallejo. Before it came under the control 
of the state government, and before the curers and industrialists gained a controlling 
interest, COVER had the interests of small producers at its core.  I describe how 
Vallejo set out to tackle problems in the interests of small producers by addressing 
their concrete problems (like theft and corruption), and introducing innovative but 
sustainable and appropriate techniques of vanilla production. 
          In Chapter 5, I present the critiques of local anthropologists, program directors 
and business owners.  The interviewees express a range of views (on the role of 
culture in vanilla production and the role of government in development), but all are 
in some sense COVER’s detractors. Like critics of development in general, these 
individuals point out the need for development programs that take the social 
organization of participants into account, rather than implementing top-down 
18 
programs.  Their critique provides insight into why COVER fails to provide an 
alternative program and has reverted to a development apparatus with governmental 
and local corruption. 
         This chapter also describes a survey, which I conducted at the producers’ 
conference in May 2005. I use this data to talk about how strong traditions in social 
organization and production organization define the role of government programs for 
these farmers.  For generations these farmers have had a clear sense of justice in 
regard to their production and they continue to show this clarity in regard to the worth 
of their cash crops.  The farmers came to the conference seeking information from the 
government, but also with the intent of the government “seeing” their numbers, 
recognizing their role in the economy and helping them to create more direct access 
to the market.  They are willing to work with the government and in some cases 
believe the government can help them, but they do not depend on the government.  
The survey data confirm that the two families I studied in depth are typical of small-
scale vanilla producers. 
          In Chapters 6 and 7, I present data from case studies with two vanilla-
producing families, whose diversified economic strategies drive the program of 
alternative development.  The Lopez family occupies the “traditional” end of the 
production spectrum.  In a departure from strict traditionalism, they willingly 
incorporate new experimental techniques and have given daughters an equal share of 
the inheritance.  In making these changes, they negotiate between subsistence 
production and production for the market, between traditional and modern 
agricultural techniques.  At the same time, they invest household labor in their 
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subsistence and cash production and maintain an extended household with strong 
social and political ties to the community.   
          The Ramirez family is less traditional in their production and household 
structure.  They live in a single family home, with the nuclear family providing the 
primary labor in their cash crop production. Vanilla is only one of the enterprises they 
are involved in, one piece of an economic strategy that will allow them to remain in 
the Mexican countryside, rather than return to foreign migration.   
     These families illustrate the way producers manage economy in contrast to many 
stereotypes of the ‘poor’.  Though they have been accused of being bad capitalists 
since the 1700s, these stories show that they are adept at balancing between 
subsistence and market production.  They are not adverse to capitalism or market 
exchange, but must maintain much more diverse strategies to maintain their 
households.  Understanding the sophistication with which many of these producers 
organize their production is important to create a more complete picture of the 
relationship between development, globalization and movements to improve farmers’ 
access to both. 
          In Chapter 8, I describe the proceedings of the conference and some of the 
social movements represented there. COVER had organized the conference in 
response to growing demands from producers and pressure from businesses and state 
government; the conference was to bring together producers, industrialists and 
foreign businesses to develop the industry.  In the latter part of Chapter 8, I look at 
the strategies developed by both COVER and the International Farmers Network (a 
group organized after the conference) as a response to its proceedings.  Both groups 
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agree that new markets must be created but they have key differences.  For COVER, 
these new markets would be developed through government initiatives and 
production would be revitalized through grants and (primarily) shade house projects.  
For the ITFN, these new markets would be created through a vanilla market that 
would regulate quality and price and ultimately provide more direct relationships 
between producers and international buyers.  Today the main protagonist of 
alternative development is no longer COVER, but the small producers themselves.  
     This work is an ethnographically informed analysis of development and 
globalization.  This study describes development at the local level that is orchestrated 
by grassroots movements, the critiques of these movements and how these groups 
alter their development plans to address problems of political corruption.  The lives of 
individuals in these groups are described so that the variation of individuals in 
development organizations is understood.  There are reasons development projects 
fail, whether these projects are imposed from the outside or the result of grassroots 
efforts from the inside.  The use of a political economy framework is used to show 
how understanding the structures of power, within the community, the development 
agency and the global market shapes but does not limit producers options.  Producers 
respond to the failed development project by reorganizing on global terms, continuing 
to “bet” on vanilla as a good option in diversification of risk, especially in light of 
new social movements in global trade. 
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Chapter 2   Framework:  Commodity production in global development 
  “Indigenous people don’t have contacts with the international market.
 These  producers are fighting to achieve this.  We hope that someday,  
 they can market directly instead of through the intermediaries here  
 who monopolize business.  Producers have faith in vanilla.  It is a  
 matter of betting on vanilla that it will provide an income.  Producers  
 are not against technology or new ways, they are against  
 monopolies.”   Luis Luna, State Anthropologist 
  
          Vanilla farmers in the state of Veracruz, who have a long history working with 
state development agencies, are requesting a new kind of development project.  
Lately, these producers have articulated the need to create projects that bridge local 
production and global markets.  The projects that they are demanding illustrate the 
fact that they challenge the economic hierarchy well established in the vanilla 
business for over two hundred years: that of indigenous producers selling green 
vanilla at low prices to businessmen in the town of Papantla.   
          These farmers have produced vanilla as a commodity for distribution around 
the globe and are thus keenly aware of the need to balance local economic 
development with changes in global markets.  Their message has not changed much 
in the last two centuries (they want access to the market and they want a fair price), 
but what has changed is their approach to development.  These farmers’ access to 
buyers on the global market is changing.  It turns out that globalization may provide 
the fair trade they have desired all along; leaving development projects that fail to 
provide equitable relationships for growers behind.  As Luis Luna pointed out, 
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producers are working to create contacts with international markets and break 
century- old monopolies at the local level. 
 
Development  
     What is development?  Edelman and Haugerud point out that the term is unstable.  
Development is an imagined ideal, a destructive myth, opportunities and 
improvements in the well-being of individuals.  Development is also a discourse 
(Edelman and Haugerud 2005:1).  In the past, development has been taken for 
granted as the natural progression for underdeveloped nations.  Traditionally, 
development has been a matter of state-led investment and coordination (Kalb 2004).  
Today development is a matter of multilateral and bi-lateral agencies, non-profit non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and private consulting firms (Nolan 2002).   
     In the case of vanilla farmers in Papantla, Mexico, development has run the gamut 
of all these definitions.  These producers have participated in state led initiatives, 
worked with NGOs from the United States and Canada and sought information from 
private industry to build their businesses.  Development in this study is used to define 
all the activities, whether associated directly with government organizations or 
grassroots groups, that can be describe as an “effort to eradicate poverty” (Nolan 
2002:32).   
          Development around the world has been “a practice and discourse (that) 
embodies the European enlightenment’s implicit project of making specific local 
worldviews and values…into universals” (Blaser et al 2004:28).  This project often 
failed because governments were in the business of increasing production in rural 
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areas, rather than improving the standard of living.  Development was seen as a 
neocolonial discourse that reinvigorated dynamics of power in developing countries, 
rather than improving the lives of rural citizens.  Arturo Escobar, an anthropologist 
who is highly critical of conventional development programs, has a simple 
explanation for the dissatisfaction small producers have experienced up to this point, 
and for their need to keep pressing demands. According to Escobar, it is in the very 
nature of development programs to favor local elites and international corporations, 
and in general to favor a “neocolonial” agenda (Escobar 2005; Escobar 1995). It 
would come as no surprise to him in this case that decades of government-sponsored 
development had done little to improve the lot of small-scale vanilla producers.  
      
          Of course, Escobar and like-minded critics of conventional development 
programs, like J. Ferguson (1997) and M. Hobart (1993), have their detractors. 
Olivier de Sardan, for example, faults them for being too ideologically-driven (not 
empirical enough) and for holding a monolithic and unfair image of the development 
enterprise as a whole (Olivier de Sardan 2005:5).  Sardan believes these critics are 
excessively discursive – in that they provide a needed critique of development, but 
create an unfortunate gap between discourse and practice.  He argues that these 
critics’ “deconstruction” of the development agenda does not yield a productive, 
comprehensive strategy for achieving economic goals.  Escobar’s typology and 
critique are valuable, but ultimately incomplete.    
          Some critics of development are ideological and methodological populists, 
valuing local knowledge over technical knowledge. Sardan argues that ideological 
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populism often errs when a romantic view of local knowledge overshadows the need 
for outside innovation.  However, he argues that a methodological populism can be 
useful when the approach allows for inclusion of “groups and social actors that have 
knowledge and strategies that should be explored, without commenting on their value 
or validity” (Olivier de Sardan 2005:9).  This latter approach to local knowledge 
refrains from valuing one source of knowledge over the other and posits a 
“multiplicity of norms” (Olivier de Sardan 2005:16).   
         Critics like Escobar argue that change must be based on community and 
indigenous knowledge (Esteva 1998, Sachs 1992, Seligson 1998).  I accept their 
stance, but also argue that it is not enough to argue that development should be 
bottom-up or based on ‘local social logic’; local knowledge must be pragmatically 
applied to the shifting landscape of political and economic power.  Recent 
anthropologists, with more nuanced approaches to the development issue, (Nolan 
2002, Crew and Harrison 1998, Lawson and Little 1995) argue for a critically-
engaged anthropology that is involved in both the implementation and critique of 
development projects.  If development, as Escobar argues, depends on the “object of 
development, controlling the terms of encounter,” then anthropology must play a role 
in the developing models and implementing new programs that make that practical. 
          Gardner and Lewis have also brought nuance to the discussion, proposing that 
development must be understood as a dynamic construct.  They argue that we should 
take development aid as a given and work to develop ways to use anthropological 
studies to critique, improve and suggest alternatives to traditional development 
projects:  “both by those working within them (who can help to challenge and unpick 
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central assumptions and practice) and by those working outside (by revealing 
alternative understanding of the world and alternative processes of change)” 
(1996:24).  For Gardner and Lewis, development studies are essentially about 
poverty, which they define as “a social relationship, the result of inequality, 
marginalization and disempowerment” (1996:25).  They encourage anthropologists 
not to give up on development.   
          Other promising research in the field of development has tried to connect issues 
of poverty and economic power to modernity’s obsession with “progress” (Grillo and 
Stirrat 1997; Arce and Long 2000; Kalb 2004).  Kalb, for example, looks at recent 
research on development and argues that neoliberal assumptions about development 
must be replaced with a situational understanding: that instead of assuming all 
peoples are on a similar development scheme of ‘progress,’ researchers should look at 
people’s situated agency in time and space.  Such an understanding, he argues, must 
take into account the structure of poverty: the ways in which local economic and 
social systems developed in relation to internal and external influences.  Once 
researchers can describe the structural constraints within which people make a living, 
they are then in a position to understand the agency of these individuals and 
communities and design appropriate development plans with local input and 
resources. 
          Given contemporary global markets, anthropology is needed more than ever to 
point out the “significance of complex, often hidden relationships.” (Kalb 2004:152)  
For researchers like Kalb, anthropology should get involved in development because 
poverty is not culturally relative.  By this, they mean that understanding poverty and 
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development sheds light on the relationships between people and systems that create 
poverty:  “Anthropology promotes an attitude and an outlook: a stance which 
encourages those working in development to listen to other people’s stories, to pay 
attention to alternative points of view and to new ways of seeing and doing” (Kalb 
2004:167).   
          In response to the critiques of Escobar and others, Nolan calls for a new 
paradigm that would produce a “kind of ‘cosmopolitan localism’: where local 
problems could be addressed in ways compatible with the solution of more global 
issues.” (Nolan 2002: 270).  In this new paradigm, development projects are to create 
sensitive models and processes that use local resources and people to carry them out.  
This process is to involve people in the decisions that affect their lives and connect 
them to others across the planet.  These new projects, because they are based on local 
decisions, needs and resources, would be sustainable --both environmentally and 
institutionally.  Finally, these new projects would be considered learning models, with 
everyone involved understanding the results of each stage of the project and 
collaborate to improve future projects (Nolan 2002).  Applied to the case of vanilla 
producers, this new paradigm incorporates the ideals of COVER (equity for 
producers) while building direct relationships between producers and the market, 
overcoming the problems of local power dynamics. 
          In contrast to Escobar and his critics (and in keeping with Nolan’s paradigm), I 
will be advocating a pragmatic alternative: one that goes beyond a simple embrace or 
rejection of development and globalization.  
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Founding Alternative Development:  COVER and Producer’s Needs 
     In this study, the agents who work for COVER, along with the producers it serves 
and even its critics, exemplify the different groups that Arturo Escobar has described 
in his article “Anthropology and Development” (2001). Escobar is a strong critic of 
the development schemes that have been carried out by agencies (and some 
anthropologists) in the latter half of the 20th Century, and he refers to them 
collectively as the “development apparatus.”  The anthropologists who serve these 
Western development agencies he refers to as the “social technicians” of the 
apparatus, or development anthropologists. I will argue that COVER under its past 
two directors (though not in its foundational phase) fit this description of a 
development apparatus.  
          It is interesting to note that while Escobar is critical of anthropologists working 
in development, it is n fact Mexican anthropologists that articulate a critique of 
COVER that resonates with Escobar.  None of the Mexican anthropologists that I 
encountered, though, could be described as “development anthropologists.” In fact, 
none of the ones I spoke to had ever worked for COVER, and all of them are critics 
of state-sponsored development schemes like it. They exemplify Escobar’s second 
category: that of the anthropologists of development, where the preposition of 
suggests a critical distance from development schemes that those working within the 
institutions do not have.  Significantly, these anthropologists have experience 
working with indigenous vanilla producers, but have not been included in COVER 
programs.  They see the current administration of the agency and its programs as 
corrupt.  They argue that COVER fails to support the “true” producers of vanilla, 
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indigenous farmers, since it implements programs that are inaccessible and not easily 
adaptable to rural lifestyles.  However, these individuals were not included as part of 
the implementation of COVER.  Many of the problems they predicted came true.   
 
          Escobar’s third category pertains to what he calls a post-development ethos. I 
prefer the phrase alternative development, which Gardner and Lewis use (1996: ix) to 
suggest the same process of moving beyond the “econocentric” and “technocentric” 
ideals that have all too often guided state-sponsored development projects: economic 
growth at the expense of sustainability; and the promotion of expensive, untested 
techniques. Such a grassroots ideal spurred the founding of the agency, but 
subsequently faded from the agenda.  Though COVER failed to provide an alternative 
development, it is important to recognize that this was the intent of the founders.  
That it failed points to the problems of development critiques, namely a lack of a 
practical scheme to guide alternative development.   
          In the last seven years, COVER has had three different administrations, which 
can be distinguished from each other in terms of the development goals.  The first 
director saw development in populist terms and believed the role of COVER was to 
make the intensification process available to as many campesinos1 as possible.  He 
was adamantly opposed to government corruption and worked to create programs that 
were accessible and fair.  Because of his populist preference for local and small-
producer interests, his administration deserves to be considered an attempt at 
                                                 
1
 Campesino is the term now used by most people to refer to rural peasants, whether they are 
indigenous or not.  Though many townspeople consider rural residents to all be indios, and use the 
term in a derogatory manner,  they themselves distinguish between campesinos and indios.  Many of 
these campesinos no longer speak Totonac or wear the traditional clothing and refer to themselves as 
campesinos. 
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“alternative development” in the sense that Gardner and Lewis use the phrase.   It was 
during the administrations of the following two directors, who were unable to hold on 
to local control over the agency’s decision-making, that a shift of COVER programs 
became evident to both producers and local agronomists and anthropologists.   
         
Globalization 
          Key to the critical engagement that these researchers call for is an 
understanding of how the issue of development is embedded within that of 
globalization.  What is missing in Escobar and Olivier’s critique is an engagement 
with globalization.  They are right that development to be successful must be planned 
with local knowledge but development can no longer be understood in local terms.  
Development is embedded in a global system of economies, politics, technology and 
social and cultural systems.  According to Edelman and Haugerud, development 
debates have fused with globalization debates.  It is impossible to critically engage 
with the issue of development without engaging the over-arching issue of 
globalization. And the same nuance that recent anthropologists are applying to the 
issue of development carries over: a simple rejection or embrace of globalization is as 
untenable as a simple embrace or rejection of development projects. 
          It is a matter of public record that until the 1970s, development was about state-
led investment and policy coordination (Kalb 2004).  But with the economic crises of 
the 1980s, development became more of a matter of global regulation --as nation 
states became more indebted.  It was at that point that the IMF and World Bank 
became debt collections agencies.  With large debts accumulating in developing 
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countries, policies within the IMF and the World Bank changed, given that 
“refinancing was meant to turn countries into competitive recipients of foreign 
finance and investments, turn them into profitable exporters and re-shape the state 
and welfare institutions into efficient service providers, for market-oriented 
‘employable states’ primary function of servicing external debts” (Kalb 2004: 2).  
Edelman and Haugerud state that:   
Development in the recent decades has come to overlap with globalization in the 
following sense: institutional changes in the global economy and the financial system 
accompanied a gradual redefinition of “development’ itself in the 1970s, with large 
institutions such as the World Bank shifting their forces from economic specialization 
within a national framework to specialization in a world economy, thus for the Bank, 
development became ‘participation’ in the world market.” (2005:17) 
 
     When these states were unable to keep up with their debt, their economies stalled 
and their governments became obsessed with how to manage their economy in terms 
of global markets, rather than national needs.  This was a troubling change, given that 
development became less about local needs and more about a nation’s ability to 
maneuver within a larger system.  It is at this point that “development had become a 
sub-theme to the practice of ideology of globalization” (Kalb 2004: 2).  McMichael 
argues that national governments “still pursue development goals, but these goals 
have more to do with global positioning then with management of the national 
‘household’” (2000:150).  In Mexico, this is reflected in trade treaties, such as 
NAFTA, that focus on international trade sometimes at the expense of local enterprise 
and trade.  Farmers in Mexico since the opening of borders have found it hard to 
compete with U.S. farmers, especially in staple crops such as corn.  While 
development projects are still implemented in the countryside, such as the case of 
COVER, these projects are not a part of a comprehensive project to globalize 
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Mexican farmers.  Mexican economic policy embraces neoliberal economic 
sentiment, leaving small farmers on their own to compete, sometimes with large 
agribusiness from both within the nation and outside the borders. 
 The debate on globalization:  Globalization is not a new phenomenon, but the pace at 
which economies interact (and the impact of the interaction between these various 
economies and state systems) has increased.  While this study is not about 
globalization but about development, it is important to understand the debate between 
globalization opponents and proponents.  Many of the same arguments that have been 
made within anthropology concerning development are also made in reference to 
globalization.  Both development and globalization as economic phenomenon were 
seen as positive economic stimulators that would improve standards of living by 
making resources and communication accessible to developing nations.  
Globalization was understood as the great equalizer, with everyone having equal 
access to the ‘free market’ (Wells et al 2001).  It has not worked out his way. Even 
though globalization has made materials, ideas and technology more accessible 
throughout the world, it has not proven to be an equalizer; there is now more 
hierarchy both between and within states (Kalb 2004).  Development was conceived 
of similarly:  through the process of development, post World War II countries and 
undeveloped countries would progress along similar lines as the developed, industrial 
West.  As the critique of Escobar et al shows, this was a problematic assumption. 
          Opponents of globalization argued that it promoted hegemony on a larger scale.  
Given the pace of globalization, rapid change created subordination of local 
economies to global trade and investments.  And it is true that human rights, 
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environmental rights, democracy and culture have been victims of progress and 
instability.  Countries that attempt to compete on the global market have entered “a 
race to the bottom” (Wells 2001:36), as employment, wages, working conditions are 
altered to make companies more competitive.  Concurrently, developing countries 
have suffered from environmental and health degradation, as corporations focus on 
competition (Wells et al 2001).   
          On the other hand, proponents of globalization argue that it is not possible to 
stop the influence of global markets and competition --and that protectionism is not 
only harmful to an economy, but ultimately impossible to enforce.  They argue, 
therefore, that globalization should be embraced as an opportunity to create more 
choice for consumers across the globe.  They also see in globalization the most 
effective means for pressuring governments to change; a chance to create 
international procedures, make trade more transparent, and encourage more 
democratic methods (Wells et al 2001). 
          There are, of course, alternative visions of what globalization can be. 
Sandbrook, for example, offers a vision of globalization quite different from the 
unregulated global market. He argues that a global economy should be regulated in 
the same way that Europeans regulate national economies --with alliances between 
social movements, labor unions, NGOs, and U.N. institutions to push for 
democratization of global markets (Sandbrook 2003).  His vision is consonant with 
those who argue for a “globalization from below,” with collaboration among 
participants. But the debate is still a polarized one.  Some define globalization is the 
shrinking world where national borders are becoming less important to trade, where 
33 
interdependence is accelerated as interregional power relations are reordered and 
intensified (Held 2000).  For them, it is “an expression of deeper structural changes in 
the scale of modern social organization” (Held 2002:5).  Opponents, meanwhile, see 
these structural relationships as further expanded by a system that is distributed and 
accessed unevenly (Held 2002) 
          I take globalization to be an important window for understanding the local –not 
something that stands in opposition to it.  Globalization is “social, economic, cultural 
and demographic processes that take place within nations but also transcend them, 
such that attention limited to local processes, identities and units of analysis yields 
incomplete understanding of the local” (Kearney 1995:548).  It does not replace 
national economic and political planning, in spite of the changing focus of national 
governments from national development to an alignment within larger economic 
forces.  Gilpin argues that although the pace of globalization has increased in recent 
years, it is not globalization that determines the strength and direction of the 
economy.  He argues that domestic economies and national policies still remain key 
determinants of economic affairs, and uses the term “political economy” to 
encompass the interaction of the market with powerful actors: national governments, 
nation-states, financial firms and international organizations.  In order to understand 
the political economy, one must understand two issues. First, one must consider that 
the interests and policies of the state are determined by governing political elites and 
powerful groups. Secondly, one must remember that the economic foreign policies of 
a nation are defined by the interests of the dominant elite of the state.  Gilpin suggests 
that the concept of “globalization” becomes a scapegoat of sorts, to deflect blame for 
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social inequities away from the feet of national governments.  The fact is that national 
governments are powerful players, and globalization is about their interaction with 
the global market.   
 
Development Embedded Within Globalization:  Political Economic Framework 
          In this study, I take political economy to be the best framework for 
investigating the intersection of local and global economies.  Ethnographic studies of 
production are important for understanding the ways that rapid globalization is 
experienced in specific locations, and how projects designed to alleviate poverty are 
implemented and perceived.  Whether we are participants in a “post-development” 
era or responsible for reforms in the anthropology of development, political economy 
provides a powerful “analytical tool for integration culture, power, history and 
economy into an analytical framework (Edelman and Haugerud 2005:20).  In this 
case, political economy provides the tool for critically engaging with both 
development and globalization issues, something missing in earlier discussions of 
development.   
          In this study, production provides a contemporary arena from which to observe 
the impact of the global market on the everyday lives of producers in developing 
countries.  The production of goods, in this case vanilla, exemplifies larger social 
structures, “Commodities existed in precapitalist economies, are culturally defined 
and molded and are embedded in political and social systems which they both reflect 
and help to shape.” (Haugerud 2000:9)  Likewise, Appadurai’s work on the social life 
of things raises the issue of the relationship between exchange of commodities and 
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social life --in particular, the relationship between value, economics and political 
power.  Appadurai argues that is not the exchange that is important but what the 
exchange says about the political nature of social value.  He states that “commodities 
have a social life” (1986:3).  By this he means that exchange is reflective of the social 
and political relationships found within the economic system of production, 
distribution and consumption.  By looking at the relationship between actors within 
each of these systems, one is able to better understand the hierarchy of power 
between actors (and/or institutions).   
     COVER was founded initially to address long held concerns about the inequity 
between producers and local businessmen.  This study shows how producers worked 
to build an alternative development project to address these power dynamics, why the 
project failed and how producers are currently reorganizing to overcome powerful 
structural bias.  The long history of vanilla production in this region and 
contemporary attempts to change exchange between producers and the market 
exemplify the economic “social life” these producers are attempting to overcome.  
The study of commodity production, distribution and consumption allows for an 
important mediation between the global and the local:  commodities are embedded in 
local social, political and economic systems, and connect these systems to others.   
          I use this study of vanilla production to examine the mutually-embedded nature 
of development and globalization, as these issues play out in the lives of small-scale 
producers.  In the case of the movement to intensify vanilla production, COVER 
started as an alternative development project that called for a bottom-up approach.  
COVER sought to address two important issues regarding production intensification: 
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corruption and environmental change.  The fact that COVER has failed to deal with 
these problems in a long-term sustainable way is borne out in the voices of critics, 
producers and COVER founders, and is due to subsequent changes in the agency’s 
policies.  Producers participate in COVER projects while at the same time are openly 
critical of them and keep as many options open as possible.  The shortcoming of this 
movement was its failure to create a stable lasting mechanism for addressing 
corruption and environmental changes once the charismatic leader was no longer in 
an administrative position.  Though COVER was organized to address the inequity of 
the system (bottom-up), there was not enough support at higher levels to sustain this 
approach.  Corruption has been endemic to those development programs that are 
headed up by state agencies and COVER’s lack of infrastructure as a bottom-up 
development project meant that it was too weak a force to overcome this legacy. 
          Producers believe that both traditional systems and new innovation play a role 
in the vanilla industry.  What these producers (and the critics of COVER) object to is 
corruption, whether it comes in the form of government nepotism or mishandling of 
funds or exploitation at the hands of local elites.  They ask that the government and 
other actors in the industry deal them a fair hand.  Given local structures of power and 
the government’s lack of concern for local needs, COVER was easily dominated by 
local business elites.  Given the power dynamics, in particular large companies’ 
connections with government grants, producers were not able to maintain control over 
“the encounter”.  The state allowed local elites to co-opt the development process.  
The ability to access the market became a rallying point for a new movement.  
Globalization is a two-edged process: the need to compete on a global market makes 
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the state less aware of local needs, but it may offer access to a fair market that local 
elites have not been willing to participate in.     
           
           Given the mutually-embedded nature of development and globalization, and 
the need for nuance, I argue for a pragmatic approach. Within the framework of 
political economy, I am seeking to go beyond a simple rejection or embrace of the 
twin issues of development and globalization. My study will show how small-scale 
vanilla producers in the Mexican state of Veracruz are working out their own 
pragmatic, nuanced approach.  These producers are aware of the dangers of an 
unregulated, corporation-dominated global marketplace, but they are also aware of 
the shortcomings of the traditional Mexican state and fed up with local development 
projects that do not serve their needs. In response, they are discovering the 
possibilities for new forms of grassroots organization and the positive developments 
within global markets themselves. As the local anthropologist Luis Luna puts it, small 
producers are willing to “bet on” vanilla.  This bet is embedded in both development 
on their own terms and access to the global market. 
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Chapter 3 Situating Vanilla:  Production in the “City the Perfumed the World.” 
 
In the time of King Teniztli the III, ruler of the Totonacs, one of his wives 
gave  
birth to a girl, to whom was given the name TZACOPONTZIZA (“Morning  
Star”).  Because of her singular beauty, she was consecrated to the worship of 
the  
goddess Totonacayohua, guardian of planting, bread and food.  But a prince  
named ZTATAN-OXGA (“Young Deer”) fell in love with her, even though 
he  
knew that such a sacrilege was punishable by death.  One day, as Morning 
Star  
was leaving the temple, he kidnapped her, fleeing with her to the mountain.  
On  
the way, a monster covered them in waves of flame, causing them to retreat to  
where the priests were angrily waiting for them.  Before ZKATAN was able 
to  
say a word, he was beheaded in one blow, and the princess suffered the same 
fate.   
Their hearts were then cast into the altar of the goddess.  There the grass 
began to  
dry.  From their blood, months later, a bush began to spring up, covered with  
dense foliage, giving birth to a climbing orchid with amazing speed and  
exuberance; perfuming the environment with its aroma.   
 
(Taken from a mural depicting the leyenda de vainilla, on the walls of the  
SuperAlan grocery store in Papantla) 
 
 
The Legend of Vanilla:   
Though the origins of this legend are not known, it is interesting to note how 
versions later than this one include an element of class conflict –the daughter of the 
king being off-limits to her more plebeian suitor.  In the earlier version cited above, 
the suitor is presumably of the same class, though Morning Star has been elevated in 
stature by being dedicated to a goddess.  The formula changes in more contemporary 
versions, where the relationship is portrayed as a mutual love interest developed 
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between the king’s daughter and a commoner (Rain 2005, Ecott 2005).  Regardless of 
the version, one element is constant.  Vanilla forms from the blood of the slain lovers, 
from the scene of conflict. 
          Understanding the history of vanilla, and the ways in which vanilla producers 
have been willing to organize, reveals that there are precedents for the most recent 
movement to revitalize production.  Totonac farmers in this region were the first 
producers to cultivate vanilla as a commodity.  Vanilla was not an item used in the 
local medicinal or food traditions but formed one of the most important commodity 
crops, along with tobacco, that indigenous producers used to balance a subsistence 
oriented economy.  When the livelihood of these producers, individually or 
collectively, was threatened by local elites or government interference, they were 
willing and able to organize.  The myth of vanilla illustrates the role of conflict from 
the beginning.  
  I witnessed this conflict as recently as December 2005, shortly after the 
official cutting date. Producers began to meet to discuss low market prices.  
Newspaper articles, visitors to the extension program offices, and protestors at the 
ayuntamiento (town hall) decried the low prices being paid for green vanilla beans 
and demanded something be done about it.  A few months later (in late May 2006) 
2,000 producers, government agencies, private business gather at the First 
International Vanilla Producers Conference in Papantla Veracruz.  The producers 
were eager to learn about techniques and government resources to improve their 
crops, learn about outside markets, voice their grievances about corruption and 
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middlemen, and show the government that there are a significant number of 
producers who are serious about this export crop.   
 
The historical background of this region foreshadows the sentiments of a 
social movement that called on the government to support an alternative approach to 
development: one based on local autonomy.  To understand the relationship between 
development projects and producers, it is important to take stock of the long history 
of these producers, and their role in shaping economic relationships around them.   
  
 
Colonial Papantla: A Legacy of Uprisisng 
  Some say the history of Papantla is synonymous with the history of vanilla.  
But it is more complex than that.  Papantla has been the center of commodity 
production, export markets and wage labor for three centuries.  Tobacco, maize, wax, 
sugar and oil have all been important sources of income for small holders.  Vanilla is 
undoubtedly an important cash crop in this region, but small-scale farmers have long 
diversified their production.  To this day, farmers balance subsistence production with 
cash crop production in a sustainable manner.  Vanilla, though important, is but one 
part of the equation act and vanilla was not the first cash crop these producers used to 
shore up their mixed economy.   
These small-scale producers around Papantla (Totonacs for the most part) 
survived colonial New Spain as fairly autonomous households.  A combination of 
low population density and rough landscapes prohibited the establishment of large 
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scale haciendas under the colonial government.  For this reason, until independence 
most Totonac families were subsistence farmers with access to enough land to 
support their households (Ducey 1999, Kouri 2005), and on occasion challenged local 
class hierarchy and external imposition of market controls (Frederick 2005).  Such 
was their response to the 1764 tobacco monopoly, which threatened autonomous 
farmers --and to which they responded immediately. 
The subsequent 1767 uprising took place because smallholders at the time 
depended on tobacco for cash income.  These households were headed by subsistence 
farmers who produced the food their families consumed, but needed cash to purchase 
items their families no longer produced (cloth, medicine).  Tobacco was considered a 
“democratic crop” because it was easy for producers to grow and process with 
household labor (Frederick 2005:75).  During the time of the Bourbon reforms, there 
were no trade organizations for tobacco growers, so it was difficult to organize 
against new laws established by the government.  So the law passed that year in effect 
“criminalized a major means of native subsistence” (Frederick 2005:76). 
The government of New Spain had initially failed to understand the economic 
significance of tobacco and did not regulate production until the passage of this 
monopoly law  –at which time itcreated a quota system and restricted independent 
production, ordering the year’s harvest to be gathered by local mayors and burned.  In 
Papantla, the Totonac farmers followed the law and brought their crop into town and 
turned it over to the mayor.  However, they returned to the building later and set it on 
fire.  Although no records exist from the time, witnesses of the 1767 uprising describe 
the tobacco monopoly.  The monopoly was successful for the Spanish crown 
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financially, but this marked a moment where producers lost their “tolerance for local 
threat to their autonomy and economic viability” (Frederick 2005:83).  This was the 
beginning of a collective sense of justice that guided leaders and community members 
to question further encroachments on their independence.  The tobacco monopoly was 
not the first time these farmers had seen their lands, labor and livelihood encroached 
upon.   
The system of labor that local elites oversaw during the colonial period was 
called the repartimiento: a system that placed forced-labor demands on the native 
population, restricted their access to outside goods, and limited producers’ ability to 
market outside the area.  The system was officially banned by the crown but thrived 
in rural areas where local officials were law.  In the 1700s, repartimientos in Papantla 
forced tobacco, vanilla and fruit producers to sell locally at prices set by the 
middlemen.  On record are eight formal complaints about local repartimientos 
(Frederick 2005).  People saw this system as unjust but it was the tobacco monopoly 
that provoked the most violent response and led to a period of social unrest.  The 
burning of the monopoly building in 1764 was followed by uprisings in Papantla in 
1767, 1787, 1813 and 1820-21.  Each of these uprisings was set off by unique events, 
but ultimately it was a sense of injustice that fueled each event. 
In addition the 1767 uprising, many Totonacs also responded to the monopoly 
law by establishing new communities and producing contraband crops.  The leader of 
one of these groups was jailed in Papantla and , for unknown reasons, the authorities 
decided to move the rebel leader, Olmos, in the middle of the night to Mexico City.  
When locals found out about the plans, they responded with violence, surrounding the 
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houses of the jefes reales and threatening more violence if Olmos was not returned to 
them.  In 1787, Totonacs took over the town and protested unjust rule.  They cited 
both the tobacco monopoly and unequal relations with Spanish residents and leaders.  
This was an outbreak that had been building for many years, beginning with the loss 
of autonomy brought on by tobacco quotas, and to the division of labor created by the 
imposed repartimientos (Ducey 1999). 
In a very general sense during the colonial period, conflict was a response to 
local abuse at the hands of non-indigenous elites.  The crown was always dependent 
on the production of rural workers, and could therefore never push too hard.  And it 
was abuse at the local level that led to protest and uprisings.  Producers seemed 
willing to be incorporated into larger systems and markets, but had a communal 
understanding of justice.  They understood the difference between incorporation as 
autonomous individuals into a market system and exploitation of their labor and 
resources by elites, local or otherwise.   
As the colonial period was ending and independence was on the horizon, 
indigenous households were experiencing more limits and restrictions on their 
subsistence.  They had survived the major part of colonial rule as autonomous 
producers with access to land.  They shared a sense of justice and had a long history 
of organizing collectively to protect their rights.  Complexities notwithstanding, 
citizens of Papantla supported independence from New Spain and saw the new 
constitution as legal protection from local inequity. 
   
Cultivation of Vanilla during the Colonial Period 
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Though most or all of the vanilla in the world during colonial times came 
from New Spain, it was most likely not formally cultivated until the mid 18th century.  
Before this time, wild beans were collected in the forests from northern Veracruz to 
as far south as Oaxaca.  But as demand increased, producers needed to insure 
guarantees of a more consistent fruit and harvest.  The first plants were cultivated in 
the 1760s in the state of Veracruz when Totonacs started integrating it into their 
agricultural cycle.  Alexander Von Humboldt, for example, wrote that the Indians 
wanted to reduce gathering time and planted in less space. Cultivation addressed the 
problems of relying on an uncertain wild crop but may have created a new problem in 
regard to land usage and tenure.  Totonac farmers soon became the largest producers 
of vanilla beans.  In the wild, vanilla is gathered off the vines after it has fermented 
and turned brown and fragrant.  Once vanilla was cultivated, a technique to cure the 
beans in a manner that protected more of the essential oils and fragrance was 
developed (Kouri 2005).   
The curing process became the art referred to as the beneficio, and its 
operations were owned by Spanish residents in Papantla: businessmen that marketed 
the beans for export.  By the late 1700s, a clear division of labor had emerged.  
Totonacs grew vanilla and sold green vanilla beans to Spanish merchants in Papantla.  
These merchants cured the beans and exported them to Europe and eventually the 
U.S.  The profit margin was not equally divided between the producer and the 
merchants.  But vanilla did provide a good option in their already mixed economy, 
especially once the tobacco monopoly limited their production and sale of that 
important crop (Kouri 2005).  As demand increased and production intensified, land 
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became more valuable. The push for privatization of vanilla lands threatened the 
autonomy of Totonac producers and touched off a new series of protests and violence.  
These households had maintained their autonomy and access to land throughout 
colonial times.  They were successful subsistence farmers within a mixed economy 
and had balanced economic needs as individuals and communities.  They had 
responded to unjust rule by local authorities through collective action and violence, 
had been forced to give up tobacco, and had established a successful cultivation of a 
wild plant.  The popularity of vanilla created the real possibility that they might lose 
their land which would cripple their households and communities.   
           In the late 18th Century, most of Mexico’s export of vanilla for Europe came 
from Misantla and Colipa further south.  Wild vanilla was an unstable business.  The 
producers, more aptly named “gatherers,” were dependent on proper amounts of rain, 
humidity and heat, on the availability of vines in their forested areas and, at times, 
were victims of competition or outright theft.  Merchants could never know what kind 
of crop might surface from the forest that year and they did not have reliable access to 
outside markets.  Initially, profits in the vanilla market, while good, were variable.  
When demand from Europe increased, the logical move for producers and merchants 
alike was to attempt to control production.   
 Cultivation allowed for some measure of control over the process of 
producing vanilla.  For farmers, they could bring the plants closer to home, making it 
easier to integrate care for the orchards into other agricultural activities and provide 
them with some measure of security over theft.  For local merchants, cultivation 
meant a harvest they could count on and the ability to build relationships with 
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particular producers.  But what cultivation did not do was to instantly create a huge 
export business.  By and large, vanilla was a cash crop like many other crops, 
integrated into the agricultural cycle and used to supplement a largely subsistence 
oriented lifestyle.  However, vanilla had advantages over other crops. 
 Vanilla was unique.  Farmers in the Papantla basin survived colonization as 
fairly autonomous groups because of the difficulty in establishing large scale 
haciendas in the rough terrain of the dense tropical forests, and because of low 
population density.  This same terrain also made trade more difficult for households.  
Vanilla was a good commodity to integrate into their agricultural cycles because it 
was both transportable and could be cultivated using household labor.  This is what 
made vanilla the perfect cash crop for subsistence-oriented farmers.  But vanilla had 
further potential too.  Vanilla was so valuable that it was the first commodity that 
provided the opportunity to create capital for producers and merchants alike.   
 Emilio Kouri has argued that it is this potential that led to major changes in 
the social organization of Papantla, and the conflicts described in his work are a 
historical precedent for much of the conflict protagonized by contemporary 
producers.  In the same way that producers in the 1700-1800s complained about 
unfair business practices of local elites, producers today call for justice in their 
dealings with descendants of many of the same elites.  Producers are also looking for 
ways to forge more direct relationships with the market and by-pass local elite 
altogether.  For this reason, I will use his work to outline the history of vanilla in 
Papantla, creating an historical skeleton.  This skeleton not only explains how vanilla 
developed as a commodity and how social relations were forever altered, but also 
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explains why the industry functions as it does today and in more particular why local 
citizens have formulated particular discourse in regard to production and the market  
(Kouri 2005). 
 While vanilla during the late 1700s and early 1800s was not a big business in 
Papantla, “tiny was not the same as insignificant” (2005:82).  Before vanilla, cash 
crops were traded locally and did not provide much opportunity for the accumulation 
of capital.  For this reason, the Spanish population in the area was marginal.  Totonac 
households were able to maintain their subsistence lifestyles.  They had access to 
land.  Vanilla changed all this.  Cultivation of vanilla created a potential for great 
profits.  The possibility of wealth meant that non-natives moved into the area to take 
advantage of business opportunities.  As demand increased, production increased and 
businesses looked for ways to increase their profits, especially by creating more direct 
relationships to export.  Initially, Papantla merchants were dependent on export 
business in the port of Veracruz for trade.  This changed as the market in Europe 
grew.   
 For seven decades, vanilla produced in Papantla accounted for only ten 
percent of Mexico’s export to Europe.  After independence, Papantla began to 
increase production at the same time that production in Misanlta and Colipa began to 
decline.  The violent transition in Misanlta may have crippled the business 
community to such an extent that they were not able to recover.  As described 
previously, Papantla was not without 18th century conflict.  The citizens, while 
willing to act collectively to protest against unjust public officials, were highly 
stratified among themselves (Ducey 1999, Frederick 2006).  Social stratification and 
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tensions were not limited to native non-native struggles, but included a hierarchical 
stratification among Totonacs.  
 Other historians have pointed out that Totonac households survived colonial 
governance as autonomous farmers.  But perhaps what is more significant is that they 
survived colonial rule without becoming victims of the colonial state.  In areas where 
haciendas controlled large tracts of land, indigenous communities were organized by 
the colonial government into corporate communities.  These collectivities were 
considered by the state to be cohesive units.  The case of Totonac households 
provides evidence of what a culturally-inappropriate scheme this was.  The 
assumption that indigenous communities could be easily organized into corporate 
units of likeminded individuals with common origins and common goals has been 
problematic since colonial rule; what is significant about Papantla is that it was 
spared colonial organization into a corporate community, a collective unit as defined 
by the rulers.   
 If we take it for granted that these producers are really individuals from 
households that belong to particular communities with varying histories, varying 
degrees of wealth, and varying degrees of resources, we begin to see how the 
development of vanilla as an industry and the changes in social relations are not 
surprising in the least.  We can also see how the division of labor established early on 
in the industry persists to this day and why producers are willing to give up on the 
potential of vanilla if those relations remain unjust. 
          Between 1760 and 1790, the average export for all of Mexico was only 1,000 to 
3,000 kilograms, of which Papantla produced only ten percent.  However, between 
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1820 and 1870, vanilla production in Papantla began to increase steadily.  During the 
decades following Independence, the town would produce over 6, 000 kilograms, thus 
contributing  about fifty percent of Mexico’s export.   
 Selling any amount of vanilla was a profitable business for Totonac farmers.  
It was a crop that was easy to add to their agricultural duties.  Once established in an 
orchard it could be maintained with household labor.  Though there was a lack of 
roads and basic infrastructure in this part of the state, it was easy enough to transport 
this lightweight product.  Totonacs were subsistence farmers with access to land who 
produced most of the food and many of the other items their households needed.  
Vanilla was a useful crop that provided the cash they needed for consumer items, 
festivals or medical needs.  Individuals were free to participate in the market at 
whatever level they deemed necessary.  Kouri states it best; they “chose to remain 
first and foremost milpa farmers.”  (2004:101).   This was hard for the Spanish 
merchants to understand. 
 Merchants complained that doing business with Indian producers was a waste 
of cash, as producers did not reinvest income.  They were accused of burying their 
money, the implication being they did not understand the market economy.  A good 
consumer made money so as to purchase more goods and keep money circulating.  As 
far as these merchants were concerned, Indians didn’t understand the larger 
dynamics. But what is more likely is that these households not only did understand, 
but had a pragmatic knowledge of the economy, both their subsistence economy and 
the new market one.  They established a delicate balance between the two that lasts 
until today.   
50 
 Area merchants may not have understood the producers, but they did 
understand the market.  These Spanish-born businessmen knew that the business was 
chaotic and their success depended on more control.  Though cultivation made 
harvesting vanilla somewhat more systematic, local merchants were not in control of 
export.  And they were dependent on outside exporters for information about value.  
They also had to compete with speculators (both Indian and non-Indian), brokers and 
thieves.  Vanilla was valuable and the business was hard to regulate.  Even with these 
difficulties though, vanilla was worth the trouble.  For subsistence oriented farmers, it 
provided cash for consumer needs.  For non-native entrepreneurs, it was an 
opportunity to create capital and build an industry in an untapped market.  Producers 
had to worry about protecting their crops and finding non-exploitative relationships 
with buyers.  Businesses had to worry about securing cheap but quality products, 
creating high quality cured vanilla and controlling more of the export side of the 
business.   
 
The 19th Century: Independence and Land-Ownership Concentration 
 
          Independence-era Mexico in general had economic problems, but Veracruz was 
an exceptional case –and vanilla is a good example of what accounted for the 
difference. The state had long been established as the key port for trade, and 
Independence did not alter this situation. Producers and merchants in Papantla had 
established trade with Europe, which had increased steadily. Nevertheless, 
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development continued to disproportionately benefit the middle class, and the town 
would be the stage for more uprisings.  
          Between 1812 and 1820, the whole region was known as “the crucible of 
guerrilla warfare” (Ducey 1999: 163). While local elites and the urban upper classes 
of central new Spain demanded home rule, rural communities revolted locally against 
exploitation at eh hands of non-indigenous elites. Indians in Papantla saw the national 
struggle against outside rule as consonant with their struggles, and adopted a 
nationalist discourse even before there was a new nation. They linked local tensions 
to the broader independence movement and demanded autonomy using the same 
terms. Indians and campesinos alike were not willing to accept threats to their 
autonomy and were willing to take up arms to protect what they felt was just.         
Given Papantla’s long-established division of labor (where Totonac 
households produced agricultural goods and non-natives acted as merchants and 
middlemen) continuing conflict was inevitable. So after independence, the energies 
that had gone into resisting the tobacco monopoly were channeled into equally violent 
protests against exploitation by village elite. And when the boom in the vanilla 
market came, land-ownership became more lucrative, Indian lands were divided and 
diminished,  and new inequities emerged.   
The first divisions began in 1875, the year Tejada was overthrown by Diaz.  
With Diaz came modernization at all costs, so it is fitting that this was the beginning 
of the end of much of the Totonac land autonomy.  Economic progress was to be 
brought about through increasing the production capacity of rural workers and 
bringing them into the market economy as consumers.  While local merchants may or 
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may not have cared about ideals like progress and modernity, the laws were on their 
side, and the time had come to divide land.  At first, this was done by establishing 
conduenazgo (private landholding associations).  These associations were made up of 
conduenos that each owned a share of land that could be bought or sold.  
Theoretically, these associations created a way for the state to recognize owners 
without appearing as threatening privatization.  These shares were taxable.   
Of course, this was a problematic system. Though the division was done by 
local elites and sanctioned by many Totonacs, it appears it did not provide for all rural 
producers equally, and it benefited non-Indians disproportionately.  The fact that 
shares were taxable became a problem too.  The majority of these households 
operated at the subsistence level and taxes increased their cash needs in such a 
manner that the balance they had long established was damaged.  New cash needs 
meant they needed to produce more products for the market: not for consumer items, 
but for the state.  Increasing production could also have an effect on their available 
household labor, and on land and environmental resources.  The divisions disrupted a 
long-established economic and social system.  For the first time, households were 
losing access to their most important resource, land.  Some lost access when they 
were not assigned ownership in a conduenazgo, perhaps for political or social 
reasons.  Others lost access when they were unable to pay the taxes.  Non-natives for 
the first time had access to land and with so many landless producers, to a new labor 
pool.   
By 1890, local leaders took up arms against federal surveyors that arrived in 
Papantla to mark more private lands.  The governor called in the federal troops and 
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2,000 Totonacs were killed.  Troops retreated but continued to prepare for another 
armed uprising.  Dehesa, the state governor at this point, was sympathetic to the 
indigenous rights to the land but adamant that the privatization was key to modernity.  
He ordered that the subdivision continue and that great attention should be given so 
that land should only be given to Indians.  The federal government wanted the land 
divided and did not really care much about who got the land, only that the land be 
used to increase production.  The state government needed to maintain peace and did 
not think unfairly distributing land would accomplish this goal.  Surveyors, who were 
awarded choice land as payment for work, wanted to get on with the project and reap 
the benefits of their contracts.  Local businessmen and political leaders wanted access 
to the land and did not want to be limited by the state government (Koth 2002). 
Historians note that Totonacs did not respond uniformly to the divisions. 
Some sided with the government, and others joined those calling for uprisings.  This 
is of course not a surprising detail; one cannot assume that rural producers, who have 
maintained subsistence lifestyles in a vast and rough geographical terrain, would 
constitute a singular body.  While they may have shared language and many other 
cultural traditions, they were by and large from independent households.  They had 
survived colonization without being forced into the false constructs of corporate 
collectivities, primarily because of low population density and rough terrain.  But it 
was also these characteristics that made vanilla such a good cash crop for these 
producers. And it was the success of vanilla that led to these producers losing access 
to that land that had sustained them for so long. 
54 
The division taking place in Papantla in the 1890s and the response was so 
complex that it was hard to know what lands were being divided and who was 
receiving those lands.  In 1894, many indigenous people still protested the division 
and threatened uprisings.  Diaz responded to continued protest in frustration and 
stated that if the Indians would not submit, they should be doomed to “live as they 
always have” and succumb “to slavery under the businessmen and Spaniards” (Koth 
2002:35).  Dehesa saw this response as dangerous, and had a greater interest in 
keeping peace.  He investigated the situation and found that previous surveyors and 
subdividers had been unfair.  At this point he ordered the division to continue but that 
only Indians should be given land --and that they must receive clear titles, good maps 
of the land and not be charged survey or legal fees      (Koth 2002, Sanderson 1986).  
Subdivision continued, but slowly, as pressure by Totonacs remained constant. 
In the spring of 1896, a group of producers drew up a complaint and 
demanded the right to retain land.  They complained that “the ambition of a great part 
of capitalists of the village who are trying to appropriate our property” should be 
stopped by the government (Koth 2002:38).  They also complained that the township 
was underserved and that they should be supplied with schools and roads.  They made 
six specific requests.  First, the government should suspend all division.  Second, they 
wanted to know what crops they should invest in for the cash market.  Third, they 
wanted all the share certificates that had been taken by non-Indians returned as 
communal property.  Fourth, they wanted all the titles entered into the national 
registry to protect their property.  Fifth, they wanted to be given possession of all the 
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larger lots.  Finally, they wanted to be paid for their work and for stamp duties and 
other state fees they had previously paid (Sanderson 1998). 
By summer, their requests unfulfilled, 900 Totonacs rebelled in Papantla.  The 
targets of the attacks were the jefe politico that had promised they would not lose land 
and vanilla middlemen and merchants.  The rebellion was suppressed by federal 
troops and division resumed with military surveyors and military guards (Kouri 
2004).  Land was divided into conduenazgos; and, as these dissolved and households 
failed to keep up with taxes on land, more households lost access to land.  These 
producers had a long history of commodity production, so the loss of vanilla would 
not have been as harsh as the loss of access to land; they could have changed 
commodities as they had done before.  But without land to produce the food their 
households subsisted on, they had lost the ability to sustain their way of life.  They 
must now rely on the market for jobs, for food, and for their lifestyle.  In 1810, these 
households had been autonomous farmers with access to enough land to sustain their 
lifestyle.  By 1910, 65 families owned more than 10,000 hectares and 116,000 
families had no access to land (Sanderson 1998). 
 
The 20th Century: From Revolution to Neoliberal Reform   
Land division had been accelerated during the Porfirio Diaz regime (1876-
1910) and local producers had responded to this with uprisings and violent rebellion.  
Dehesa claimed these rebellions were not political in nature.  Obviously, he had 
missed the point.  These individuals and communities knew they had been exploited 
and knew they had lost their way of life.  This had occurred because of politics, at the 
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local, state and national level.  To claim otherwise was to be ignorant to the demands 
of the rebels.  They knew what they had, and they knew why they had lost it.  It was 
political.  And their hopes may have been high when the ideals of the revolution 
promised renewal of communal landholding and access to land. 
Following the Mexican Revolution, especially during the administration of 
Lazaro Cardenas (1934-40), communal land ownership rose to 47% of lands. During 
the three decades that followed his administration, however, governments favored a 
nationally-based program of industrialization at the expense of the rural sector. By the 
1970s, agriculture was under-funded and the division of labor was prominent again.  
Though producers had access to land, they were in a new relationship to the market.  
They had become consumers and they were now more dependent on cash.  They also 
had tax debt once again, which further strained their cash supply and led to problems 
with land and to problems with cash crops.  They were unable to invest in vanilla. 
The net effect of the Mexican Revolution and its aftermath was to shift the 
locus of conflict from the issue of land ownership back to the issue of the division of 
labor.  The land redistribution program gave back land to the small producers.  But 
the issue of who controlled the curing and marketing process, re-emerged as the 
dominant problem. 
          The boom in vanilla was the key element for changes in the social relations of 
Papantla.  While I agree that the boom created new relationships, I believe its 
relevance was more economic than social.  Papantla does have a history of collective 
action when citizens see social relations as unjust, but the population was never 
homogenous.  With the Mexican revolution had come new ideas about the rights of 
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rural people and urban workers.  These ideas were wrapped up in the land.  The 
Indian was to become a citizen and this would come about with the creation of small-
landholders (Frye 1996).  Liberal reform was reorganized in nationalist terms.  The 
next seventy years in Papantla were a matter of cycles of government investment and 
abandonment.   
 While the markets changed a great deal during the 20th Century, the 
techniques and infrastructure of the industry in Mexico did not change.  The 
cultivation of vanilla is not conducive to mechanization.  Plants must be cared for 
daily, vines guided as they grow, diseased leaves discarded, compost moistened.  
During the six weeks where the flowers bloom, each bud must be hand pollinated 
early in the morning before the heat sets in.  Crops must be irrigated during dry spells 
and weeds must be kept to a minimum to avoid pests and disease.  This work is still 
done primarily by Totonac Indians or rural peasants.  Most orchards are tended to by 
an extended household; parents, children, grandchildren.  Though the curing process 
has been mechanized in other parts of the world, in Papantla the process is still a 
matter of human labor.  The beans must first be killed, either in boiling water or in 
special ovens.  Once the enzymes are stopped, the beans must undergo a process of 
steam, heat and drying that acts to ferment the beans and create the dark color and 
rich oils and fragrance.  The beans are laid out in the sun on large black tarps during 
the morning hours.  Once the beans are sufficiently hot, they are wrapped and put into 
barrels to create a sweat.  The next day they are brought back out into the sun.  This 
process can take up to two months and must be done with care, as the beans can 
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easily mold, dry too quickly or split open, all of which would seriously compromise 
the quality of the harvest.   
 The social organization of this process has not changed much in last two 
hundred years either.  The beans are still produced by small holders.  The curing 
process, until very recently, is mostly in the hands of non-Indian businesses.  It is the 
maintenance of this division of labor that has been key to the most recent organization 
of producers and has provoked new changes in the way vanilla is grown, cured and 
marketed.  If one does not know the history of this area and town, one might see 
recent developments and demands from producers as something unique and 
contemporary.  I argue that these producers have always had a keen understanding of 
the situation.  These households have been involved in a mixed economy for nearly 
300 years, where they have balanced and maintained a subsistence strategy with cash 
crops.  This has never been an easy task, but these households continue to do this 
delicate balancing act.  Producers have been aware of the division of labor and filed 
official complaints as far back as the 18th Century, when they were forced into 
repartimientos with Spanish residents –limiting their access to outside markets and 
commercial goods.  This is because they realized that this system impeded their 
ability to maintain their mixed economy.  They had a sense of justice, and were 
willing to organize collectively and violently if need be to fight for their right to 
autonomy.  These actions by producers foreshadow the most recent developments 
aimed at increasing production of vanilla in Mexico. 
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          As the 20th Century drew to a close, vanilla production had been decimated to 
the extent that export was almost negligible and a generation of growers had been 
lost.  Before COVER was founded, a group of local anthropologists and agronomists 
organized a program to both document vanilla production and provide training for 
young men in communities traditionally involved in vanilla.  Though these young 
men likely descended from fathers and grandfathers that produced vanilla, they were 
primarily engaged in the production of newer commodities (oranges, lichees) and 
wage labor.  One community, Ejido Cinco de Mayo, organized and solicited the 
government for the resources to establish the first indigenously-controlled curing 
plant, or beneficio.  This beneficio, ostensibly, would give local producers 
opportunities the earlier generations of growers had lost to elites:  access to higher 
profits by curing their beans and selling more directly to the market.  The citrus 
market had been significantly reduced by this time and the ability to reintroduce 
vanilla into their subsistence strategy enabled these producers to spend a bit more 
time in their community.  It was clear to most of those involved that the primary 
reasons for the lack of production were threefold:  the profit margin for Indians was 
too low, and they would need access to beneficios and the market to increase 
production and they needed some protection from theft to make it worth the labor.  
This is the immediate context that would give rise to both COVER and its critics.    
 
The Legend and Progress 
In 2005, just in time for the First International Vanilla Producers conference 
held in Papantla, the state-operated agricultural institution INIFAP produced an 
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instructional DVD to educate producers and the general public about vanilla.  The 
legend of vanilla is retold with modern twists, as only a good telenovela (a TV soap 
opera) could be told.  In this retelling, the beginning is similar but the characters 
change their social class.  The King has a beautiful daughter that he dedicates to the 
gods.  The daughter falls in love with a commoner, whom she is forbidden to see.  
Together they plan an escape.  As they run through the forest, drums beat as they try 
to outrun the king’s henchmen.  They are unable to maintain their lead.  The king 
arrives and watches as the hearts are cut out of his daughter and her lover’s chest, as 
an offering to the gods.  The bodies decompose and the delicate orchid springs from 
the mixture of earth and blood.   
 Conflict is a theme that predominates in the modernization of Papantla. But an 
equally important theme throughout its history is the sense of autonomy individuals 
and their extended families consider crucial to their economic survival.  The economy 
of vanilla has changed through the years, as does the technique, infrastructure and 
government organization.  But the social milieu associated with vanilla and the 
resulting division of labor, changed very little. Elites maintained control over the 
curing process, brokering and outside markets.  Small producers stopped growing 
vanilla when they no longer saw it as the best option.  By the late 1990s, they were 
less likely to bet on vanilla. 
 Papantla’s history of resistance has been anything but passive. Nevertheless, 
armed uprisings are a less conceivable response to this new situation of World Bank 
structural adjustment and global communication; resistance now takes on subtler –if 
not passive—forms. Perhaps the reduction in production was a form of protest.  Or 
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perhaps it was just a shift in response to changing markets.  Regardless, their activism 
on behalf of their interests has a long tradition. 
          While we many not know the answer to why farmers stopped producing 
vanilla, we do know that the producers collectively acknowledged an unfair division 
of labor and moved into producing other cash crops.  When the market for citrus (the 
major new cash crop) crashed, producers needed a new crop.  Though many 
households and communities no longer cultivated vanilla, everyone still had parents, 
grandparents or close relatives that had cultivated it.  Vanilla was a part of their 
history and remained a possibility in most producers’ minds.  
     It was in this context that the grassroots founders of the Consejo Veracruzano de 
Vainilla (COVER) began to meet monthly to discuss the fate of vanilla.  This group 
included individuals from both sides of the conflict.  They petitioned the government 
to fund an extension program that would organize producers, businesses, industry and 
artisans to save the identity of Mexican vanilla.  In 2001, COVER was decreed by the 
state governor and became a reality.  Papantla was to be the center of the 
reorganization of vanilla production.  Though production had declined, many farmers 
and even the government were still willing to bet on vanilla. And, just as important, 
they had a legacy –stretching back to colonial times—of taking matters into their own 
hands.  
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Chapter 4 Forming COVER: Grassroots organization and Alternative 
Development 
 
 
In 2000, the Veracruz government charged the Consejo Veracruzano de 
Vainilla (COVER) with the task of increasing vanilla production for export.  After 
many years of grassroots work, countless trips to the state capital in Jalapa and 
negotiations with several governors, the state of Veracruz established COVER in 
Papantla.  On November 27, 2000 the state government published the charter for the 
new extension program.   
  Given: That the cultivation of vanilla is of great importance (going  
back to the time of the Totonacs, who used it primarily to embellish  
chocolate), that Mexico is considered the original center of this cultivation,  
and Veracruz one of the principal producers of vanilla at the national level, 
  That vanilla is an orchid whose fruit is considered a spice that presents  
traits that allow it to be widely commercialized in national and international 
markets –for the manufacture of liqueurs, as a base for perfumes, for crafts,  
for displays of a dried version of the product, and for vanilla extract, among  
others, 
     That Veracruz’s agro-climactic diversity, especially that of the region  
known as “Totonacapan,” is considered well-suited to its cultivation, and that  
by enabling producers to apply adequate techniques, it is possible to improve  
the yield of the surface area currently cultivated, as well enlarging that surface  
area, in order to satisfy the demand for this product,    
That the establishment and development of this cultivation, by its very 
nature and especially in regards to pollination, requires special care, giving 
rise to a number of day-jobs and generating employment for the inhabitants of 
the vanilla-producing regions, 
That it is necessary to define a marketing scheme for natural vanilla, 
and its possible market niches, in order to compete robustly with synthetic 
products, so that the consumption of natural vanilla should increase, thus 
managing to directly raise the economic status of the producing region, 
That it is the state government’s interest to promote the development 
of vanilla cultivation, through the impetus of producers’ and marketers’ 
organizations, integrating participants into its branches with a shared objective 
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(the promotion and support of said cultivation).  (No. 236 November 27, 
2000) 
 
 This charter established the infrastructure for COVER and outlined its 
mission.  COVER would become an umbrella (rector) development organization that 
would create a plan for all of the state’s producers, manufacturers and marketers.  As 
the rector, organizer of all things vanilla-related, COVER would assist producers and 
producer organizations, push for technological advancement in production and 
manufacturing, develop markets within the country and in the global market, manage 
lands available to producers and maximize potential and rent ability and work with 
institutions to improve production.  They were organized to represent all steps in the 
process, from production, manufacturing and marketing, a diverse group of interests.  
This was not an easy task, given both the history of conflict between producers and 
vanilla businesses, past grievances between the government and producers and 
environmental changes that make traditional production techniques hard to implement 
on a large scale basis.  A revitalization of production had very different implications 
for a diverse group of producers, businessmen, industrialists and the government.   
          This chapter outlines the first phase of this development project that began as 
an alternative to previous development initiatives --primarily because it was the result 
of local initiatives.  This new development agency had the potential to be an 
alternative to traditional development, because it explicitly addressed the problem of 
corruption in previous development projects and set out to rein it in.  A core value 
articulated by the founders was to create an industry that would provide a fair income 
to vanilla producers and a development program that invested in rural producers 
rather than corporate welfare.  This project was to put the developees in charge of 
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“the encounter” (Escobar 2005).  Key to the first phase of revitalization was the 
tenure of the director of COVER, Victor Vallejo.  Mr. Vallejo was a member of the 
group that solicited the government for support and directed COVER for eighteen 
months.  Though he first came to Papantla from central Mexico over forty years ago 
to build a cattle business, Mr. Vallejo became an active member in this movement out 
of a sense loss and injustice.  He was very concerned about the ability of local 
farmers to make a living, especially in the face of so many environmental changes 
(due to cattle grazing) and a history of exploitation.  His first job as the director of 
COVER was to survey producers in the region and to develop a plan for increasing 
production.  In his assessment, the most difficult problems for revitalization of the 
industry were the environmental changes that make traditional production nearly 
impossible and the historical problems of hierarchy and exploitation at the hands of 
businesses, industrialists and the government.   
While they were given a good deal of autonomy in the beginning, they were 
not given a lot of resources in the form of money or technicians.  Mr. Vallejo was 
aware of both the goals that needed to be attained and the limitations he would 
encounter. He was aware of historical exploitation of the small producer, and the 
traditional hierarchies he would be up against.   He knew that COVER needed to 
spread production as widely as possible and with as much authority as possible before 
the state government got their hands on the project.  And he had to work against new 
environmental challenges: changed weather patterns and poorer soils than in the past.  
Mr. Vallejo attempted in that first year to establish a better understanding for the role 
of vanilla production in the countryside and create a new system of production that 
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would revitalize production. And he faced, in short, two great challenges: a culture of 
exploitation, and the degradation of the environment.   
 
 COVER Responds to Exploitation: Corruption, Theft and Unfair Prices 
           Prior to this, government projects directed towards vanilla producers had 
amounted to gifts of money, usually to the savviest of community’s leaders.  
Communities received money if they were fortunate to have leaders with the right 
connections.  When the representatives of COVER first began to travel widely to 
advertise new projects, they often angered people when they announced that they 
would not provide help in the form of cash.  While COVER was sensitive to the ways 
in which producers were exploited in the past, they were clear about their goals of 
revitalizing the industry.  Revitalization would only be possible through 
systematically correcting past problems and establishing new systems.  These systems 
had to promote not only the agricultural changes but political change as well.  Mr. 
Vallejo wanted to create programs that would empower the producers, while at the 
same time reining in corruption and exploitation.  One way they hoped to end 
corruption was by providing producers with materials, rather than having government 
funds arrive in cash payments that in the past did not make it to producers.     
          But Mr. Vallejo discovered that the agents sent to work for COVER from the 
state government were actually padding their costs for the materials.  They were 
charging twice as much as the government paid for plants –thus robbing producers.  
Vallejo confronted the agents and immediately fired them.  He knew that he would 
make people in the state government angry, as this practice was tolerated and wide-
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spread, but he was adamant that COVER would only survive if it implemented a new 
program that ended the exploitation of the producers.  He realized his actions were 
likely to have consequences for his tenure, but decided to try to push through as many 
changes while he was in office.     
Vallejo was taking on the institutional hierarchies that were built into vanilla 
production, as well as the corruption that these hierarchies often bred. Early on, he 
became aware of money that had been made available to several businesses in the 
area, based on false claims; local industrialists had solicited monies claiming the 
investment was needed to support an industry that was barely producing.  Vallejo tells 
how this money was given without any inspection of results.  For this reason, during 
his tenure, he was very careful with money solicitation and implemented a program 
based on materials rather than money grants.  Producers would solicit COVER for 
vines, irrigation and compost materials, but COVER did not hand out money.  He 
took a big chance in changing the system because individuals used to exploiting 
government programs no longer had access to cash. 
Producers are aware that while the government has in the past invested large 
sums in their industry, they and their neighbors have seen very little of that money.  
In the recent memory of many producers are images of dummy producers’ groups 
that solicited monies but were in fact fronts for greedy businessmen.  These small 
producers need concrete investment, but continue to see state monies given to 
businessmen and large organizations.  This continues to be true today.  In 2005, the 
government granted a local industrialist a large sum of money for new machinery.  
Producers were horrified.  At the moment, there was already a sufficient amount of 
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machinery to process all of the vanilla produced in the region --so this investment was 
a case of corporate welfare.  One producer commented, “He probably didn’t even buy 
new machinery.  His whole factory is fairly new.  He probably painted the old 
machines and pocketed the money.”   
In addition to institutional corruption, exploitation could also take the form of 
crop theft or unfair prices offered by middlemen.   For centuries, vanilla farmers have 
had to deal with the theft of vanilla from orchards.  Given that many traditional 
orchards were located far from communities and households, it was hard to protect 
them.  Even when families began to post members at the orchards day and night 
during the crucial final weeks of growth, many producers were robbed on the poorly 
maintained roads as they took their crops to market.  Before oil companies became 
interested in the area during the early to mid 1900s, most communities were only 
accessible by foot paths.  Roads were built by the petroleum industry as needed to 
reach wells, but not maintained once the well was abandoned.  This lack of 
infrastructure made it more difficult to transport the year’s harvest to buyers in 
Papantla.   
In response to the fact that theft in the orchard is a difficult issue for farmers, 
COVER instituted an official cutting date in hopes of addressing the problem.  
Vallejo felt that by requiring communities to receive a certification from COVER 
before producers could cut and sell vanilla, he could protect producers from some 
theft --as it would be illegal to have green vanilla in one’s possession before the 
official date and without a certificate from COVER.  An added benefit of this was 
that allowing the vanilla to remain on the vine longer produces a higher quality 
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vanilla in the long run.  The official date is now December 10th, over a month past 
one of the most important ritual days for many of these producers.  Vallejo explains 
that he took into account that traditional indigenous producers and the small-scale 
producers today, are balancing the needs of a subsistence-communal oriented lifestyle 
with the production of cash crops.  By showing this kind of concern for the culture of 
the small producers (alongside their economic well-being), he was promoting an 
alternative agenda of development. He was offering a different approach from that of 
the industrialists and their favored large-scale, large-investment projects.    
          Aside from theft, growers have historically had to contend with another type of 
exploitation: the unfair price offered by the middlemen.  Until very recently, farmers 
did not have access to information about outside markets and were at the mercy of the 
buyers in Papantla. But today farmers are angry that they have to rely on these 
middlemen for transactions and are looking for a more direct access to the market.  
This concern was emphasized during the first phase of COVER, the implication of 
this new development project was that farmers would be able to break the monopoly 
held by businesses and gain access to buyers, thus reaping higher profits on their 
labor. 
The curing houses, for their part, argue that they provide a service that is not 
easily substituted.  They not only act as a rural outlet for selling green vanilla beans 
but as a banking service.  They have historically provided small loans to the farmers, 
with the loans being due at harvest time.  The curers treated these loans as insurance, 
expecting a certain amount of the year’s harvest would be due to their curing house as 
repayment for loans.  But the farmers felt this relationship was another form of price 
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exploitation and bound them to a particular buyer.  They began to sell their crop 
elsewhere for higher prices and to repay loans with cash rather than crop.  This 
satisfied the farmer’s sense of justice but became a problem for the curing houses. A 
system that had seemed logical to the buyers (to lend money now and assure oneself a 
supply and control over prices) was no longer working in their favor.  When farmers 
looked for better prices and repaid loans with cash rather than product, the curers 
were unable to fulfill contracts.  They were angry with the farmers and accused them 
of being dishonest.  But the farmers saw themselves as free agents, indebted to the 
curing houses for loans but free to repay those loans with money earned at the highest 
price.   
Farmers today, not unlike the farmers of the 18th and 19th centuries, feel a 
sense of injustice in their dealings with Papantla buyers and curing houses.  They may 
value the relationships they have with particular buyers, they may appreciate much-
needed loans, but they also feel they are justified in looking for the best prices.  Social 
obligations are important to these families, as evidenced in their response to extended 
family needs and communal reciprocity.  But selling vanilla is a business and they 
understand the value of their product.  They believe in the right to sell for a good 
price and they understand where the large profits are made.  These farmers balance a 
subsistence oriented lifestyle with strategic participation in market economies with 
cash crops.  If a cash crop becomes too much of a risk, they are willing and able to 
switch production to a different crop.  This may provide another explanation for the 
decline in production; given the conflict between farmers and curing houses, it 
became easier to invest labor and resources in other commodities, especially given 
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the farmers limited access to information about foreign markets and buyers. As 
farmers have developed new relationships with global markets, they became 
interested in reviving the vanilla industry.   
Given these conflicts and cultural misunderstandings between farmers and 
buyers, it is interesting to note that the grassroots development of COVER included 
not just producers but individuals and organizations involved in both aspects of the 
industry.  The owner of one of the largest curing houses was one of the most involved 
individuals.  COVER was formed through this alliance between producers and 
businesses.  While the first efforts of COVER were concentrated on increasing 
production in order to have product to bring to market, they were also aware of the 
need to address the inequities in the local and global market.  Producers saw COVER 
as an opportunity to get better prices locally while curing houses and buyers saw 
COVER as an opportunity to create more local product and obtain better access to 
global markets.  This joining of two groups with very different goals may explain 
why COVER began to lose focus and influence when Vallejo left office.  Under his 
leadership, due to his charismatic personality and tenacity, COVER was able to focus 
on an alternative development strategy that took into account the problems associated 
with past injustices.  But subsequent COVER directors lost sight of producer’s values 
and local elites began to assert more influence over the project.   
During his tenure, Vallejo had to balance creating new initiatives to increase 
production while addressing long entrenched social and political cultural habits 
surrounding three hundred years of vanilla production.  He was beginning to 
experiment with vanilla production on his private lands but was adamant that he 
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would not use public funds in his personal orchards.  He felt that corruption was one 
of the biggest problems and that to partake of any government funding would make 
him suspect.  He personally financed his orchard and shade house while building the 
infrastructure for COVER, being very careful to maintain the highest level of 
integrity.  A major objective in this alternative to previous state development projects 
was to overcome institutional and cultural hierarchies and corruption. He would make 
strides against corruption and theft, but the privileged status of buyers vis-à-vis 
producers (a status that historically allowed them to pay unfair prices) would reassert 
itself after he was gone.  
 
Environmental Challenges:  COVER Responds to Ecological Change  
Sadly, the natural environment of northern Veracruz has changed drastically.  
It is no longer possible to cultivate vanilla in the traditional system, without 
agricultural inputs.  Given the other needs of a contemporary industry, especially the 
need to compete on a global scale and keep production costs down, contemporary 
intensification is a complex issue.  Historically, many of these producers come from a 
long line of subsistence producers that used vanilla as an important supplement to 
their economy, integrating the crop into their land rotation schedule.  Vallejo 
described this as a system in which a portion of each household’s lands would be 
allowed to fallow and would grow back tree cover that provided the shade for the 
crop.  But today, given problems with rainfall, soil erosion and  soil nutrition, 
building a cost-effective industry is all the more difficult.  New techniques need to be 
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developed that take into account these climate changes and the production methods of 
households. 
 Before introducing new techniques, COVER needed to conduct a census of 
producers.  This entailed fieldworkers traveling into as many communities known to 
still produce and market vanilla.  Besides basic demographic information, this census 
collected information about production techniques.  At that time, most vanilla was 
grown with three techniques, based largely on traditional manners but with some 
modern variation.   
          For very small-scale producers, the traditional acahual was most common.  In 
this system, vanilla is placed in the fallowed re-forested section of families’ land.  
Communities cluster near water sources but each families land could be located an 
hour’s walk, given population density and the tradition of rotating land use.  The trees 
in these forests have been allowed to come back naturally, so they are not in orderly 
rows.  The vine is placed at the base of appropriate trees, ones that have grown tall 
enough and have enough shade.  The vines are usually allowed to grow high into the 
trees and can only be reached with ladders.  These ladders, fashioned from thick 
bamboo, are used for pollination during the fertilization season and for harvesting 
when the beans have matured.  Because of the arbitrary nature of the placement of 
trees and the fact that vines can grow up to forty feet high, the maintenance of the 
traditional accahual is highly intensive labor.  However, the labor is not of a heavy 
nature so it is easily incorporated into the daily schedule and can be done by almost 
everyone in the household: man, woman and child.  The labor is easily absorbed by 
the household in this case and the yield does not tend to be high in this type of 
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production.  However, when prices were decent, vanilla was a good solid cash crop.  
For generations of subsistence focused farmers, vanilla was a reasonable investment 
of their time and resources.  It worked because they did not have to invest much 
capital, they could use land that was not needed for food production and they could 
get the crop to a local market for sale.  The key to reinvigorating production was to 
introduce new methods that allowed households to continue to balance commodity 
production within a broader economic strategy.  
          The Introduction of the Pichoco as Tutor 
          One of the first techniques introduced under Vallejo’s tenure was the planting 
of tutores rather than using established forest.  There are three different tree varieties 
that are used, but the most popular is the pichoco tree that has been imported to the 
region.  This tree is sturdy enough to support the vine and the many activities 
associated with pollination and harvesting.  It has a broad canopy of leaves at the very 
top of the trunk.  The tree flowers in the spring, producing a bright red flower and 
edible green pod, that are both sold in the local market at a high price.   
          There were several communities that had already begun to experiment with 
pichoco orchards before COVER began.  These orchards are relatively low cost and 
very space efficient and labor efficient.  Vines must be tended to daily to ward off 
mold or infections and the neat rows of trees makes this task quick.  During 
pollination and harvesting, the rows make work much faster than having to track 
vines throughout the forest and scale thin ladders to tall heights. Because it was cost 
effective and very labor effective, COVER concentrated their first projects on this 
technique.  It was much easier to introduce irrigation systems into the pichoco 
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orchard and this became more and more important as COVER began to realize the 
significance of environmental changes in rain fall and subsequent impact on vanilla 
cultivation.   
          Integration with Citrus Orchards 
          One of the commodities local farmers invested in during the mid-1900s was 
citrus.  Many families dedicated large portions of their land to orange orchards and 
made a steady living selling their produce to juice concentrate plants in Mexico.  The 
market declined in the late 1990s and then a plague hit Central American citrus trees.  
Mexican citrus farmers were worried that once the plague hit trees in Mexico, they 
would no longer be able to compete with American farmers.  Once the plague hit the 
U.S., farmers there would use pesticides.  But the expense of pesticides for Mexican 
farmers would make it impossible to compete.  In the interest of finding a use for 
well-established trees, several farmers began to integrate vanilla into their citrus 
orchards.  This technique proved efficient.  Farmers place the vine at the bottom of 
the orange tree, which provides the tutor and the shade needed to grow the vanilla.   
          Like the pichoco orchard, the orange orchard is space- and labor-efficient and 
provides a good yield.  The investment is minimal, as this technique is only used in 
existing orchards.  At most, farmers must purchase the plants and install irrigation 
systems.  For most of the year, households can easily absorb the daily labor of 
tending to plants, cleaning up dead leaves, keeping the roots healthy, the soil loose 
and looking for signs of disease.  Depending on the size of the household, families 
may look for day laborers during the fertilization period when a small orchard might 
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have up to 10,000 blooms in one day.  Citrus growers actively sought the help of 
COVER in developing this new technique. 
          Shadehouse Production 
          The third system introduced during Vallejo’s tenure was the shade house.  
Shade house production allows for a more intensive technique because both shade 
and humidity can be more precisely managed.  Shade houses take up very little space 
and can be located within communities and near households.  Tutors can be made of 
bamboo, pichoco trees or concrete posts.  Polyester netting is strung over a larger 
frame to provide the necessary shade.  Irrigation strung between support posts is fed 
from pools made to collect rain water or pumped from nearby streams or wells.  
Shade house production, while common in other vanilla-producing countries, is still 
fairly new to Mexico. It is a high-cost option and still in the experimental stage. 
 
COVER Operations:  Programs and Participants 
The office of COVER is located in Papantla, something that the founders 
insisted on to maintain local autonomy.  When the board of directors was first 
formed, the counselors elected to serve on the board reflected the diversity of this 
group.  This is true today, with each group represented on the board by three 
members of each community (producers, curing businesses, industrialists).  Funding 
for the operations of COVER and the implementation of programs comes from the 
state government department of agriculture.   
COVER offers a limited number of programs and services to a diverse number 
of producers.  While the board of directors is made up of the varied interests of the 
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vanilla industry, the programs were initially directed towards producers.  There are at 
the moment a sufficient number of curing houses and processing plants to handle the 
current production levels.  Besides the director, COVER employs three field agents, 
one events coordinator, a secretary and an accountant.  The director oversees the 
implementation of programs, the work of the agents and works with the state 
agricultural department to solicit funding and build production and marketing 
initiatives.  When Vallejo was the director, he focused on getting traditional 
producers to reinvest in production and worked to develop new techniques to address 
climate changes.  While they were experimenting with shadehouse construction and 
encouraging groups to organize these projects, his directorship provided access to 
funding for plants and materials for other types of production.  The drastic changes in 
climate meant that production would eventually need to move away from traditional 
production, but they were looking for the most cost efficient way to reintegrate 
vanilla into the agricultural and labor cycles.  Producers were encouraged to plant 
pichoco orchards closer to their homes, to integrate vanilla into their citrus orchards if 
they already owned them and to organize into groups to construct shadehouses.      
Projects are funded through several government agencies, both state and 
federal.  I inquired early in my fieldwork about the funding and got different answers.  
At first, I was told that COVER does not handle any money.  Vallejo was adamant 
that in order to curb corruption, COVER should manage distribution of materials for 
production rather than cash.  For this reason, the first programs initiated provided 
plant material and irrigation equipment.  These materials were purchased by state 
government officials and distributed through COVER programs.  But this situation 
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became more complicated as COVER focused on shadehouse construction and 
expanded their services.     
Shadehouses construction is costly, roughly $4,000 U.S., not including plants 
and the compost.  For one family, this would be an unlikely investment given that one 
day’s wage brings in $5 U.S.  COVER organized communities into groups to build 
and fund the shadehouse, with the idea that both the financial obligation could be 
easier to meet and labor would be provided by this larger network.  The groups must 
include at least ten individuals and tend to be a combination of family members and 
neighbors.  The larger network is good for spreading out the financial burden but can 
be problematic in organizational terms.  Often when we traveled out to meet with a 
group, we spent more time tracking down members than assisting them in their 
project.  Vanilla is a side business for these farmers, so this may have accounted for 
much of the trouble locating members, but there was also some organizational 
trouble.  These farmers work independently on their own lands for the most part, so 
maintaining cohesive goals within a group was difficult.  For this reason, the timeline 
for completion of many projects often lagged behind the dates set by COVER.  
Ideally, field agents were set up to visit each project at the beginning of each building 
phase of a project and would direct them in the next step, and make arrangements to 
visit at completion.  It was common to arrive at the site and find that construction had 
not begun or the next step had not been completed.   
Organizing shadehouse projects around larger networks was useful for 
deferring capital risks, but the mere intensification of production had labor 
implications that at times outstripped labor sources.  In the rainforest, production was 
78 
very small scale and easily integrated into the family labor pool.  But modern 
methods intensified production in such a way that families were no longer able to 
handle all the labor needs.  This began to be a problem during 2005 and producers 
looked to COVER to solve it.  By funding new techniques that were necessary for 
production given the climate changes, they also created an intensive production 
method that made for labor shortages.  The projects were funded and producers were 
able to share the capital risk with other households, but were then unable to handle 
the additional capital burden needed to hire wage laborers.  Most recently, COVER 
counselors have initiated a government program to hire additional labor.  This would 
create a new relationship between COVER and cash, which was purposely restricted 
in the initial phase of the movement.  This change in access to funding is illustrative 
of larger changes that affected the overall governance of COVER and the attitudes of 
producers and critiques of the type of development project it had become after the 
tenure of Mr. Vallejo. 
           In a very short span of time, COVER has both increased overall numbers of 
producers, and has had to deal with the issues of production technology.  As with any 
agricultural product, these farmers must control costs to stay competitive.  
Environmental changes make this difficult, as crops must be irrigated and soil must 
be amended.  Gone are the days where producers could rely on the fertile soils of 
fallow rain forest and abundant consistent rains to nurture their crops to maturity.   
 
COVER and Alternative Development 
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While all four production techniques are in use today throughout the region, 
most government programs are encouraging production in either pichoco orchards or 
shade houses.  There have not been very many studies comparing the efficiency of the 
various techniques, but farmers, business men, anthropologists and agronomists have 
strong opinions.  Among agronomists, there are camps that staunchly support and 
staunchly oppose the use of pichoco, citrus and shade house production.  Opponents 
of pichoco and citrus production argue that the trees do not provide sufficient shade.  
Opponents of shade house production fear persistent pest problems in such an 
intensive production.  In all three of these techniques, farmers must carefully weigh 
investment and cost of production with return, especially given the uncertain market 
in recent years.   
 Vanilla producers are a heterogeneous group.  They are individuals and 
households and communities.  They are subsistence farmers, wage laborers, landless 
and land owners.  COVER took on the difficult task of building an industry among a 
diverse group of producers in an industry with centuries of cultural practices.  The 
difficulty in organizing this industry was not only due to the differing interests of 
producers and businesses, but also to the diversity among producers.  COVER was 
initiated by a diverse group of individuals and organizations, ostensibly as an 
alternative to past development projects.  
           Under the strong, focused leadership of Vallejo, COVER was able to initiate 
new programs and production systems, consonant with the producers’ sense of 
justice.  However, when Mr. Vallejo left, control shifted to government officials in 
the state capital.  This loss of local autonomy and focus in regard to producer’s rights 
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gave rise to many critics of COVER.  COVER was conceived as an alternative to 
previous development projects, and faced the difficult challenge of outwitting corrupt 
government officials while developing new production techniques.  So without 
consensus over the best technique to support, and weaker leadership, COVER was 
easily co-opted by government officials and local elites. It was under the two more 
recent administrations that COVER reverted to more traditional development 
strategies, where programs are established from the top-down.  Local anthropologists 
and agronomists, in response, became critical of the program and called for a more 
populist approach to development. 
 The critics of COVER’s current program express values similar to those 
expressed by the first phase of COVER. They hold that the most important goals are 
to stop corruption and to develop appropriate technologies.  For these critics, 
corruption is possible because of the lack of organization in general and a lack of 
strong leadership.  Because of this lack of leadership, COVER fails to see the 
importance of serving ‘real producers’ with appropriate technology and instead 
becomes a program for government payoffs and corporate welfare.   
 
Development Co-opted   
 Vallejo was the director of COVER for the first eighteen months.  During that 
time, he says, his goal was to organize as much as possible and change old systems of 
corruption in the process.  It was no longer possible for farmers to produce in a 
traditional manner, and new techniques had to balance efficiency with cost-
effectiveness.  He wanted to direct intensification in such a manner that small-scale 
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farmers would still have access to the crop, and he knew this was dependent on 
dealing with environmental limitations in an economical manner.  At the same time, 
he feLT that his time in office would be short, given his insistence on local autonomy 
in decision making and strict guidelines on financial allocation.  He worked “like a 
dog,” he said, because he knew it was only a matter of time until he angered the 
people in Jalapa and they got rid of him.   
 Vallejo felt like the state government was an antagonist that he had to work 
against, but COVER’s own board of directors became a similar problem.  The 
problem with the board is that it is not representative of the numbers involved in each 
group. In effect, it under-represents the producers and allows them to be out-voted by 
the common interests of curers and industrialists. There are presently close to 4,000 
producers, four or five active curing businesses and only three industrialists in the 
region.  But each group has three representatives on the board of directors. 
 The director after Vallejo was an agronomist named Rafael Damiron.  He was 
in office for only one year and was a weak leader.  Mr. Damiron was convinced that 
innovative techniques (like the use of citrus trees) were a mistake, so he stalled all of 
COVER’s projects.  Unfortunately, Vallejo feels, it was during this period of weak 
leadership that old systems of corruption resurfaced.  COVER had a difficult task to 
accomplish and tried to build a coalition, but ultimately this coalition thwarted the 
chance of operating an alternative development project.  In 2006, the state 
government made a large grant of $400,000 U.S., but the recipients were not 
primarily the producers.  Of this grant, $300,000 U.S. went to one local curing house 
in what amounts to corporate welfare.  Many producers, like Vallejo are both 
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disgusted but not surprised by the allocation of funding.  It is during this period of 
time that the role of COVER began to shift in the mind of many producers and 
became a target for criticism not only for farmers but for other local development 
agencies.   
 During the harvest of 2005, producers were fed up with COVER.  They 
blamed COVER for not protecting producers from the exploitation of local buyers 
and for not funding their projects.  Producers protested in the streets, talked to 
journalists and visited the COVER office to complain.  At this point COVER had lost 
so much authority that it began to operate at the same level as other agricultural 
organizations, and was now accused of promoting the system it had aimed to replace. 
Though COVER had attempted to implement a development agenda from the bottom-
up, it had now become a project that disregarded the needs of the small producer, a 
system of corrupt disorder, and of costly, inappropriate technical investments. Their 
frustration was symptomatic of this central fact: that COVER had gone from being a 
grassroots organization that represented their interests, to being one more agency that 
served the interests of local elites.    
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Chapter 5:  Conflict and Corruption:  Local Critics and the Social Milieu of 
Production 
 
 Bright sun shone over the central park gazebo one morning.  I sat in our 
favorite restaurant on the square and looked down just as a brown late model Ford 
pickup truck pulled up to the curb in front of the town hall.  A middle aged man 
stepped out of the driver’s door with a megaphone and jumped into the truckbed.  He 
threw a handful of racemes, the stem on which vanilla pods grow, onto the street.  He 
announced that something must be done about the low prices.  He announced to all 
around him that the government was not doing enough to protect producers.  Locals 
walked by, a few stopped to listen, several offered advice.  After he finished making 
his announcement, he waved to the crowd, jumped to the ground and drove away 
from the square.  When I talked to people sitting nearby, they said that they were not 
surprised by his frustration or by his public display.  A man sitting on the square said 
that many people felt the same way.  Others agreed that prices were too low and that 
the government should protect producers.  This display seemed to be accepted as a 
logical reaction to local problems.    
 The scene on the square transpired just after the official cutting date.  At that 
time, producer organizations travel into Papantla to receive an official statement from 
COVER to begin the cutting process.  Soon after December 10th, when farmers are 
sanctioned to cut their beans, talk in town was focused on the low prices being 
offered by curing houses and buyers.  Who was to blame for the record low prices?  
Some felt blame was with the curing houses that historically pay low prices and 
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exploit indigenous farmers.  Others felt the blame should be with COVER, an 
organization that was created to protect the producer.  Producers talked about what to 
do with their crops.  If they cut them now, they risked low prices.  But if they waited, 
they risked theft from their orchards.  Every other day, the newspaper printed articles 
with accusations of poor management by COVER or exploitation by the businessmen. 
          The actions of the producer on the square and the frustration expressed by 
farmers are symptomatic of the debate between supporters of COVER and its 
detractors.  The most difficult issue of the first phase of COVER was a need to 
protect against corruption (government and local elites) and to develop new 
technologies to address environmental change.  Critics of COVER now argue that 
these values have been lost, due to organizational disorder which led to corruption.  
Local anthropologists argue that corruption has led COVER to ignore the social 
milieu that needs to be taken into account in order to develop useful programs that are 
accessible to the neediest producers.  Local agronomists believe that the promotion of 
untested production systems is potentially costly and leads to more corruption.  
Though COVER was conceived as an alternative to traditional development projects, 
much of the criticism aimed at COVER are similar to the post development criticism 
of Escobar and Olivier.  Founders of COVER were not able to maintain control over 
the development project in terms of the needs of small scale farmers.  Though these 
local professionals were initially supportive of COVER as a unifying development 
scheme aimed at helping farmers benefit more directly from vanilla production, they 
were not included in the implementation of COVER programs.  COVER lost control 
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over “the encounter” as it became co-opted by local elites and more focused on 
capital intensive production methods.  
 
Organizational Disorder  
        One morning, I happened upon a crowd in the center of town, whose sign read, 
“National Vanilla Producers Meeting.”  I was a bit perplexed that I had not known 
about the meeting, right there in Papantla.  I sat down to listen to the presentations.  A 
man at the podium said to much applause, “The problem in rural Mexico is that 
producers do not organize.  The problem with vanilla producers is that they are not 
organized.”   
This statement was illustrated clearly when I found Vallejo among the crowd.  
I diplomatically inquired as to why I had not heard about the meeting.  He 
apologetically explained that he had only heard the night before and rumors were that 
the Isabel Engler, director of COVER, had refused to attend and was not advertising 
the meeting to COVER board members.  This was the second organization I 
encountered that used the name National Vanilla Producers Organization.  Earlier in 
the year I had attended the National Producers of Vanilla’s strategic planning session.  
The problem in the countryside is that there are too many organizations working for 
common goals with no coordination.  Though COVER was conceived to coordinate 
these groups, it had ceased to provide direction. 
 For this reason, I decided I needed to understand how producers are organized 
in broader terms.  COVER was supposed to be the over seer of all programs, but now 
I had evidence that COVER was not involved with every vanilla producer’s 
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organization and was even antagonistic towards some groups.  I interviewed the 
leaders of four agricultural organizations located in the area in an attempt to 
understand the role of COVER in the larger scheme.  Not only had COVER lost the 
role of orchestrating all other producers’ organizations, but leadership at COVER had 
become competitive with other producers’ organizations, and groups were no longer 
cooperating on broad terms.   
These groups ranged from private civic to local or federally funded 
organizations that each focused on a different constituency of producers --for many 
vanilla being but one of many projects they sponsored.  For instance, the private 
Campesino Workers Union was working with producers to arrange funds to build the 
first rural extraction plant.  They claimed that the majority of vanilla is produced in 
pichoco groves by campesinos that they alternatively addressed as non-Totonac and 
indigenous.  They stressed that the most important impediment for producers was the 
monopoly of coyotes.  An extraction plant located in the campo and run by 
campesinos would break this monopoly up, “Controlling a plant would mean 
controlling the market.”  Their goal in controlling the market would be to create a 
stable price where producers would be guaranteed eighty to one hundred pesos per 
kilo of green vanilla, much higher than the thirty pesos being offered during the 2005-
2006 harvest seasons, but lower than the 400 pesos offered four years ago.  A 
standard price would keep one more generation on the land and in their estimation 
would act as an environmental conservation mechanism as pichoco and other shade 
trees were planted.   
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Three other local groups worked with vanilla producers as a part of a larger 
system of rural development.  These were all government-sponsored, two by the state 
government and one by the county government.  These groups experienced similar 
disappointment at the manner in which COVER had organized production in general, 
and viewed COVER as competition rather than as a director.  Anthropologist Luis 
Luna worked with a state organization that was established to stimulate economic 
projects among indigenous groups.  He pinpointed the problem:  with so many 
different groups working with vanilla production in isolation, the impact is diluted.  
In regard to the role of vanilla production in local indigenous communities, he felt 
that though the indigenous economic model was distinctive, it was not hard to 
integrate new techniques to intensify production while maintaining traditional social 
organization.  Although prices have fallen in recent years, he believes that Totonac 
families “have faith in vanilla.”  He argues that indigenous producers are not against 
technology, against changes in production or more advanced curing systems.  But, he 
believes, they will be willing to change their systems to produce intensively but not 
extensively.  They will not be willing to produce vanilla at the expense of subsistence 
crops and do not have access to large tracts of land for expansion. 
Mr. Luna believes that investing in vanilla production can be a stimulus for 
maintaining traditional social systems.  They involve women in all their projects 
because they believe the strong matriarchal system of the Totonac will insure the 
“passing on of knowledge to the next generation.”  In the same way that many 
Totonacs are “betting on vanilla” as a crop to balance their cash needs in a 
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subsistence economy, this organization is “betting on women to pass along the 
cultural knowledge of vanilla production” to the next generation.   
  People are willing to bet on vanilla because they have faith in it.  It is a  
 cultural thing, not a religious thing.  Indigenous communities have always  
 produced and are always willing to produce, they are not willing to give up  
during  hard times.  Because of this cultural identification with vanilla, even  
when it does not look economically advantageous, they take a chance.  We  
need to work with these producers in groups and make it possible for them to  
work intensively, but not push them to produce vanilla extensively.   
 
 These sentiments were expressed likewise at the local county level.  The 
county administration worked with state funding sources to organize various vanilla 
projects and likewise have begun to focus on women’s groups.  They pointed out that 
not only are there too many different groups working with vanilla producers without 
coordination, but that often these groups work simultaneously within the same 
community --creating a new source of conflict and tension.  This group was 
particularly critical of COVER because of perceived injustices towards local leaders.  
Though COVER was located in the town center, municipal authorities were not given 
an active role in COVER projects.  They argued that COVER offered a do-it-yourself 
model but that most producers needed more concrete tangible support and guidance.  
They had just finished soliciting the federal government for aid to establish a new 
association of producers that would be operated by the county government.  The 
speaker at the conference I happened upon in the center of town received applause 
when he summed up the problem of producers as lacking central organization.  
Perhaps some of the problem lies with too many organizations without overarching 
infrastructure.  What has historically been an advantage for rural producers, the 
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ability to organize and solicit the government for funding, has exponentially 
confounded the process.    
 These organizations had more things in common than not: much of the 
philosophy behind their projects, the target population they hoped to serve and their 
criticism of COVER. All the things these groups were trying to accomplish should 
come under the direction of one organization, what COVER was supposed to be.  
Ultimately, the work each was able to accomplish was “diluted” because of 
competition and lack of coordination.  Further evidence of this lack of coordination 
occurred during these late spring interviews:  all of these groups were unaware of the 
upcoming COVER sponsored conference.  The First International Conference for 
Vanilla Producers was organized for all vanilla producers to help disseminate 
knowledge, make connections and build direct relationships between producers and 
the market.  But when the conference was only weeks away, the leaders of these 
groups I interviewed were unaware of the event.   
 COVER lost the ability to orchestrate programs throughout the industry and 
lost credibility with leaders within these organizations.  One of the counselors of the 
original board of directors is critical of the bureaucratic nature of COVER today.  Mr. 
Herbierto Larios, the owner of one of the largest curing houses in town plays an 
ambiguous role in the operation of COVER programs.  On the one hand, he is a 
business owner with vested interest in low cost, high quality green vanilla beans.  He 
is one of the buyers that are often accused of acting like predatory coyotes, coercing 
producers into unfair sales.  But, on the other hand, he has been very active in the 
formation of COVER and critical of corruption.  He was instrumental in supporting 
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the election of a campesino to the presidency of the national producers’ organization 
in an attempt to wrest control away from corrupt industrialists and government 
agencies.   
 Mr. Larios argues that the major problem in organizing producers and 
intensifying production is an “organizational confusion”.  He believes that COVER 
should have been the sole director, where all the technological know-how and 
funding would be consolidated.  He explained that in Mexico, any civic organization 
can go to the government to solicit money and the government will respond to 
political pressure.  This means that there is no organizational direction and no way to 
account for investments.  
 According to Mr. Larios, there should be only two state-sponsored producer 
organizations, COVER and the National Consejo, with separate governing bodies.  
All other organizations working with producers should be non-governmental, with the 
ability to work with the government agencies but without the right to petition the 
government for direct funding.  This would allow for a consolidation of resources that 
would allow COVER to disperse appropriate technology and increase productivity. 
 Critics of COVER differed in how they perceived the role of COVER in the 
industry as a whole, but they agreed on the twin issues of disorganization and 
corruption.  Because COVER was not able to maintain an authoritative position over 
production and commercialization of the vanilla industry, corrupt government 
officials and local elites were able to co-opt the funding mechanism and benefit from 
funds that would have been allocated to producers.  A second set of critics feared that 
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COVER disorganization led to an erosion of local culture by pushing through 
programs based on expensive and inappropriate social programs and technology. 
 
The Culture and Technology of Production 
 These critics of COVER’s programs believe the government is addressing the 
needs of the industry at the expense of the diverse culture of traditional producers.  
COVER fails to take into account the social milieu that Sardan argued was critical.  
Rocio Aguilera, an anthropologist who works full time with the Culturas Populares (a 
government agency funded to promote cultural projects) argues that COVER is 
developing a program that is essentially inaccessible to indigenous producers.  She 
explained that the new technical packages being offered by the government do not 
take into account traditional indigenous producers’ social organization, and ultimately 
underwrite programs that require capital investments so high that indigenous farmers 
cannot access them.  Because the programs do not take into account the needs of 
these small-scale producers, government funding that was meant to help indigenous 
farmers goes to mestizos who already have access to capital and political resources.   
 For most of these indigenous producers, vanilla has been an ideal cash crop to 
integrate into other subsistence and cash crops.  Even if climate changes necessitate 
new technologies for vanilla production, Ms. Aguilera argues that vanilla production 
within traditional organizational schemes provides important secondary crops that 
would be lost if producers all became intensive vanilla producers.  Indigenous 
producers integrate vanilla production into a larger system of crop rotation that is 
focused on maize production for household consumption.  Within a maize field grow 
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important medicinal herbs and food products that would be lost if these crops were 
reduced.  Likewise, if intensive production required the cutting of more forest, other 
subsistence items would be lost. 
      As COVER lost its original focus of serving small scale producers, the programs 
they developed and funded most were not as accessible to indigenous farmers.  
Vanilla orchards were seen in terms of hectares, numbers of plants, rows of tutors and 
harvest capacity rather than the role of the crop in a broader system of subsistence.  
This limited the ability of indigenous producers to get involved with official 
programs, because to get involved in an extensive production system would throw off 
their traditional production organization. 
 COVER was the result of a diverse groups of individuals, but critics argue that 
the programs being offered by COVER are limited.  To Rocio, and others, COVER 
programs are directed only at those producers interested in intensive production.  She 
points out that the production of vanilla has always been small-scale for Totonacs and 
has been the most important crop they have collectively used to maintain a 
subsistence lifestyle in the midst of an ever-encroaching market economy.  The idea 
that both production systems, indigenous and intensive, could equally benefit from 
programs with COVER, was not acceptable to Rocio.  She argued that so far, all 
programs are inaccessible to traditional farmers --a group that far outnumbers new 
producers.  She sees this shift in policy as a result of corruption, where programs are 
designed by individuals that want to dedicate their efforts to the monocropping of 
vanilla.   
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 The idea that these communities are trapped in the dilemmas posed by 
tradition and change, is important for understanding many of the criticism launched 
by local anthropologists.  It’s not that these anthropologists are beholden to a static 
notion of indigenous existence, but that they are concerned with the fragile dynamic 
of tradition and change.  They object to government resources being given to those 
with easy access to resources, but they also object to poorly directed resources in 
indigenous communities. These modernizing programs have been responsible –at 
least in part- for the decline of rural, indigenous communities. Ms. Aguilera says that 
although the state of Veracruz has a lot of natural resources, it does not invest in 
manufacturing.  Because of this, the countryside is becoming a nursery while able-
bodied workers move to urban centers to find work.  Investment is needed for the 
survival of these communities, but investment only comes to communities with 
political ties. 
Ms. Aguilera makes the point that projects fail when they do not incorporate 
appropriate technology, do not tailor programs to available household labor, and do 
not reach out to the “have-nots” (the poorer producers).  As a case in point, she cites a 
Culturas Populares project she was involved in to re-integrate vanilla plantations into 
rural communities that had experienced dramatic declines in production.  She and her 
group targeted youth that would have traditionally learned cultivation techniques 
from their fathers.  They were able to start a successful project involving young men 
that eventually resulted in the building of the only rural indigenous curing house.  But 
the programs being offered most recently by COVER do not adequately take into 
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account household labor sources and propose techniques that are inappropriate for 
these communities. 
Labor 
 Vanilla production is described as the second most labor-intensive commodity 
on the world market, but it does not require heavy labor.  Families work together to 
maintain orchards and are able to accomplish the work with household labor.  Women 
are seen as partners in agricultural work.  In a subsistence-oriented economy, division 
of labor is observed and practiced along traditional lines. But ultimately, the work 
must be done and the family needs to accomplish work with available household 
members.  Rocio points out that recent projects with farmers fail to take the labor 
pool into account.  According to her, the size of the orchard should correspond to the 
labor force available.  She says, “You can’t have a one size fits all package.”  
COVER programs today are offering a development project that is not representative 
of all vanilla producers but favors producers that already have access to capital and 
other resources.  For producers with access to capital, hiring day laborers during 
pollination periods or harvest is doable.  But for indigenous farmers, this causes cash 
problems. 
     She was skeptical of the conference COVER had planned for the spring of 2006 
and was sure it would confirm her fears of government projects addressing only the 
needs of those with their feet firmly planted in the market economy.  She felt sure that 
most of the producers that came to the conference would be from citrus farmers.  In 
her mind, traditional producers do not have access to citrus orchards or shadehouses 
and this conference would focus on the needs of this limited group of producers.  In 
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her experience, this happened with many government initiatives in the countryside.       
She argued that the government should not fund citrus growers in an industry that has 
historically belonged to indigenous communities.  Government programs are 
designed to have social impact and should only be offered to those with the least 
means.  This sentiment was repeated often as I traveled around to various projects.   
 Production Technology      
     At a practical level, many critics accused COVER of pushing production 
techniques that have not been proven to be efficient or advantageous.  During 2005, 
COVER sponsored thirty vanilla groups –about half of them provided for irrigation 
systems and the other half shade-house projects.  But all 31 of the 2006 projects 
funded were shade houses.  For many, this signaled a policy change with several 
implications.  Irrigation projects could be implemented by groups working in all four 
production processes, which are available to a wide range of communities.  Shade 
house projects imply a certain level of resources.  For an organization set up to 
represent all vanilla producers, this was problematic; it was a sign of favoritism.  
From a technical aspect, it was a problem because the technique is still considered 
new for Mexican producers and many agronomists were not convinced it was an 
appropriate means to produce vanilla.  Erasmo Curti, a research agronomist who 
worked with Ms. Aguilera in the vanilla project, explained that focusing on 
shadehouse production is a mistake.  Shadehouses are extremely costly for Mexican 
growers.  He feels that it is more appropriate to integrate methods that allow for an 
intensification of plant numbers in pichoco, citrus or modified rainforest orchards.   
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 Before the decline of vanilla production in the late 1900s, the industry was 
fairly straightforward:  30,000 indigenous producers harvested traditionally grown 
vanilla and sold the beans to a limited number of curing houses in the local market.  
Producers negotiated between subsistence production and commodity crops in order 
to satisfy needs within their households.  They voiced dissatisfaction with the division 
of labor between producer and buyer, they sought better prices and were vocal about 
their dissatisfaction with this division of labor.  The founders of COVER saw an 
opportunity to rebuild a dying industry built on new ideas about the role of producer, 
curer, and industry and market control.  But the inability of COVER to maintain the 
position of director of these activities raises important questions about the role of 
government in development projects, especially in regard to variation among 
contemporary producers.  
          Erasmo Curti suggests an additional reason that COVER has not managed to 
garner the allegiance of producers as a whole (in addition to the issues of under 
representation and inaccessibility): its eagerness to push new, high-risk methods of 
vanilla production without thoroughly testing them first. 
          Given the confusion created by such a wide range of interests involved, it is no 
wonder COVER has seen its mandate diminish.  In five short years, COVER has been 
at the center of huge change.  An industry that has maintained a strict division of 
labor between producers and businesses was rapidly changing in every way.  The 
industry is now very complex and COVER has trying to represent too many interests.  
All this variation is complicated further by the lack of cohesion in organization.   
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Alternative Development:  Limiting Organization Goals 
 The current director of COVER, Isabel Engler, was keenly aware of the 
difficulties the organization faced in accomplishing the goal of intensifying 
production while protecting the producer. Obviously, the success of COVER relied 
on producers’ willingness and ability to intensify production.  But producers had 
made it clear that they would produce only on their terms.  They knew that the 
greatest profits were to be made in the market and they were now unwilling to sell to 
local buyers for low prices.  There producers, many with a long family history in 
vanilla production, knew well how to integrate cash crops into their agricultural cycle 
and how to use household labor.  They also had a sense of the value of their product 
and were demanding fair trade.  COVER was caught in the middle.   
          Engler was one of the first field agents for COVER under Vallejo.  She knew 
the producers well and had a good understanding of their lives and livelihood.  In her 
mind, COVER facilitates each process and makes the important contacts for the 
industry to grow.  She acknowledges the main problem “that prevents us from taking 
off” is that the process of curing and marketing vanilla has been monopolized by four 
or five individuals.  She explains that organizing producers into groups is an 
important first step to enable them to create access to a wider market, which the 
“government regards as a kind of business.”  For her, the success of this business is 
dependent on breaking the monopolies and “old ideas that persist.”  But she is an 
employee of the state government at this point and has very little leverage to change 
mandates given to her from above.  She was in office in 2006 when the large 
allocation of funds was given to the curing house.  She was angry but without any 
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power to stop the action.  When COVER lost local autonomy, her position became a 
matter of implementing programs prescribed by the state officials and negotiating 
with local leaders on the small funds left for COVER projects.   
 For COVER, the issue at hand is creating an industry where the producer has 
access to the market.  This is a political issue that takes a lot of time and energy for an 
organization that is also charged with creating a modern industry out of traditional 
production techniques, in an environment that has changed in the last forty years.  
COVER has lost its founding role as overseer of the chain of vanilla production-
curing-marketing. And my conversations with leaders –both inside and outside 
COVER- have yielded two reasons that I can easily summarize: an organizational 
deficit that allows corruption to resurface and over-investment in untested systems 
that are inaccessible to poorer (indigenous) producers.  Because of these deficits, 
COVER has failed to provide an alternative development agenda and instead 
reinforces the dynamics of power that allow for the exploitation of farmers. 
          In such a fragmented and confusing landscape, it is not surprising that 
producers would have low expectations of any government program. It is also not 
surprising that they should, for pragmatic reasons, choose to craft their own strategies 
that draw on available programs, but do not depend too much on them. They are 
willing to bet on vanilla but not willing to risk everything on government programs.   
To understand the significance of this move I needed to have information about the 
social organization of these producers and to understand their perception of 
development.  I was able to travel to many communities over the course of my 
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fieldwork with COVER agents.  At the conference, I was able to collect information 
about these ideas by conducting a survey of producers.   
 
Development on Producer’s Terms:  The Social Organization of Rural 
Production. 
 
 Traveling with COVER fields agents was important for understanding the 
social and economic organization of producers in this region.  The agents would make 
appointments for each week based on the needs of producers and the phase of various 
projects.  They had to find balance between visiting well-established projects and 
visiting the newer projects at each building phase.  We usually made it to three or 
four projects per day.  One day we arrived at a project site after numerous buses, only 
to find the field empty.  We walked through the field, which had been recently 
burned, measured its dimensions, and checked out the soil.  After waiting an hour for 
the leader to arrive, the agent decided we should walk into the community, about two 
miles away.   
We made the uphill journey on foot, as bus service was infrequent and there 
was no guarantee one would come along until the evening.  We found the entire 
group at the leader’s house, mixing concrete and filling wooden forms to build the 
posts for the shadehouse.  The field agent inspected the posts they had made 
previously and calculated how many posts the house needed in total.  They talked 
about what the next step would be, and when we would return.  While the agent 
talked at length with the leader, I had the opportunity to talk to the other members.  
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They were surprised to learn that I was from the United States; they had assumed I 
was from the state government.  Several of them offered that they had previously 
been in the United States as workers.  One in particular wanted to talk about his time 
in California working in produce fields.  He laughed when I asked him if he ever 
planned to return, “I’m too old to do that again.  Plus, I’m going to be a vanilla 
producer.”  I asked if migration was a common practice for other families in the 
community.  Of six hundred community members, they estimated that two hundred 
are working in the U.S.  One hundred of these migrants were in California while 
eighty lived in Texas.    
They invited us to a lunch which their wives were cooking in the main house 
of the complex.  We sat around a table next to the kitchen and passed around large 
bowls of chicken cooked in a red chile sauce, rice, beans and hand-made tortillas.  
After the meal, I excused myself and asked the women if I could join them in the 
kitchen.  They giggled when I asked them how to make the chicken sauce.  I asked 
them about their involvement with the vanilla project, as the group had officially 
listed two women on the membership list.  They said that once all the heavy labor 
was completed for the shadehouse, they planned to help their husbands in the vanilla 
business. They were aware that vanilla took a lot of care, and knew women were 
considered good guardians of vanilla orchards.  They were excited about the project 
and anxious for the shadehouse to be completed so that the group could begin 
planting the vines. 
The agent and group members finished up the timeline for the next stage of 
building and agreed on a meeting time six weeks later.  One of the men had arranged 
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for a young man in the community to drive us back to the main road in his pickup 
truck.  On the thirty minute ride, the driver mentioned that he had recently returned 
from working in San Francisco.  He had made enough money working in a restaurant 
and car wash that he was able to build a house and start a family.  He thinks about 
returning, but doesn’t want to leave his small child behind and worries about crossing 
the border.  He had not yet gotten involved in the vanilla project, but thought he 
might if it worked out for the others. 
The time that I spent traveling with COVER field agents allowed me to 
observe the daily lives of producers and to develop an understanding of the role of 
social organization in the economic strategies of rural communities.  It was an 
understanding of these various producers that helped me to formulate a picture of the 
range of households involved in vanilla and to seek out representative households to 
work with more closely. 
 When I learned about the international producers’ conference COVER 
planned for the following spring, I knew this would be a good opportunity to test 
these impressions.  COVER director Ms. Engler gave me permission to conduct a 
survey and I provided her with a copy of the survey for approval before the 
conference.  I also showed the survey to Mr. Vallejo and Ms. Aguilera and visited 
with them about what might be accomplished with the survey.  I hired two assistants 
to help me collect data during the morning sessions of the first two days of the three 
day conference. 
         My main purpose was to get a general portrait of the producers that COVER 
had been organized to serve. This opportunity proved to be an excellent moment to 
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speak to a large cross-section of producers and learn first-hand of their needs, hopes 
and plans. The general profile that emerged from the survey was that of producers 
who grew much of their own maize, employed household labor (and did not have the 
means to hire wage-laborers), and would stand to benefit most from low-tech 
investments and niche markets. In spite of the genuine enthusiasm for the shadehouse 
project that I had witnessed, most producers were wary of costly investments. They 
were much more concerned with simple matters like irrigation and fair prices. 
        To get a sense of the variation among producers, I conducted two surveys.  Both 
were a random sample of the individuals attending.  The first was a structured survey 
with 100 producers and concentrated on more quantifiable data, especially in regard 
to household structure, labor issues, economic resources and production technology.  
The second was an opened-ended survey with a more qualitative focus, especially in 
terms of how producers view vanilla production in their lives and their ideas about 
improving production. I conducted this survey with 40 individuals (20 female and 20 
male), seeking to understand the relationship between production and investment 
decisions and the intensification process. What follows is an overview of the results. 
These results paint a picture of a pragmatic, forward-looking group of producers, for 
whom vanilla production is one source of income, but never the exclusive source.   
 
 Survey Results:  Households and Vanilla Production 
 In the first survey, my goal was to develop a broad sense of the social and 
economic organization of producers that attended the conference.  I gathered data on 
where participants were from, age, marriage status and household members.  I asked 
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about use of household labor and data on the types of crops they planted and how 
they used the crops, how many hectares each family ‘owned’ and what kinds of 
agricultural inputs they used.  I used this survey to collect data about participants’ 
current vanilla production, use of development programs and the reasons they were 
attending the conference.   
           Economic and Social Organization of Producer Households 
 The majority of the producers at the conference were male (81%) and married 
(75%) and the median age was mid-fifties.  Most of the producers live with their 
extended family and 90% responded that they work with their spouse to accomplish 
all the tasks that the family needs to complete to provide for household consumption 
needs.  They saw their spouses as equal partners.  Land tenancy was split fairly 
consistently between ejidal (communally owned) and private property.  Most of the 
participants farmed small plots of land; 41% had less than 2 hectares to farm. Thirty-
five percent of the producers speak an indigenous language and more than half are 
literate in Spanish. 
            Current Systems of Vanilla Production 
 About one third of those interviewed are very new to vanilla production, and 
many of those are only harvesting their first crop this year.  Fourteen percent of these 
producers have already installed an irrigation system in their vanilla orchard and one 
hundred percent of those without irrigation plan to do so.  Only thirteen percent use 
chemicals to control pests and fungus, the majority of the producers preferred to deal 
with these problems by removing effected leaves and keeping a clean orchard. The 
most common tutor system used by these producers was split between orange grove 
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and pichoco orchards.  For most producers, vanilla accounts for a small percentage of 
their daily work.  Outside of pollination and harvest periods, these producers are able 
to attend to their orchards at the end of their work day.  They often responded that 
they work “a rato”, a little here and a little there, several times a week.  They 
expressed concerns over the recent drought and said that their inability to add 
irrigation to the orchards was detrimental to production.   
 The majority of these households produce all or most of the corn they 
consume.  Only 21 of these vanilla producers do not grow maize.  Of the 79% that do 
produce corn, only 28 actually buy any regularly.  The rest of these producers 
maintain subsistence production of corn for their family’s food needs.  They also 
produce other cash crops such as coffee, beans, bananas, tropical fruits and at time 
sell corn.   
 They often said that they would like to hire laborers to help when they are 
unable to complete tasks but do not have the cash to do so.  In these families, 43% 
have used migration as a strategy to bring in cash, but the majority of the respondents 
had sent sons as laborers rather than traveling themselves.  Of these migrants, the 
majority found work in Mexico rather than internationally.  When asked if they plan 
to migrate in the future, only 14% responded positively.  Those that do not want to 
migrate added, “If God is willing, vanilla will work out and I won’t have to leave my 
family.”   
 Of those that have been producing vanilla for more than two years, 51% 
planned to sell that year’s harvest as green beans to local buyers.  But one hundred 
percent of all of the producers in this survey wanted to learn how to cure their 
105 
harvests and would do so as soon as possible.  They expressed this as a primary 
incentive for attending the conference.  They also expressed an interest in learning to 
produce value-added products with vanilla and to develop markets outside the region 
to sell these products.  One of the most significant advantages that curing vanilla 
provided these producers is the ability to hold out for higher prices.  Green vanilla has 
to be fermented right away or it will mold.  So farmers that sell raw vanilla must sell 
immediately and cannot spend too much time looking for better prices.  Properly 
cured vanilla has a long shelf life and those that have learned this skill are willing to 
store their vanilla for longer periods of time.  This gives the producers more power in 
the market place.   
 Besides maintaining small vanilla orchards on family land, many of these 
producers also participate in group projects, especially shadehouse production.  One 
hundred percent of the respondents said that they thought group projects were a good 
way to organize and would be willing to participate in projects, especially if it helped 
them to establish ties outside of Mexico and to develop new markets for their product.  
They understood implicitly the significance of establishing markets outside the region 
and wanted to do so with direct access to those markets.  These producers are fed up 
with “coyotes”, local elite buyers and curing houses, as is evidenced in their desire to 
cure their own vanilla and develop direct relationships to market for cured vanilla and 
value-added products. 
 The only individuals in this group that were not COVER members came from 
outside the state and everyone also named a local group to which they were affiliated.  
Less than half, 38%, of these producers had received assistance from COVER 
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through technical support and only 12% had participated in other forms of 
development programs, such as grants or loans to buy plants and compost, install 
irrigation or build a shadehouse.   
 
Development Projects and Producer Expectations 
          The second survey I conducted was constructed for a more in-depth 
examination of the role of development in producers’ lives, and to understand their 
expectations of programs.  This survey included most of the same demographic data 
as the first survey, but allowed for longer discussions with participants about their 
goals in working with COVER and what they hoped to gain by producing vanilla. 
          When asked if they would like to increase their production, the majority of the 
producers responded positively.  Those that did not plan to increase cited a lack of 
labor as the inhibiting factor.  When asked what would encourage them to produce 
more, the majority responded that both access to finances for irrigation and fair prices 
would entice increased production.  They said that they were more likely to invest 
more labor than capital to intensify production.  They all worked to some extent with 
their extended family and felt they would increase everyone’s work before seeking 
wage laborers. If they had access to cash to pay laborers, they said they would 
intensify more but they did not want to take on debt to accomplish this.   
  The obstacles for these producers lay in two variables with historic 
precedents:  lack of water and lack of consistent fair prices.  Producers argue that 
access to both these would spur an increase in production.  Because this region had 
been so heavily de-forested, producers were wary of changes in rainfall.  At the time 
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of this conference, they were experiencing a severe drought.  Both producers with 
traditional orchards and new production systems were worried about their 
investments.  Without rain, the vanilla vines would wither and they would lose not 
only the work and money they had already invested in the orchards, but it would take 
three years time to rebuild viable orchards.   
 Equally problematic for these producers is the issue of price.  They were 
adamant that they planned to intensify production on the basis of developing more 
consistent market prices and being able to make more direct relationships with 
outside buyers and markets.  They were aware of the history of tension between 
producers and local buyers and had come to the conference to learn about 
alternatives.   
 Producers were fairly consistent in expressing what they would like from 
government programs.  First, they want COVER to provide them with direct aid.  
They expressed concern over past projects where government agencies make 
promises of aid but the funding or work never arrives.  Many of them felt that their 
presence at the conference would be proof to the government that there are real 
producers in Veracruz and that they are ready to organize.  They are happy to 
participate in projects that provided materials to build orchards and with the exception 
of cash needs for hiring laborers, do not expect to receive monetary aid.  They want 
irrigation materials, plants, compost, tutors and the supplies to build shadehouses.  
The majority of these producers felt COVER should focus their efforts on irrigation 
systems.  With the lack of water caused by environmental changes, lack of irrigation  
could be detrimental to their success. 
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 The producers had the feeling that COVER should create a system that cut 
down on the corruption of former development projects.  They also felt like COVER 
should play a role in protecting producers.  Many expressed that they thought the 
government should play a major role in setting prices and building markets.  They 
had specifically come to the conference to find out about possible markets.  They felt 
that their presence at the conference conveyed a message to both the government and 
buyers:  “We are here and we are looking for new ways to sell vanilla.”     
 The majority of these producers see vanilla as an alternative business to 
supplement other subsistence and cash crops.  They view vanilla as a good crop to 
integrate into their larger agricultural cycle for two reasons.  Vanilla was easily 
integrated into their other subsistence and commodity crops because it is possible to 
intensify production in a small space but also because they felt an attachment to 
vanilla.  For these producers, vanilla was attached to a way of life.  They expressed a 
love of growing vanilla in spite of the inconsistent market in recent years and troubles 
with water.  These individuals claim that vanilla is a part of a heritage and that 
through good times or bad, their commitment to it would keep them producing, at 
least on a small scale.  But there would have to be some changes before they could be 
persuaded to invest more land or labor, as COVER was encouraging them to do.  
Those changes would have to come in the form of fair prices and more control over 
the market. 
 Producers attended this conference with great hopes of making connections 
with other producers, learning about available help and about markets.  One producer 
said that they came because they wanted the governor to see that there really are 
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vanilla producers and that they are serious about production.  The atmosphere was 
very positive and producers were attending the conference with hopes for the future, 
for their families and for vanilla. 
 
The Social and Economic Organization of Production: Betting on Vanilla 
 This survey is useful for understanding what Olivier de Sardan describes as 
“actor’s strategies and contextual constraints”.  First, it gives us a good picture of 
what the phrase “appropriate technology” means in this situation. Second, it creates a 
picture of the producer population and the optimal scale of their vanilla production.  
Finally, it shows consensus among producers regarding their plans for selling their 
harvests and points to a new direction in the industry.  These ideas are consonant with 
the critiques made by local anthropologists and agronomists.   
 It is significant that none of the producers interviewed spoke of a need for 
shadehouses. Their needs were for irrigation and pest-control schemes that are much 
more modest and low-cost investments. Their use of citrus and pichocos as tutors was 
an indicator of their interest in modest innovations. In short, an alternative 
development scheme seeking to use an appropriate technology of vanilla production 
would do well to follow the investments and emphases of the first phase of COVER. 
 In terms of scale, the general reluctance to use hired labor suggests that the 
intensification of vanilla production should be such that all of the work can be done 
by available household labor. Otherwise, the families will have to hire paid laborers 
and run the risk of incurring debt, a risk that has been historically fatal to their 
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survival as small farmers. This is not a producer population that lends itself to large-
scale projects.  
          The producers’ strong desire to cure their own vanilla beans suggests that they 
would benefit more from an investment in curing technology than from shadehouse 
construction.   Such an investment could be the basis for an alternative development 
strategy that would bring maximum benefit to the small producer instead of the 
middlemen and industrialists. Such a strategy might bring on the opposition of vested 
interests, since it would bypass the local elite and the state government bureaucracy.   
          These households need to have means of meeting cash needs that come with 
education and rites of passage. Without a cash-earning source, like vanilla, they will 
be forced to migrate in search of it.  Many of them are betting on vanilla. Their needs 
are modest, but crucial to meet --if their rural lifestyle is to be sustained. The two 
chapters that follow provide an in-depth look at two different families that are 
representative of the producers I surveyed at the conference. They want to remain and 
raise their families in rural Veracruz, and to that end they have adopted vanilla as part 
of a diversified economic strategy.  Development strategies will succeed to the extent 
that they are attuned to these modest but crucial needs.  
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Chapter 6 Betting on Tradition and Innovation:  The Lopez Family   
 
 From the bus window, a uniform landscape yields to patches of distinct color.  
This patch is a freshly-plowed field, ready for the second crop of the year.  That patch 
is drying corn, waiting for harvest. Next, we pass a fallowing field and on the other 
side of the bus, the forests have given way to cattle grazing.  Looking down from the 
bus, I see the loading docks at the citrus cooperative, closed and empty more often 
than not.   Thirty minutes out of town, we cross a river and drive through a banana 
plantation.  We pass through small communities, slowing to pick up a passenger 
waiting at a crossroads or to wait for farm animals crossing the highway.  This bus 
takes me out to a community one hour from Papantla to visit with a family of vanilla 
producers. 
 The second time I traveled out to work with the Lopez family, I missed the 
bus in Papantla.  But this was no serious concern; I knew that I could jump a different 
bus that would pass by the road that leads away from the highway to their 
community.  This alternate bus would mean a walk of four kilometers because I had 
missed the only morning bus to the community.  As I walked through several 
communities on the way, individuals came out of their houses to assist me, sure that I 
was a lost tourist.  They laughed when I told them I was not looking for the ruins of 
Tajin but for the community of Zapata.   Once they found out I was visiting the 
family of Sergio Lopez they sent me on my way with directions to the family house.  
Occasionally I passed a PEMEX sign marking the way to a pump pad.  Several fence 
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posts acted as billboards, advertising Coca Cola or petrochemical companies.  Hand 
made signs offered public service announcements:  “Violence in the home is not 
good”, “Maternal health is a community asset” “Wash your vegetables with clean 
water” “Don’t litter.” The road cut through fields of corn: fields tilled, fields with new 
sprouted corn, fields with tall green sturdy stalks rustling in the wind.  I walked 
around one more corner, around one more milpa, over one more hill, the road turned 
into the community of Emiliano Zapata.   
 I first met the patriarch of the Lopez family at the Vanilla Festival in Papantla 
in December.  Sergio had just been elected the president of the national vanilla 
producer’s organization. There was some controversy surrounding his election, as he 
was the first president of the organization that others considered to be a real producer, 
and a campesino at that.  Shortly after his election, I had a meeting with a local broker 
who described the controversy.  This broker was a long time friend of Sergio’s and 
supported his election.  His interpretation of the controversy was that having a 
peasant in a leadership role meant less opportunity for government officials to steal 
funds.  This made these officials angry.  It was at the vanilla festival that his position 
was to be unveiled to various government officials that had come to participate in the 
ceremonies.   
The next time I met with Sergio was in the offices of COVER, where he had 
come to talk over some business with the director and to set up the office of the 
national organization for producers.  Sergio had been a member of the original group 
that worked together to establish COVER.  Once COVER was established, he had 
worked with board members to solicit producers and build the programs.  His family 
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kept their traditional vanilla orchard in the forest and they had invested in vanilla for 
their orange orchards.  They were waiting on a grant to add irrigation to their orange 
orchard.  Sergio was involved with COVER programs and decision making, but once 
he was elected president of the National Vanilla Producers Organization, he spent 
most of his time traveling between Papantla, Mexico City and Puebla, working with 
government officials to raise money for projects and talking with the different 
regional vanilla organizations about their needs and projects.  One of the chief 
complaints of farmers was a lack of organization for producers.  Sergio traveled 
widely to meet with groups to discuss the best ways to organize and solicit the 
government.  During the first six months that he held the position of president of the 
National Vanilla Producers Organization, his office was housed in the COVER office 
in Papantla.  For this reason, when he was not traveling for national business, he was 
involved in COVER business, which usually amounted to his weighing in on new 
projects and calming the emotions of individuals and groups that came to COVER 
wanting to know why their projects had not been funded or they had not seen 
extension workers in over six months.   
When I first met Maria, Sergio’s wife, she was sitting in the plastic chair 
against the front wall of the COVER office.  Sergio was in conference with the 
director.  We talked over the sound of cars and buses on the street in front of us. 
Though we had just been introduced, she was an avid and enthusiastic 
conversationalist. Without much prompting from me, she told me about her five 
children and of her family’s life in the community.  She described the feast of the 
Three Kings in detail.  In the community where her family lives, the three kings are 
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considered the guardians of the milpa.  On the January seventh each year, they take 
freshly prepared tamales to the milpa as a gift to the kings.  She told me about her 
children, now all grown adults and their dislike of gathering the family water at the 
well. They had recently told their mother that they should put running water in the 
family house. They did not see why they should continue to walk to the community 
well each day to haul buckets of water to the house. She laughed as she described 
their discontent. She told them there was no need for running water.  They had a 
community well down the hill from the family house. Trips to the well provided 
opportunity to meet with relatives and neighbors, catch up on news, and talk about the 
weather, the crops, and the next community event. And besides, she laughed, ”What 
else would they do with all their time?”  This first meeting with the matriarch of the 
household was encouraging.  My goal in establishing a closer relationship with 
working households was to understand the daily lives of producers and how specific 
systems of social organization led to economic strategy and implementation.   
 
     After I had been working in Papantla and with COVER for several months, I had 
begun to seek out households where I would conduct more long-term, focused studies 
of the daily lives and work of producers.  Part of working with COVER was to 
understand the variation among producers and the production process.  As I traveled 
with COVER agents into the field to work with individuals and groups, I found that 
producers had as much variation between them as they did similarities.  When vanilla 
production declined in the end of the 1900s, the type of households producing vanilla 
was fairly homogenous.  Until that time, most vanilla in Mexico was produced in the 
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rain forest on very small scale.  Today, as I stated previously, there are four systems 
of production which are practiced by a wider range of households.  Some traditional 
producers have diversified into pichoco orchards or have introduced vanilla into their 
citrus fields.  Likewise, individuals and households not previously involved in vanilla 
production have constructed shade houses or pichoco orchards. For this reason, I 
needed to choose households that were representative of these similarities and the 
variation. I did not think of producers as representing a lineal progression from 
traditional to contemporary production.  I think to divide producers along those lines 
would miss out some of the important ways these producers are able to strategize 
economically in a constantly changing market.  But I did want to work with families 
that represented the spectrum of producers, both in the techniques they used to 
produce vanilla, in the ways they organized household labor and in how they viewed 
organizations’ and producers’ access to the market.   
          The household of Maria and Sergio was a good place to begin, since they have 
worked with vanilla their whole lives.  They grew up working with their parents in 
traditional orchards and have integrated modern techniques into their household 
work.  They now have a large crop of vanilla that they grow in their orange grove.  
They live in an extended family household and work with their grown children and 
their spouses.  They produce all the corn that the household consumes together on 
their multiple plots of land and manage cash crops that they have integrated into the 
subsistence plots (oranges, beans, chilis, fish).   Their experience bears out how 
COVER, at its best, has not fostered an over-reliance on vanilla production, and has 
encouraged modest innovations consistent with the producers’ need to maintain 
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diversification. In short, Maria and Sergio are the beneficiaries of Vallejo’s policy of 
preference for modest innovations (the use of citrus trees) and simple irrigation 
schemes. Even though these policies have been eclipsed by the more recent over-
investment in shadehouses, the good investments that have been made continue to 
bear fruit.  
 
 I spent six months visiting with this family, in their home, in their vanilla 
orchards and at community events.  They visited my family during Corpus Cristi, 
Papantla’s big saint’s day celebration.  Early on, as I waited with the women from the 
Perez household for a truck to take us to a school event, my presence raised questions 
among community members.  Pointing to me, a woman asked one of the small 
children of the household who I was.  The little one responded, “My aunt.”  The 
crowd of women laughed and reported back to the matriarch about the rumors her 
granddaughter was starting.  When we returned to the house later, they began to have 
a conversation about who I was in relation to the household. I had been impressed 
with the ease with which they had welcomed me into their daily lives.  But now that 
we were seeing each other throughout the week, they decided they needed some way 
to understand my presence.  
The matriarch encouraged the children to continue to call me Tia (Aunt), and 
the daughters discussed my becoming a godmother to one of the children.  I 
suggested that one of the un-married daughters get married during the time I had left 
in Mexico as I was anxious to see a traditional wedding in a community.  They all 
laughed but declined my offer to find an appropriate male.  The un-married daughters 
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were very happy in the extended household.  They enjoyed working with their sisters-
in-law; they felt good about helping their parents in the house and fields. Their father 
had divided his land among his five children, male and female alike, though 
traditionally land would have only gone to the sons.  These young women were not 
anxious to marry mostly because they would have to leave their parent’s house and 
move to the house and community of their husband’s family.  Given that no wedding 
was in the future, they decided that I should become the godmother of the youngest 
grandchild during her third year presentation at the church. This meant I had an 
official relationship to the household, neighbors could be told that I was a comadre 
(co-mother, meaning godmother) and the children would continue to call me Auntie 
or godmother.   
 The Lopez family lives in a community an hour bus ride from Papantla.  Their 
household is made up of three generations. Sergio is the eldest male and Maria is the 
eldest female, both in their mid-fifties.  They have been married for thirty years. They 
have five children, two of whom are married. One married son lives with his wife and 
child in the household.  The second married son was able to buy a house one plot 
away from the family house and lives there with his wife and two children.  The 
family lives in the house that Sergio inherited from his father. The house is a 
traditional Totonac structure, modified with some modern materials:  dirt floor, 
bamboo walls, tin roof.  They have a stove constructed out of adobe in one end of the 
structure.  Most of the household cooking is done at this stove.  There is a long table 
where the women usually eat after having fed the men in the other structure.  Behind 
cloth curtains is the sleeping bed.  Beside this traditional house is a modern house 
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with cement floors, walls and tin roof.  This house has bedrooms that belong to the 
unmarried sisters, the unmarried brother and one of the married couples.  Each 
morning, the women make a small breakfast for the men before they head out to the 
fields.  Maria instructs her daughters and daughter-in-law in the daily tasks.  They 
divide up the day’s work: corn must be ground for the day’s tortillas, meals must be 
prepared and taken to the men in the field at mid day, children must be attended to, 
clothes must be washed at the river, vegetables must be harvested from the fields.   
 The Lopez family balances subsistence production with cash commodity 
production.  Their lifestyle is representative of both traditional social organizational 
patterns and modern struggles with local, national and global markets. They are 
traditional in the sense that they live in extended households, utilize household labor 
to produce both subsistence and cash crops and maintain community relations 
through ritual and social obligations. They are modern in many of the subtle ways 
they have changed their production, investment and consumption patterns.  An 
examination of their life stories illustrates this blend: maintenance of important 
traditional life ways makes modern production more efficient and sustainable.  What 
follows is an account of this balance through their life histories.  The accounts lay a 
framework for understanding the nature of social organization in a traditional 
community and how these families balance household needs through labor, 
management and social participation. 
  
Maria’s Story:  Social Organization in Rural Communities 
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 Maria, the matriarch of this extended family, was born in the community 
where they presently live.  She is in her mid-fifties and runs the house with the help 
of her daughters-in-law and daughters, whom she supervises from a chair in the 
kitchen.  She works in the orchards when there is need for extra hands during the 
spring, but her weak eye sight makes it hard to pollinate the flowers anymore.  She 
spends her days organizing the work of the women of the household (two daughters 
and two daughter-in-laws) and visits with her sisters, sharing recent gossip.   
She began telling me her life story by explaining the difficulties she 
experienced both as a child and as a young adult. She has spent her entire life being 
responsible for the care of her family: first as a child with poor parents and then as a 
young adult with a sick child.  Because her parents did not have sons, she was 
expected to help the family in the fields.  She said that when she was young, her 
father drank a lot and mis-treated her mother.  He was often ill and so Maria was 
counted on to work in the fields and to take on extra jobs to earn money to help 
support her younger siblings.  It was not until her siblings were grown that she felt 
able to leave home and marry. 
     Women generally marry men from nearby communities and are expected to take 
up residence in the man’s father’s house. Once Maria decided to marry Sergio and 
leave her family’s house, she was faced with a new obstacle.  As the new daughter-in-
law, she would be expected to work for her mother-in-law in the household.  Having 
spent so much of her childhood in the field and orchards helping her father (or 
replacing him), she was not used to domestic work and felt uncomfortable in her new 
role.  Perhaps, in addition to not wanting to leave younger siblings at home with an 
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irresponsible father, she put off her marriage in order to avoid this situation.  She was 
uncomfortable when she first arrived at her in-laws home, feeling like she belonged in 
the fields with a machete rather than in the house at the cooking fire.  
     Maria lived with her parents-in-law after marriage until her first born experienced 
health problems.  Given a lack of health care in the community, Maria had to take the 
baby to Papantla for medical care.  At this time, her husband was working for the 
national petroleum company and was often away from home.  She was able to stay 
with a friend in Papantla and attend to the baby’s medical needs, but leaving the 
community was very difficult, both emotionally and financially.  In town, she had to 
have cash to pay for her food and medical needs.  In the community, Maria had taken 
care of her siblings and was adept at fieldwork.  In Papantla, life was difficult 
especially given her illiteracy. She could not read signs or the forms given to her in 
the medical clinics.  There were doctors that offered treatments but no cures and 
endless demands for cash.  In addition to all that, she was separated from her support 
network in the community and her connection to the subsistence she had managed 
from childhood.   
 The community at that time practiced a system of communal land ownership 
called the ejido.  This practice is important to understand because it is integral to the 
use patterns of households in this region.  In an ejidal system, community members 
had access to unused parcels of land.  Maria described how they could collect 
firewood and medicinal herbs anywhere.  Now, each parcel is considered private 
property and individuals are limited in where they can gather useful items. 
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   As mentioned earlier, households generally had access to enough land that 
they were able to divide the land into parcels for several purposes.  Using swidden 
agricultural techniques, households would allocate one portion of their accessible 
land for milpa production.  After clearing trees and underbrush, they would plant 
maize for household consumption.  On the outskirts of these plots, they planted beans 
and squash.  Though they planted these crops primarily for household consumption, 
they could barter or sell these crops as needed. At any one time, a portion of the land 
would be allowed to fallow. As trees and underbrush grew, these forests could be 
used to grow vanilla and as gathering space for wild vegetables, medicinal and 
culinary herbs and firewood.  
 If the household had access to a sufficient amount of land, they might keep a 
portion in original forest growth or rent out a parcel to neighbors or households from 
nearby communities.  This rotating of crops and forest lands has been in practice for 
centuries and continues to be the preferred practice.  However, due to the 
privatization of lands that left households with diminished access to lands, households 
have had to diversify economic activities.  Families have now converted some parcels 
of land to commodity crops (orange, leeches, banana) and have begun to see a change 
in migration patterns.  From an outsider’s point of view, this household followed 
fairly traditional patterns of production, distribution and consumption, but Maria 
often commented during our visits on the changes she sees in her children’s lives.  
During her childhood, food was almost exclusively produced by the family or 
gathered in the woods.  She worried that her children didn’t want to eat traditional 
foods and relied on store-bought products.  But she is very proud that her children all 
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work with the family. The fact that they are able to keep their family together in the 
community is the result of careful balance between subsistence and commodity 
production.  If they were unable to produce the majority of the food that their family 
consumes or unable to produce and market a cash crop they would have to diversify 
their economic strategy further.  She and Sergio were able to purchase several large 
tracts of land over the last twenty years and now have enough land to keep all their 
children busy and the entire household fed.  While she is adamant that her family 
stays together and counsels her children to stay in the community, she is keenly aware 
that there are pressures on her children.  One of her daughters worked for a short time 
in Poza Rica, a large petroleum city.  Sergio had been hurt in an auto accident and she 
wanted to help the family out by taking wage labor.  After several months, her mother 
begged her to come home.  She was happy to oblige and returned to the community.   
Maria is reluctant to allow her children to migrate for wage work, but she is 
eager to adapt growing techniques to increase the family’s commodity production.  
Increasing their profits in commodities will allow one more generation of her family 
to stay in the community.  It will allow for her grandchildren to be educated and for 
her family to afford health care and improve their home and invest in more lands.  
Family stability is paramount.  Balancing subsistence and market production 
perpetuates stability. 
Vanilla has never been a part of the food tradition of this region.  Before the 
conquest, vanilla was a tribute item collected in the wild and sent to the empire as 
payment.  During the colonial period, it was integrated into traditional planting 
practices and became an important cash crop.  It is important to note however, that 
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vanilla is not a common ingredient in food or anything medicinal in these 
communities.  The production of vanilla was never intensified in this region.  These 
farmers used vanilla as a tool.  Much like the majority of producers today, vanilla 
production was integrated into a larger production system.  Key to this production 
system was household labor and land use patterns.   
Maria’s father planted vanilla in the traditional manner during her childhood 
and she was involved in the care of the orchard from a young age.  When she was ten, 
her father fell from ladder and was not able to care for the crop.  She was sent to 
pollinate the orchard on her own.  This technique of planting in the forest was 
common until the late 1900s.  Traditionally producers would sell their beans green to 
buyers.  Maria’s family always sold their harvest green.  At that time, crops were cut 
before Day of the Dead when families needed the cash to purchase consumer items 
for the festivities.  Buyers traveled out into communities and paid cash.  As prices 
world wide began to fall, producers in Mexico were not able to sell their vanilla at a 
price high enough to justify the labor.  Farmers moved on to other cash crops.   
Though prices remain low, this family is working to integrate vanilla into a 
diversified economic strategy.  This is not something new, as Maria’s stories about 
her childhood illustrate.  While much has changed in the forty some odd years since 
she was a child, the practice of balancing subsistence agriculture with cash crops 
remains a significant economic strategy.  For many of these producers, investing in 
vanilla today is a continuation of a century’s old pattern that has enabled them to 
reproduce social patterns in a world where many must rely on market exchange for 
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subsistence.  For Maria, success in the vanilla business would enable her to keep her 
children at home for one more generation. 
Sergio’s Story: From Landless Peasant to Landowning Producer 
 Sergio was not born in the community and only came to reside there as a 
young adult.  He was the eldest son of a farmer in northern Veracruz and because his 
mother was the second wife, he was sent out to work for wages at an early age.  The 
work he was able to attain at such a young age was low paid and involved heavy 
labor.  He often described the working conditions as harsh.  He moved around to 
various ranches in the county and was paid very little for a day’s work.  He slept in 
the fields and he ate whatever the bosses threw his way:  tortillas and occasionally 
beans.   
He eventually found work with the national petroleum company, PEMEX and 
was able to save some of the money he earned. It was at this time that he went to the 
community of Zapata, where his father had moved with his extended family and 
began to look for a wife.  He met Maria and they entered into a marriage agreement.  
Maria wanted to put off their marriage for as long as possible to continue to care for 
her siblings, so Sergio continued with PEMEX.  He was able to save enough from the 
petroleum job to return to Zapata and purchase land, which was for sale because of 
new privatization laws.  As a relative outsider, he had to establish himself in the 
community.  He tells a story about how his arrival in the community created 
suspicion among the elder men.  He had been working all over the region for wages 
and they did not know what to make of him.  He challenged them, “I know who I am. 
I will work hard in this community.  If after five years, you do not think I should be 
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here, I will leave.”  Six months later, he was offered a position in the community 
cargo, an important religious-political position.  He continued to work with PEMEX 
because he was able to use his wages to purchase more land.  When PEMEX offered 
him a severance package after ten years of work, he invested the cash in more land 
and turned to full-time farming, with enough land to balance household subsistence 
and commodity production.  Vanilla was one of the cash crops he integrated into this 
system.  “I kept buying and I kept working the land.  The first thing I did was to plant 
vanilla in the jungle, following the traditional system.  Then I planted oranges.  
Before that, I planted a lot of beans and jalapenos to sell.  After that, I bought another 
plot of land so that my children would not suffer as I did and have something to 
work.”   
 The Lopez family has built their life on long held traditions but is creative in 
the manner in which they integrate new ideas and enterprises.  They are adamant that 
the survival of their family relies on the passing on of traditional values of land 
management and subsistence work.  Sergio is concerned that local families tend to 
sell off land and children are left with little options but low pay wage labor on other’s 
land or migration.  He feels that families do not value rural life.  He said that his goal 
is to “give something to my children, so that one day they say, ‘Good, my father was 
worried about us.’”  Land provides an option for the next generation. 
 
Social Organization of Labor:  Household work 
 
 This integration of cash crops into the broader system of subsistence crop 
production has persisted for many generations.  The way in which these households 
have organized household labor to accomplish this balance is important to the 
126 
survival of this lifestyle.  When households are not able to meet the demands for labor 
within their own family, they are forced to hire labor which poses problems.  First, 
hired labor requires access to cash which is almost always limited in these 
communities.  Second, it is difficult to find individuals for hire, given that most 
families are involved in pooling household labor for their own subsistence and/or 
commodity production. 
 This household has seven adult workers that perform most of the labor in the 
house and fields, though occasionally they hire non-family members during peak 
periods (vanilla fertilization and orange harvest).  Women tend to work in the 
domestic duties.  They are responsible for the kitchen work, the house and house 
animals and the children.  They rise early to begin preparing the morning tortillas and 
sweet coffee.  In this extended household, once the men have headed to the fields, the 
five women talk about the day and decide who will be in charge of the main meal.  
The woman in charge of this meal will gather up ingredients, ask for money from 
Maria if there are items that must be purchased, and then begin the task.  The others 
share the daily tasks of preparing the corn for tortillas (which will be made 
throughout the day for each meal or snack), washing clothes at the well, gathering 
firewood, hauling water to the house for drinking and cooking, watching over the 
children, tending to the animals, tending to customers in their house store, chatting 
with neighbors and the various other endless tasks of the home.  I asked if there was a 
system for deciding who did what in the house each day.  Were there ever 
disagreements or fights?  They all laughed and said that Maria was easy to work with, 
she gave them the money they needed when they needed it and they could cook 
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whatever they decided.  They knew there was conflict in other households, but in 
general, their household got along well and enjoyed working together.   
The men, Sergio and his three adult sons, divide their time between various 
plots of land, depending on the cycle of each crop. They start each morning at the 
dining table in the main sleeping house.  They discuss what needs to be done in the 
various orchards or fields and leave the house as soon as they have had a small hot 
meal of tortillas or bread and sweet coffee.  The plots are mostly in walking distance 
but they drive the family truck if the day’s job makes it necessary.  Depending on the 
time of year, they work through the morning and return to the house in time for the 
largest meal of the day.  I spent more time with the men in the orange orchards, where 
they produce the majority of the vanilla that they take to market than in the milpas.  
After the work in the corn and bean fields is completed in the mornings, they would 
walk through the orange groves weeding between trees, checking the vanilla vines for 
pests and assessing the general health of plants.  They used this time to tend to the 
fish ponds they integrated into the orchards.  Vanilla must be tended consistently.  It 
is important to note that while it is intensive, it is not exhaustive at this level.  They 
integrate the crops into their land use patterns and labor force so that in general their 
family is able to easily tend to the crop.  During times when the men must focus their 
workday in the corn field, the women of the household walk through the orchard 
cleaning the aisles and picking off dying leaves.  The whole family works together 
during the most intensive periods of fertilization and harvest.   
Division of labor based on gender is a strong tradition in rural communities 
and yet they are aware of other patterns and able to deviate from this norm. Often my 
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oldest son would travel with me to Zapata.   His favorite part of the day was preparing 
the masa and making tortillas.  I wondered if they thought it was a problem that he 
took over the fires. They were happy to teach him and take a seat when his 
enthusiasm left no room for other cooks.  They mentioned that they had heard that 
men in the States do kitchen work, but they didn’t seem particularly impressed or 
envious.   
One day, we were returning to the house from the river where we had been 
swimming with the children.  My daughter picked up a branch of seed pods that 
popped when you squeezed them.  The five year old granddaughter gasped in horror 
and explained to my daughter that girls should not play with the pods.  I was a bit 
confused because just the week before, the women had delighted in teaching my son 
to pop the seed pods.  Everyone laughed and explained to that yes, girls in the 
community should not play with the pods lest they become clumsy with the dishes, 
but that my daughter could play with the plant.  For some of us, making distinctions 
between our own traditions and a wider world is often a complex problem.  We have 
a hard time holding on to our own traditions without imposing them on others.  But 
the Lopez family was able to see the value of their own traditions without needing the 
outside world to look the same.   
 For subsistence level producers this is an important trait.  Had gender roles in 
the community been inflexible, Maria’s family would have had no recourse when her 
father had been unable to work.  This flexibility is ideal in an industry where cost of 
production is a crucial factor.  The success of vanilla production in Mexico hinges on 
the ability of families to use household labor rather than hiring day laborers that must 
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be paid in cash.  This ability of families to absorb labor within the household keeps 
investment needs low.  For the most part, field labor with subsistence crops is handled 
by the men of the household.  But vanilla demands the work of the whole family. 
 
Traditional Methods, Contemporary Production and Balance 
 The land that the Lopez family owns is dispersed throughout the community.  
The largest orchard is just down the hill from the household, about a five minutes 
walk.  This orchard has approximately 300 orange trees and is planted in vanilla.  
They have also built two breeding ponds for tilapia fish, which they sell in the 
community for extra income.  Alongside the orchard, they plant a bean field twice a 
year, enough for the family and at times a bit to sell or trade.  A walk through the 
orchard provides other staples, such as small tomatoes, chiles, pumpkins and herbs 
growing wild.  We always returned to the house with enough vegetables to make a 
salsa and usually a side dish of nopales (cactus) or sweet potato.   
 The second orchard is further from the house and takes thirty minutes to travel 
to by foot.  At times they use the family truck, but most days the men walk or ride a 
mountain bike out to this section of land.  This orchard has 100 orange trees and is 
also planted in vanilla.  It is located near the lands that are rotated between planting 
and fallowing.  The family plants and harvests all the maize that their household 
consumes in these fields.  They rotate the fields between maize and bean production 
and once the production begins to fall they allow the land to reforest.  On my first 
visit, Sergio showed me the land that was planted in corn five years ago but has a 
significant re-growth of trees and undergrowth.   
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     He pointed out a virgin stand of trees that he has instructed his children never to 
cultivate.  He saved the land so that his children would know what the virgin forest 
looks like and wants them to always preserve it. They still have a traditional vanilla 
orchard in this stand of forest and attend to the vines, though they do not depend on 
this production for sale.  The price of maize has fallen consistently for the past five 
years, so they do not sell it, but they have begun to sell the husks.  They were a bit 
perplexed by this new enterprise but given that the husks sell for twice the price of the 
maize, they entered this new business.  The price has also fallen for oranges.  In the 
beginning of the harvest period, it did not pay to harvest the oranges so they left them 
on the trees.  Towards the end of the season, the price picked up and they began to 
harvest on an as needed basis.  In the two different orchards, they grow at least three 
different varieties of orange trees.  These different varieties are selected because of 
the variability in harvest seasons (one is early; another is ripe later in the season).  At 
times when prices are low, they allow the fruit to remain on the trees.  This allows 
them to use labor in other endeavors and wait for prices to increase.   
 With the fall in citrus prices ten years ago, farmers in the area were at a loss.  
They had invested heavily in trees but were faced with both the fall in prices and the 
possibility of a new crop of pests moving into the region.  Given the low price of 
oranges and the possibility of losing their trees, farmers in this area began to talk 
about new crops.  Several began to plant vanilla along the trunks of the trees and 
experiment with this dual planting.  While many were skeptical, and still are, the 
farmers felt like they had nothing to lose.  Everyone acknowledges that no one would 
plant an orange tree to grow vanilla, but if you already have orange trees, it may be 
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worth the risk.  There are plenty of critics, but more and more orange farmers are 
adding vanilla to their orchards.  Sergio’s family had always maintained a traditional 
orchard in the rain forest, so experimenting with the orange groves made sense.  It has 
been a profitable endeavor.  Vanilla has proven to be a good alternative crop and 
inputs into the orchard (compost and irrigation) benefit both oranges and vanilla. 
 Given the success they have had with the orange groves, they are working 
with a program (not COVER-related) on a project to integrate pichoco trees into the 
forest.  This would make the traditional setting for orchards easier to adapt to 
contemporary environmental needs.  Traditional planting is inefficient, given that 
trees and vines are interspersed haphazardly.  Modifying traditional techniques might 
provide a sustainable technique that would be more cost effective and have 
environmental benefits.  Planting trees in the forest would make a more uniform 
orchard and make pollinating, cleaning and harvesting more efficient.  The forest 
would provide better shade, addressing one of the criticisms of the pichoco technique.  
The family is also planning to build a shade house, which would make all 
these tasks even more efficient, though the cost will be high for construction.  The 
family is hesitant to begin this new project not only because of the cost of 
construction but also because they find it difficult to pollinate their present orchard 
and have a hard time hiring enough labor to accomplish the task. 
   
     The Politics of Vanilla:  “If you know about politics, even if you don’t work, 
they’ll give you resources.” 
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 Sergio balances the tasks of holding his family together and providing for his 
children’s future while working with state and federal agencies to improve the lives 
of other producers.  He began in politics with community cargo positions and moved 
on to working with local agricultural unions for vanilla producers.  He said his 
approach was to raise awareness in the communities that rural people have rights and 
the government should help.  “If we are already working the earth without the 
government’s help, then good.  Well, the little that the government could help with, 
we could do more, right?”  He worked with this group for ten years and then became 
the president of an ejido union.  He worked with them to organize rural people to 
develop land.  After he finished his work with the union, he began to attend meetings 
in Papantla that would eventually form the basis for COVER.  In these meetings, the 
group established that COVER should act as a director of all other organization to 
provide cohesion.  He argues that it is a lack of organization and direction that allows 
the government to remain corrupt, therefore community leaders should organize to 
impede corruption. 
 As an individual, Sergio has accomplished a great deal.  But his politics are 
focused on the rights of rural people as a group.  He feels organizations are important 
because economic development is dependent on political connections, without regard 
to the real needs of the people.  He sees the need to continue to organize as a group.  
 Though politicians promise resources for groups, much of the corruption that 
most producers refer to involves unethical individuals.  Of all the interviews I 
conducted and meetings I attended, never was there an accusation made against 
legitimate producers’ organizations, whether they be civic organizations or unions.  
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Stories about corruption were very consistent, whether they were told by producers or 
buyers.  Allegations of corruption always involved bureaucrats at the state level or 
local industrialists, or individuals that solicited funds from the government for ghost 
organizations.  Sergio’s solution to this corruption is twofold.  First, he agrees with 
other COVER participants that producers must make up a larger percentage of the 
counselors on the board of directors.  His becoming the president of the National 
Consejo is representative of this move.  Secondly, he is sure that the next step 
producers must make is to learn to cure their own vanilla and market directly to 
international buyers, “People in the campo, we are obligated to stay and we have to 
work.  If you have oranges and vanilla, you have diversity.” 
 COVER inherited a complex situation.  On the one hand, most farmers in this 
region produce vanilla on very small scale in traditional ways.  COVER was initiated 
to increase vanilla production, both in terms of how many farmers bring vanilla to 
market and how much each of those farmers produce.  COVER inherited the old 
patterns of production.  But the goal of increasing production is difficult on such 
small scale and traditional production methods are limited due to environmental 
changes.  Even if environmental changes did not make it impossible to produce in this 
manner, traditional production would not provide a consistent quality or quantity of 
vanilla to allow producers to establish themselves in a competitive market.   
  It is a new era for vanilla and it is difficult to know what will become of the 
industry with such diverse techniques and interests.  But for families like Sergio and 
Maria’s, vanilla is another option for staying on the land for one more generation.  At 
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this point, they are not dependent on government programs to succeed.  The programs 
are one more option that they integrate into a larger diversified strategy. 
 
The story of the Lopez family illustrates the role of diversity in economic 
strategy in rural Mexico.  At the same time that rural producers are accused of not 
understanding the economy, they are involved in a delicate balancing act:  negotiation 
between subsistence production and market forces of distribution and consumption.  
The Lopez family reminds us that there is not one economy that is limited to capitalist 
exchange, but that economy must be understood in complex terms.  Economy is 
“what people do to make a living” and the Lopez family reminds us that most of us, 
even in a market driven economy, do that through diversity.   
 In his role as president for the national Consejo, Sergio is often away from the 
community visiting with producers’ organizations around the region.  At a meeting in 
the neighboring state of Puebla in the spring, a producer attempted to agitate the 
crowd at Sergio’s expense.  Sergio was at the meeting to announce COVER’s 
conference.  This producer complained that the government should not be spending 
money on conferences but should be putting money into the fields.  Other producers 
in the room agreed and gave a hearty applause.  Sergio defended COVER and said 
that the producers should see the conference as an opportunity to learn the best way to 
intensify production.  He said, “We send our children to school, it costs us money, but 
we pay the money because we believe on the other end, we’ll have new ideas and be 
able to improve.  The conference is an investment in new ideas and an improved way 
of doing things.”   
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This quieted the crowd for a bit, until the agitator’s son, a lawyer, redirected 
the conversation.  He wanted to know why the government was funding vanilla 
production when it was not a good investment.  He said that vanilla was not a 
business because if he invested today, he would not see any profit for five years and 
only then if prices were high enough.  Sergio explained to me that this guy was 
thinking about vanilla in the wrong way.  He said, "If you clean the forest, put in the 
vanilla, care for it with your own labor, then you will see a profit in the third year 
when you have your first harvest.  But if you hire the labor, it will take much longer 
to realize a profit.  Vanilla is that kind of business.”  Vanilla farmers need manage 
cash needs carefully to remain competitive.   
For the Lopez family, investment is not only a matter of money, but also a 
matter of labor.  Not only do producers such as this family understand the economy, 
they understand that economy is much broader than capitalist modes of exchange.  
They also understand that as their consumption patterns change with each new 
generation, they need to intensify production.  Traditional production is no longer 
possible given environmental changes.  Changing production techniques is a part of 
an economic strategy that thrives on diversity 
The Lopez family is a success story and they serve as a model for other 
families like them.  Sergio is active with development projects, previously with 
COVER and presently with the national organization working to help families to 
diversify into vanilla or intensify their current production.  They often host producers’ 
groups on their land and go out of their way to support growers in their area.  But the 
fact that COVER has shifted the emphasis of their projects and that the administration 
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of these projects is no longer local, makes it harder for families like Lopez’ to 
participate.  The projects now supported require investment of larger amounts of 
capital and, more importantly, labor.  These families for the most part must continue 
to balance subsistence and commodity production in such a way that does not 
increase their cash needs.  Intensifying to such an extent that the household labor pool 
is over-extended creates new cash restraints when the family is forced to hire wage 
laborers or lose their crops.  Like the producers in the conference survey, the Lopez 
family is very efficient at balancing these systems.  The move within COVER to 
change the emphasis of programs, especially towards capital and labor-intensive 
shadehouse production, ignores this social milieu. 
 On January 1, 2007 during a phone call to wish the family a happy New Year, 
Sergio mentioned that the harvest is almost in and the beans are healthy.  The bad 
news is that the price is below forty pesos for green vanilla beans, so they will dry 
this year’s harvest and wait until they can make contact with a foreign buyer.  The 
good news is that his youngest son and daughter are studying computers in Papantla.  
As he relates the news, I hear the family in the background preparing for the New 
Year feast.   
          This is the sound of innovation and tradition in the campo. It is the lifestyle of a 
household that maintains it affiliation with COVER, has even helped to lead the 
organization, but also maintains a pragmatic distance from its new agenda. Maria and 
Sergio select from COVER what best suits their own agenda of a diversified 
economic strategy, their own selective blend of tradition and innovation. In doing so 
they are modeling, if not articulating, an alternative development.  
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Chapter 7 Betting on Contemporary Production: The Ramirez Family   
 
 Dust kicks up as the bus eases off the paved road onto the main street.  I 
imagine I hear the melody of old Western television shows as the bus edges through 
town between old adobe buildings with huge front patio areas.  The first building in 
town is used for tobacco; empty when I first begin visiting.  On my last visit to town, 
the building was full of dried tobacco leaves: dry, dark dusty leaves hanging in 
symmetry.  There are several markets for dry goods, a store with consumer items, 
used clothing.  The names of agricultural unions and cattle associations are painted 
across the faded facade.  This street has an abandoned feel, without much action 
except the coming and going of the buses and taxis.  The union buildings are shut up 
tight, the tiles on the roofs askew.  The street only gets busy when the traveling fair 
moves in with electric carnival rides or when the town saint day procession moves 
through the community.   
 Cocos is a mestizo community.  Local anthropologists estimate that over fifty 
percent of the population is presently in the US.  There is a town in east Texas that 
many have nicknamed “Little Cocos,” given the high percentage of migrants living 
there.  This town has a long history of migration to the U.S., somewhat of an 
aberration in a region where international migration is fairly new.  I first traveled to 
Cocos with COVER workers to meet with a group called the Primos who had started 
a shadehouse project.  At the time I met with the leader of the group, they had begun 
the process of making the concrete posts that would be used as the tutors in the shade 
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house.  The first time I spoke with Francisco (Paco) Ramirez, who was to become one 
of my two informants there, he mentioned that he was not from Cocos originally and 
that he had spent sixteen years in the US working before moving to Veracruz with his 
wife.  They have one son born in the United States and two daughters born in Mexico, 
with whom they live in a single family house near the center of town.  I initially made 
visits to his house with COVER agents who were working with Paco’s group to build 
one of the new shadehouses.  After several visits with COVER, I made arrangements 
to visit his family to talk about a more in-depth study.   
          That first encounter with the family was more awkward that I had expected.  I 
had begun working with the Lopez family at about the same time and had fallen into a 
pattern of visits in the community that felt familiar.  In Cocos, introducing the idea of 
research to the family was odd.  At Zapata, when I asked permission to work with the 
family, I was given a lecture about how important it is to learn about other cultures, 
how we have so much to teach each other and that this exposure would be good for 
both parties.  In Cocos, I asked if I could come to the community several times a 
week, spend the day watching their work, talking about life and investigating their 
ideas about vanilla.  They were stumped with what to do with me.  At first, they said 
the only day I could visit was Sundays, because other days were too busy with work.  
“But work is what I am after,” I told them.  Finally, I told them with a laugh, “It is 
important that the daily lives of people in Mexico are understood in more concrete 
terms.  I know it is a strange job, but that’s what we do.  I’d like to spend time with 
you and your family while you work.”  I think they had their doubts about how to fit 
me into their daily lives and they were suspicious about how my “watching them 
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work” was useful.  But they agreed to let me come and I started by spending time 
with Paco’s wife in the house.  I was hopeful that by building rapport with her, Paco 
would trust me to follow him around in the orchards and be comfortable enough to 
talk to me about his life.  In the end, they were gracious enough to let me hang around 
and we developed a comfortable rapport.  I often spent my days helping Teresa in the 
kitchen, cleaning cactus or deseeding chiles.  I followed Paco around the orchard or 
talked to him as he built posts for the shadehouse, moved the compost piles or dub the 
irrigation pit.     
 I chose the Ramirez family not because, in comparison to the Lopez family, 
they represented direct opposites in lifestyles, though at first glance it may appear that 
way.  Whereas the Lopez family works with labor from an extended household, the 
Ramirez family is a nuclear family.  The Lopez family has a history in vanilla, the 
elders having grown up in the orchards working for their parents.  The Ramirez 
family lives in a town that has relied on cattle production and migration for economic 
diversity and has only entered vanilla production in the last two years.  The Lopez 
family plants in a traditional orchard and has intensified within their orange groves.  
The Ramirez family has planted their pichoco orchard and is constructing a shade 
house.  Subsistence crops are the mainstay of the Lopez family while the Ramirez’s 
purchase machine made tortillas off the back of a motorcycle.   
            But the impression that these two families are complete opposites is 
misleading. The fact is that both of these families rely on a carefully balanced 
economic strategy that requires diversification for success.  In this new era of vanilla 
production, the variety of production techniques has multiplied as has the 
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demographics of the producers, and this means that there are different ways to 
implement the principle of diversification.  I wanted to work with the Ramirez family 
because I felt their story showed the range of variation among producers, a different 
point along the spectrum in relation to the Lopez family.  Getting to know the 
Ramirez family revealed some important things to me. Hearing about the delays and 
political pressures that Paco Ramirez faced made clear to me the extent to which there 
had been a power shift within the Consejo towards the interests of industrialists and 
state government bureaucrats. It also made clear the fact that even the most 
innovative and modern producers cannot rely exclusively on vanilla. The family’s 
success, when it comes, will have been due to its tenacious hard work –more in spite 
of COVER and what it has become than because of it. The difficulties they described 
in their experience as migrants made clear to me the depth of their commitment to 
remain in rural Veracruz, if at all possible.     
 
The Ramirez family lives in a new house that they are constructing 
themselves.  They bought the land with money saved from their work in the United 
States.  Paco and Teresa have completed all the exterior walls of the house and a 
strong aluminum roof.  Throughout the year, construction continues: a garage in front 
to store wood and protect the truck, interior walls stuccoed with concrete in time for 
visitors from the north.  They have running water and plumbing, electricity, a 
refrigerator, an oven, television and radios.  Though Teresa has an electric washing 
machine, she washes the clothes by hand and hangs them in the sun.  Using the 
washer would mean more money for the electric bill, and, besides, everyone washes 
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by hand here.  They have three children, one in elementary school and two still at 
home.  Teresa’s family lives in town, her father owns a butcher store on the main 
street.  They bought an orange orchard about a ten minute walk through grazing 
fields.  Though the ideal work week would allow for the family to rest on Sundays, 
Teresa often complained that Paco worked too much.  He always had a new project to 
start and was meticulous in completing each project. 
They have only been in Cocos for the past five years, having moved back after 
many years working in the United States.  On day as Teresa and I processed chiles to 
make into sausage, she told me about their endeavor into vanilla and how they came 
to live in a town where so many have left.  Teresa was born in Cocos and lived there 
until she attended college in Puebla.  She earned a bachelor’s degree in public 
administration and worked in Puebla for several years.  Her government job did not 
pay well, so she decided to find work in the United States.  
 Teresa joined a group of migrants from Cocos that had arranged for a coyote 
to guide them across the border.  She traveled to North Carolina because she had 
relatives working there and she was able to use their house as a base camp until she 
found work.  Paco and Teresa met at the Kmart on her first evening in North 
Carolina.  She was an educated young woman that saw her time in the states as an 
opportunity to experience new things, learn English and make a life.  He had left 
home as a teenager, without a high school education and saw the states as a place to 
make enough money so that he could settle in Mexico with a family, land and a 
future.  Despite their differences, they married and made a home together in North 
Carolina where they worked a series of jobs.  She was successful at several of her 
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jobs and was chosen as a supervisor.  The owners of the store relied on her to direct 
the other workers and she was very successful at her job.  After they had their first 
son life became more difficult.  Teresa related how hard it was to balance work with 
childcare.  She worked up to the evening he was born and went back to work shortly 
after his birth because she was able to arrange childcare.  The company she worked 
for treated her well and gave her a supervisory position because she had good  
English skills and leadership abilities.  But her son suffered from asthma and she had 
to leave the factory to take care of him.  Once his condition stabilized, she tried to 
find childcare but was unsuccessful and decided to stay home with Pacito.  She began 
to make food to sell in the neighborhood and to other employees where her husband 
and father-in-law worked.  She made tamales and bread, treats for other migrants 
either too busy to cook for themselves or without the skills.  She would rise early 
before the men left for work and bake bolillos and pan dulce.  This business was very 
successful and she was able offset her former wages.   
When her son was two and a half years old, Paco and Teresa decided to return 
to Mexico.  For Teresa, it was not an easy decision as she enjoyed working in the 
U.S. and especially enjoyed the income she was able to make.  Teresa and Paco 
differed in their interpretation of life in the states.  Whereas Teresa could see herself 
making a life there, Paco never saw the United States as a place to raise his family.   
  When they first returned to Mexico, they started off in the northern 
state of Tamaulipas, where Paco’s family still lives.  During their time in the U.S., 
they had sent money to his family to purchase a house and land.  For that reason, they 
set up home there first.  Once Teresa was settled in the house near his family, Paco 
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returned to the states to work.  He had worked the previous two years with the same 
man and his boss asked him to return to work one more year.  Once he finished the 
year of work, he joined Teresa and their now two children.  They decided to sell their 
property in the north and move to her community of Cocos in Veracruz.     
The state of Tamaulipas has been heavily farmed so Paco felt their chances of 
making a living in the tropical south were better.  There was land available to build a 
house and her father had just heard about a neighbor that wanted to sell one of his 
orange groves.  The tropical climate and geography was new to a man used to the 
desert plains of the north, but he set about building their house and developing 
business interests.  He went in with Teresa’s cousins and opened a welding shop on 
the main street.  He had learned welding skills while in the states and was able to 
gather enough equipment to provide this service.  The land they sold in the north 
allowed him to invest in wood, which he rents to builders.  This turned out to be a 
good business.  Buildings in this part of Mexico are made out of concrete; the wood is 
recycled into various forms for floors, walls and ceilings.  With the price of oranges 
low, he was able to get a good deal on the orchard.  Like other farmers in the area, he 
tended to leave the oranges on the tree as long as possible, investing labor on other 
projects.  He was experimenting in one part of the orchard with nopal (cactus) 
production which he hoped would make a good item for the local markets. 
  Before settling in his wife’s town, he had not paid attention to the role of 
vanilla in the area.  Teresa explained that when Paco found out about vanilla the price 
was a lot higher than today.  Though prices are low at the present time, they have 
hoped that by the time they begin to harvest their orchards, prices will have stabilized. 
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 Teresa talked a lot about the amount of work it took to run the various 
businesses and take care of the house and land.  She was both proud and frustrated by 
Paco’s work.  She worried about him when he worked ten hour days seven days a 
week, often losing weight in the hot weather.  But she understood that he was 
determined to make something for their family and that the work was never finished.  
She worried about whether the pay off for the work would be worth it.  Unlike the 
Lopez family, they had only the two of them to complete all tasks in the house and 
various businesses.  They had a strict division of labor, with the housework (cooking 
and cleaning) and child care being her domain.  Though taking care of three children 
and a house is a full time job, she also helps her father in the butcher shop.  She 
would like to bake bread to sell but they do not have an oven at the present.  One day, 
after she had washed the family’s clothes and hung them in the sun, killed two 
chickens and prepared the day’s lunch, taken the son to school and returned with his 
lunch (he refuses to take a cold lunch) and was preparing spices for the chorizo, she 
looked at me and exclaimed.  “Look at me, I have a degree! Here I am at home with 
the children.”  Teresa had felt frustrated with the lack of childcare in the U.S., but her 
ability to work outside the house did not improve by returning to Mexico.  Even 
though she had returned to her community, her parents were too busy with their own 
lives to help with the children.  With her degree, she could find a government job in 
Papantla or Poza Rica, but she would still have to struggle with childcare issues.  She 
has brothers and cousins but most of her family members cycle in and out of 
migration so that they are not a reliable source of childcare.   
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     Returning to Mexico did not solve Teresa’s childcare problems, but it did reduce 
their living expenses.  Food is relatively cheap, and they do not have debt on their 
house.   Little by little they add onto the house and they continue to build the different 
businesses.  They are able to live only by maintaining extremely diverse economic 
endeavors, of with vanilla is the newest venture 
 Paco first heard about vanilla through relatives in town.  He attended a tour 
offered by COVER of Vallejo’s shade house and investigated pichoco orchards.  He 
talked with a cousin that lives in Texas and they began to invest in the project.  Paco 
invested his land and labor, and his cousin provided the capital.  Paco planted the 
pichoco orchard beside the house, a plan that allowed him easy access and provided a 
certain amount of security for the plants.  He did not receive a lot of technical 
assistance at the time, but sought out advice from growers in other communities.  
Because he had already invested in the pichoco orchard, he qualified for a grant from 
the government to construct the shade house.  He organized ten of his wife’s cousins 
into a group and began the process of soliciting funds for the shade house.  COVER 
provided access to the grant and arranged for all the technical support and ordered all 
the supplies for the project.  They began the construction of the greenhouse in the fall 
of 2004 and were ready to begin planting vanilla vines by July 2006. 
Economic Diversification:  Vanilla and Risk 
 Hard work and risk are not new to Paco.  His story is important for what it 
tells us about the differences between push and pull factors on both sides of the 
border.  As a very young man, work in the states was an opportunity to earn money 
that he would someday invest in property and work in Mexico.  While he was 
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successful in the states, there were good reasons to return to Mexico.  Paco talked 
about his childhood and how he decided to try work in the states.  He was born in 
Tamalipus and worked with his father on an ejido.  They raised cattle and grew 
sorghum, corn and beans.  He only attended school until the third grade, when he 
began to work for his father full time.  At the age of sixteen, he decided to look for 
paid work and first found a job on the Mexican side of the border working to harvest 
in large agribusiness fields.  Eventually, he migrated further north and held a series of 
factory and construction jobs in the mid-west.     
 He heard there were jobs in North Carolina and shortly after he moved there 
he met Teresa.  He had a steady job there with the same company.  He was so well 
liked that he has an open invitation from the owner, something he thinks about when 
the supply of cash is low.  But life in the states with children was not what he wanted 
for his family.  The first time I met him he mentioned that once he had a child, he 
knew he would return to Mexico.  His take on American culture was that it wasn’t 
something he wanted to expose his children to.  He was frightened by the drug use 
and worried that parents did not teach their children to respect their elders.  Perhaps 
the stress they experienced with childcare created enough pressure for them to return.  
He returned because he wanted to make tangible use of his earnings. In the United 
States, he said, it is difficult to build anything with your savings because investing it 
would be too risky.  If a migrant is caught by immigration, they lose all their 
belongings.   
 The idea to plant vanilla came from a compadre.  At first he turned down the 
idea because it takes a long time to get a yield.  But in spite of the investment of time, 
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money and labor, he has decided it is worth the bet.  He first learned about COVER 
from friends when they were soliciting communities to create groups of ten to build 
shadehouses.  They were offering the projects at no cost to the producers so he was 
not concerned with what the project might mean to his cash flow.    
 They began work with COVER in the summer of 2005.  Paco worked seven 
day weeks and had the shade house ready for netting by the beginning of 2006.  
During the time that I worked with their family, they waited almost four months to 
receive the netting they had ordered and paid for through COVER.  Paco began to get 
suspicious about the role of the extension program.  Not only was it taking a long 
time for him to get materials he had had to sacrifice to pay for, but he had several 
negative experiences with agents.  One agent came to town to talk to him about his 
vines in the pichoco grove and advise him on the progress of the shade house.  All of 
the advice he received that day ended up being not only wrong but detrimental to his 
crop.  The agent had given him bad measurements on the shade house which caused 
him a half week’s work to correct.  Even worse was advice the agent had given him in 
regard to cutting the vanilla vines, which ended up stunting the growth of that years 
crop, resulting in a loss of blooms for the entire season.  He had been planning to 
pollinate that spring, but was having his doubts as to whether the agents would have 
the skills to teach him.  Paco didn’t want to tell me about the mishap, but Teresa told 
me one day out of frustration, “They say we learn through mistakes, but it is their 
fault.  They told us to cut them in October and now they won’t bloom for a full year.”  
I mentioned that I had learned to pollinate the flowers the week before and he wanted 
to learn.  He said he was doubtful that the extension agents would know how to 
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pollinate correctly.  He had three blossoms that day so we pollinated each.  He 
continued to fertilize the few blooms in the orchard that spring and by the time I left 
Mexico, he had a small crop, including the three we pollinated that first day.  He was 
disappointed in the loss of blooms for that season, but happy that he was having 
success in pollinating.  He seemed relieved that he learned the technique without the 
help of the extension agents. 
Besides problems with technical assistance, some of the infrastructure of 
COVER programs provided difficult for the Ramirez family.  When COVER goes 
into communities to start shadehouse projects, they require that ten individuals work 
together in a group.  The agents told me that the reason COVER required ten 
individuals in a group was to enable them to raise the money to fund their part of the 
project (30% of the total costs) and to assure that once the shadehouse was 
established, they would have enough labor to tend to the crop.  I asked if the groups 
were family members or if anyone in a community was able to join.  They said that at 
times groups were made out of family members but often they were community 
members that heard about the initiative.  I wondered if shifting work groups from 
primarily household labor to entrepreneurial would create difficulties in 
accomplishing tasks.  About half of the projects we visited in the field had problems 
that might be attributable to this fact.  When we arrived at one project where we were 
to meet the group leader, we had to hike into town to find a representative after 
waiting an hour.  When we located a group member, he described to us the 
difficulties the group was having in organizing work days and collecting money and 
supplies to complete the next step of the shadehouse.  I wondered if it would have 
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been more useful to organize groups by family, as that was the most common way for 
producers to organize labor.  But this new initiative was based on a more 
individualistic view of production so groups were to be made up of individuals who 
could be described as “good workers.”  The contradiction to this organizational 
structure was however that there were no traditional forms of obligation tying the 
groups together and could account for some of the delay of many of the projects. 
For the Ramirez family, delay was a matter of the bureaucracy, not a matter of 
an insufficient amount of work.  On the one hand, when the agents visited Paco’s 
shadehouse, they were impressed by the skill he exhibited in constructing the various 
components and the speed with which he accomplished projects.  Though he was one 
of the last projects funded in the 2005 grant period, he was several months ahead of 
all the other groups.  At times, he was delayed from completing the next step of his 
project because he had to wait for enough of the other projects to catch up to justify 
the purchase of bulk materials.  So Paco’s work ethic and skill meant that he was an 
ideal worker.  On the other hand, he was penalized for being too efficient.   
When I was first introduced to Paco, I was told that the group he was a 
member of was made up of cousins in town.  But when I visited the shade house, 
more times than not, Paco was working alone.  I worried that asking him about this 
matter would cause problems with COVER, because they had been so explicit about 
the group rule.  Finally, I broached the subject.  He said that the other men that make 
up the group have other jobs and study, so they have worked out a system where they 
pay for labor.  Paco had built a group out of investors rather than equal workers.  The 
situation seemed for the most part to be agreeable to him, though he often complained 
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about an inability to find men that were willing to put in a long day’s work.  He had 
the cash to pay laborers, which would have allowed him to take a day off each week, 
but more often than not, he did most of the work with minimal help.  At the beginning 
of several projects (the garage, the security house, and the well) he would travel to 
neighboring ranches looking for day laborers, offering to pay cash and a meal for a 
day’s work.  Most days, he returned to Cocos without helpers, to begin another 
project on his own.   
I asked him what the implications are in a town where half the population is in 
the United States working as migrants.  With such an impressive level of migration, 
could one assume that men of working age had migrate, thus leaving a deficit of 
eligible workers.  He said, “There are plenty of men here.  There’s no shortage of 
workers in this town, only a shortage of men that want to work.  They might work a 
couple of days, then they have money to drink and they are off.”  This was a common 
complaint that I had heard in other communities.  The Lopez family hired workers 
occasionally during orange harvest, and they often mentioned difficulty in finding 
workers.   
The netting Paco had ordered in January showed up in April but a fourth of 
what he needed to complete the house was missing.  COVER agents assured him they 
would have the netting to him within the month, but he continued to worry about 
finishing the house in time to plant the vines.  After waiting such a long time for his 
netting, he was frustrated.  He mentioned that he felt that he was being punished for 
not supporting the party line at COVER.  During one of his visits to the office he had 
not responded to what he felt was political pressure.  He recounted how several 
151 
agents encouraged him to vote with the PRI party in the upcoming federal elections. 
He was a supporter of the opposition party.  He and Teresa were suspicious that the 
next elections would be won by the PRD but that ultimately the elections would be 
stolen by the PRI.  For this reason, he felt that in the offices of COVER, he needed to 
keep his opinions private.  When he felt pressure in the offices, he did not respond 
either in the positive or the negative and now that his materials were consistently 
delayed, he worried that politics had become an issue in finishing his project with 
COVER.  However, he never spent much time worrying about the delay, as he was 
constantly engaged in new projects.  While he waited for the net, he finished digging 
(by hand) the well on the property that he would need for irrigation, and he built a 
small house on the property that he would use to house a security guard someday.   
In my day to day experience with COVER, politics were only discussed as 
abstract ideas.  The agents working in the field and the director were recent graduates 
from the university.  They were the first people in their families to complete 
university educations and in some cases the only individuals from their small farming 
communities to seek out education after high school.  During our discussions, they 
expressed concern over the history of exploitation of farmers and felt part of their job 
was to improve the producer’s access to fairer prices.  The director at one point even 
told me that the biggest problem was that producers needed an organization that 
worked in their interest, rather than an organization that represented such diverse 
interests as producers, curing houses, brokers and exporters.  Though there was never 
any overt political campaigning at any COVER event I witnessed, the fact that 
COVER was slowly converting from a locally run organization with a large amount 
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of autonomy to a government agency run out of the state capital could account for 
some of Paco’s discomfort.  The state governor is from the PRI party and at the time 
of this discussion, representatives from the state government had begun to visit the 
COVER offices in preparation for the upcoming conference.  Paco told me, “Political 
parties don’t matter to me.  I don’t care who gives me money.  But no one has the 
right to tell me to vote for this or that.  You feel like they are buying you so that 
you’ll vote for them.  I, for one, will not vote for PRI.  But whoever has money can 
do what they want.”  He was reluctant to go into the office because of this pressure, 
and wondered if his lack of enthusiasm for their political party affected his project. 
 
Though the Ramirez family is new to vanilla production (and Paco is new to 
the region), their entrepreneurial experience works to their advantage.  Vanilla is one 
other option in their diversified economic strategy.  They are aware of the historical 
problems associated with production and realize they have to find better ways to 
market their product.  The newest and youngest of producers understand the 
importance of setting up direct access to the market.  I asked Paco what role the 
government should play in rural life.  He said that he wasn’t sure what the 
government should do.  His experience in the past had been that the government is 
self-serving.  He is suspicious that local ‘coyotes’ have worked out a deal with 
COVER that will allow them to pay low prices.  He admits that his family is 
benefiting from COVER programs but he wonders if farmers benefit the least.   
     Paco was frustrated with COVER’s time-frame.  He began building the shade 
house in August (clearing land, building and setting concrete tutors, setting poles for 
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the frame) and was ready to add the netting by January.  He raised the money and 
paid for both the net and the delivery by mid-January.  Paco was an ideal participate 
for COVER, he was self-motivated and worked until he finished each job, just the 
type of worker that Engler specifically talked about in her description of the perfect 
producer.  All the groups that had entered the project at the same time as Los Primos 
were still at various stages of completion, some I visited had not even completed their 
concrete posts but the new year.  So on the one hand, COVER in policy wanted to 
work with hard working individuals (within groups) but were not structurally sound 
enough to respond to variation in work pace.  He was not rewarded nor encouraged 
for his ability to get things done at such a fast pace. In fact, he felt he might be 
punished for not supporting office politics.  It was a bit of a bureaucratic hole:  he 
could only progress as fast as the slowest of all the organization’s projects because 
COVER would only buy materials in bulk.  Regardless of the frustrations, he 
continued to improve his land and looked forward to the day when he would perhaps 
be able to take Sundays off.   
Though this family had only begun working in the vanilla industry, they had 
already developed a clear sense of what kind of production and marketing they would 
need to do to make it profitable.  Paco dreamed of developing markets for his 
family’s vanilla.  He has relatives in the U.S. that work in international sales and 
several that work as journalists.  He feels like his experience as a migrant gives him 
an advantage in dealing with foreign businesses and making useful contacts for 
developing his own markets.  He also feels that the experience of working in so many 
different enterprises during his sixteen years as a migrant laborer create a desire in 
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himself to be self-sufficient and to work for himself.  In his mind, running his own 
business and being self-sufficient is the best way to build something to give to his 
children.   
Besides building his business through connections with outside markets, he 
has clear ideas about how he should handle the business in Mexico.  He realizes the 
market he wants to capture will demand high quality.  He is also realistic, he is not 
asking for more than he can produce.  He wants to grow high quality vanilla and get a 
fair price for it.  He is committed to working hard and he is willing to bet that he will 
find a good market. 
Vanilla at this point in the life stage of the Ramirez family is a better bet than 
migration.  The Ramirez family maintains a diversified economic strategy that 
includes migration as one option among many.  Before they had children, migration 
to the United States was a good option, given their desire to make enough money to 
purchase land and build an independent life.  Now that they have children, they are 
more attached to staying in Mexico.  However, like the producers in the survey, 
migration remains a last resort.  Of the producers I surveyed, almost half had 
migrated in the past; but only fourteen percent planned to migrate in the future.  Like 
the Ramirez family, they expressed hopes that their work in vanilla would enable 
them to stay in Mexico.  Migration was a bet like vanilla, but during a different stage 
in their lives.  They have many connections in the U.S. that would facilitate repeat 
migration but, for now, they want to do what they can to make their vanilla business 
work.  They are betting on vanilla to keep their family in Mexico and to give them 
something to pass on to their children. 
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 Families new to vanilla production may have much to learn but they bring 
innovative ideas and at times connections to outside markets.  By the spring of 2006, 
producers were ready to talk about the industry and develop strategies for moving 
forward.  COVER organized the First International Vanilla Conference in Papantla 
Veracruz in order to bring together producers, industrialists, marketers and buyers 
from around the world.  Producers old and new came together for four days of 
lectures, tours and meetings to discuss the future of vanilla.  Producers came looking 
for answers but they also came to make their voices heard.   
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Chapter 8:  The First International Meeting of Vanilla Producers:  New 
Alternatives in Developing the Vanilla Industry 
 
 In the spring of 2006, employees at COVER began planning an international 
conference for producers.  When I first heard about this event, I wondered if the 
preceding months of controversy had motivated COVER to address the 
disappointment producers were vocally expressing throughout the region.  Before the 
official cutting date each year, producers must receive official approval to harvest 
their beans and bring them to market.  This went smoothly enough, as I witnessed for 
several weeks before the December 10th harvest date.  Producers, or representatives of 
a group of producers, would arrive at the COVER office in Papantla and register as 
official vanilla producers. The procedure for harvest approval included a registry that 
required producers to be photographed and present this photo identification for all 
transactions.  This was designed to protect the producers in several ways.  To begin 
with, the registry of producers legitimizes the producers; as mentioned previously, the 
government had given monies to several ‘groups’ of imaginary producers and the 
money was pocketed.  In addition, COVER also hoped to protect the producer from 
theft (both in the fields and with the buyer) with the combination of an official cutting 
date, registry and a requirement that buyers may not purchase vanilla without proof of 
authority from COVER.   
But shortly after the beginning of harvest, the office became a center of 
controversy.  At the beginning of the harvest season, farmers were only offered thirty 
pesos ($3 US) for a kilo of green vanilla.  At first, when producers came to inquire 
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about the best price in town, COVER employees answered that they were not 
involved with the selling process.  When prices did not change and producers were 
left holding green vanilla, they arrived at COVER en masse with more questions 
about price.  They wanted to know why it was so low and what COVER was doing 
about it.  COVER director Isabel Engler told producers that the organization had no 
control over prices and had no authority to deal with the problem.  Almost daily, the 
newspaper published articles with producers accusing “coyotes” of cheating farmers 
out of a fair price.  Some leaders accused Sergio Lopez, the newly elected president 
of the national producers’ organization of not defending producers.  Most of the 
articles mentioned the lack of leadership at COVER and accused the director of 
siding with elite buyers.   
At this same period of time, the field agents mentioned to me that COVER 
planned to sponsor a conference for producers in the spring.  They said the goal was 
to gather as many producers together for planning meetings and workshops about 
production, distribution and marketing.  They also planned to invite international 
companies in the hopes of developing more direct access for producers.  The impetus 
for the conference arose from a new organization established as an online community 
for farmers by Patricia Rain.  The International Tropical Farmer’s Network, ITFN, 
was established as a Google web group to provide a forum for vanilla farmers around 
the world.  In the forum, farmers primarily discuss marketing techniques and share 
technical information.  Ms. Rain initiated the conference in Papantla to launch this 
group.   
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Patricia Rain first traveled to this region, in the eighties, to do research in 
preparation for a cookbook on vanilla.  A romantic and activist, Ms. Rain fell in love 
with the vanilla business and soon became an advocate for vanilla farmers.  As the 
“Queen of Vanilla,” she opened an internet-based business where she sells high-
quality vanilla and promotes fair trade.  She traveled to other vanilla-producing 
countries and began to build a network between producers.  It was due to the 
relationships she had formed with these growers and a concern about marketing their 
products that she developed the idea to coordinate producers of vanilla on an 
international level.  When she first organized the ITFN, farmers from Madagascar, 
Indonesia, Central America, Tahiti, Uganda, Kenya, India, Papua New Guinea, 
Australia and Mexico joined the discussions.  Access to computers and internet 
service is limited in many of these countries so those producers that are able to access 
the network represent other producers in their area.  As membership grew, farmers 
began to discuss meeting to set an agenda for developing the vanilla industry 
worldwide.  Ms. Rain has long term connections with many of the founders of 
COVER, so Papantla was chosen as the first host for the network.  COVER was 
asked to oversee the project.   
For COVER, the conference was an opportunity to address the concerns of producers 
and promote public relations with international companies.  Although they began 
talking about the conference in December 2005, they did not have many of the 
specific details organized by mid-March 2006.  This created a new controversy.  
Many of the founding members of COVER were disillusioned with the inability of 
COVER staff to organize the conference properly, so Mr. Vallejo and several other 
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founding members of the board got involved with the conference preparation.  After 
Mr. Vallejo visited Jalapa several times to talk with the state agriculture employees, 
the government was brought in to orchestrate the conference.  They hired a 
professional company to organize the conference.  This group more or less had one 
month to confirm speakers, arrange for the infrastructure of the conference (grounds, 
lighting, sound, tour buses, food) publicize and print the various documents needed.   
The conference was a source of controversy because the planning stages were 
indicative of the ineffectiveness of COVER.  The frustration caused by the 
conference may have been the final impetus for many of the members to think 
seriously about focusing their energies outside of COVER activities and look for new 
networks for developing the industry.  The primary purpose of organizing for these 
producers was earning more money by cutting out the monopolies.  At this point, they 
had come to believe that COVER no longer represented the small farmer’s interests 
and they were anxious to learn what they could from the conference about creating 
new opportunity for producers. 
 
Conference in the Tropics 
 A huge sign outside the fairgrounds welcomed producers to this First Annual 
International Vanilla Conference.  The official poster featured a Totonac man, 
dressed in a crisp white traditional shirt, fertilizing a vanilla bloom with the Tajin 
pyramid in the background.  Producers registered at the entrance of the fairgrounds 
and made their way to the amphitheater.  There were two days of presentations by 
scientists, international business owners and an American vanilla producer.  One 
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afternoon was scheduled for breakout sessions with producers in discussion groups 
concerning organization, pollination, value-added production and marketing.  The 
final afternoon was scheduled for fieldtrips to various production sites.   
     A critic of COVER had warned me that the conference would only attract orange 
growers and that the parking lot would be full of trucks that “no true producer” would 
ever own. Patricia Rain, on the other hand, had pictured the first conference of the 
international network as a large gathering of indigenous growers, the crowd full of 
Totonac families in traditional dress.  The reality was somewhere in the middle.  The 
farmers and their families mostly wore store bought clothing and arrived in collective 
buses.  Only a third of the producers at this conference speak an indigenous language 
but the majority are full time subsistence producers.  These are modern producers, 
individuals and families that have strong traditional ties within their communities but 
understand global markets and seek to participate fully in those markets.  They do not 
fit easily into finite categories.  They seem to be much less worried about how they 
are defined by outsiders and more concerned with developing their potential within 
the vanilla market.   
 The state government dropped the admission fee to assure that all producers 
would have access to the event (including food).  One of the biggest criticisms was 
that “real” producers would be unable to afford the trip to town or an admittance fee.  
Many of the local producers’ organizations arranged for collective buses to provide 
rides into town each morning.  The critics of COVER were concerned that this 
conference was being organized to promote the businesses of local elites and that 
ultimately the producers that need access to information, technology and grants would 
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be overshadowed yet again.  In reality, the conference was a mixed bag.  The 
government paid for the entire conference, making it accessible to everyone that 
could get into town.  There were smaller breakout meetings geared to inform farmers 
about the most important elements of growing their business.  The lectures given 
were varied but mostly focused on topics that were geared towards developing a 
strong niche market based on local growers’ potential.  The businesses that were 
invited to present their products were much more high tech and required large 
amounts of capital (shadehouse materials, chemical pesticides and fertilizers), a 
reflection of the emphasis of newer production processes. 
 
          On the first day of the event, the outdoor amphitheater was full by the time the 
first presentation began.  Sergio Lopez, the director of the national vanilla producers 
union, welcomed the producers and their families.  He said that the purpose of the 
conference was to organize producers and create a plan for making vanilla production 
a viable industry.  He encouraged everyone to work together over the next three days 
to develop strategies for building a stronger industry for producers.  After all the 
official introductions, instructions for the following activities and proper ceremonial 
recognition took place, the conference began with a series of lectures aimed at 
broadening producers’ knowledge about vanilla. 
   
Presentations: Encouraging Production for a Niche Market 
 The speakers represented a range of interests.  There were scientists from the 
state university in Mexico City, representatives from producers’ organizations, 
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business owners from the U.S. and international producers (Costa Rica and the U.S.).  
Each of these presentations served as an example of options for local producers.  
These presentations illustrate well both the strengths and obstacles faced by these 
producers.   
          Local producers have always had the feeling that their vanilla was high quality, 
and there were presentations that lent scientific data to that assumption.  The first 
presentations were given by biologists and emphasized the high quality of the vanillin 
crystal in Mexican vanilla.  These were followed by presentations by leaders from a 
Fair Trade organization (Comercio Justo Mexico) and an organic certification 
program (BIO AGRICERT).  These producers have always understood the value of 
this crop and have protested un-fair trade for centuries.  The role that organic 
production might play is unclear, as Mexican farmers are historically tied to chemical 
contracts through government programs.  But what was clear from these presentations 
was that some of the niche potential for vanilla depends on these characteristics.  At 
the moment the majority of Mexican producers to not add chemical fertilizers or 
pesticides to vanilla crops.  This could be crucial for entering gourmet markets.  But 
the bureaucratic aspect of certifying farms for organic trade could be an obstacle, 
given costs and access to information.  The Fair Trade market now popular within the 
U.S. and Europe is also an interesting angle for building these businesses.  Fair trade 
is essentially what these farmers have demanded since the 1750s.  Their participation 
in this niche market could be powerful, as they have a point of view to offer 
consumers.  They not only believe in the value of their product and work, but they 
also have marketable symbolic capital.  These producers are attempting to maintain a 
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sustainable lifestyle and their skill and ability to do so is impressive.  Development 
that values these ties to traditional systems is key to prospering in niche markets.   
 An American vanilla producer from Hawaii offered a new way to think about 
production.  Jim Redekopp of Pa’quilo Vanilla Company runs a family farm on the 
big island of Hawaii where he incorporates vanilla production into eco-tourism and 
local sustainability.  He is currently working with the USDA on a rural development 
project.  His farm is located in an area that used to be sugar cane plantations.  When 
the price of sugar fell, these plantations closed, leaving land to be sold off at high 
prices and loss of employment.  Mr. Redekopp and his family have built a self-
sustainable farm run on solar energy.  He employs six local workers and pays them 
$10 an hour.  His goal is to continue to grow the vanilla orchard and employ more 
locals at a fair wage.  His presentation, he said, was an attempt to share his 
experiences with Mexican farmers and encourage them to diversify their vanilla 
farms through eco-tourism and value-added products.   
 The Pa’quilo farm has contracts with cruise ship tour guides for one-hour 
tours of the vanilla orchards.  He says that the most important thing for producers to 
do is to educate the public.  He begins each tour with a lesson about the origins of 
vanilla and the importance of buying pure vanilla.  He talks to the group about the 
importance of sustainable lifestyles and how fortunate he feels to raise his children on 
a farm and make a difference in local economic struggles by employing neighbors at 
fair wages.  He creates a wide range of value-added products and makes these 
available to the tour groups as samples and for purchase.  When he told these 
Mexican producers that he sells a single vanilla bean for $10 USD, the crowd gasped.  
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He stressed that through tourism, he is able to reach his market directly and to sell his 
vanilla and other products for retail profits.  He said, “Everyone has a story.  Let your 
story sell your vanilla.”  He encouraged the producers to develop their marketing 
image and create a concrete identity.  Branding, he said, was key to letting the 
consumer know what you are about and creates your image.   
 Mr. Redekopp’s presentation was followed by a short question and answer 
session (the entire presentation was given in English with simultaneous translation for 
the crowd).  The questions asked by the crowd illustrate the complicated relationships 
between producers.  The first question was about the role of the U.S. government in 
farming.  Redikopp explained that America was founded on farming and that the 
USDA is concerned about developing rural areas which have been abandoned as 
families move to the city.  His farm is an example of re-vitalization of rural 
economies and the government gives him seed money to get this project off the 
ground because, he says, “If my farm is successful, then others will have hope and 
anyone crazy enough will take the risk too.” 
 The next question confused Mr. Redekopp; and the translator, not being from 
the region, did not understand the significance of the question.  Someone asked, 
“How do you guarantee that no one will steal your beans or vines?”  He hesitated and 
said that he didn’t have trouble with theft.  After a moment, he suggested working 
within the community to build good relations, pay good wages and respect your 
workers so that people would feel connected to the farm, to use dogs and ultimately, 
have a gun.  While all these suggestions were good, they were disconnected from the 
reality of traditional production and local culture.  These producers organize their 
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lives around building good relations with their neighbors, within their communities, 
but theft in Mexico, as I suggested in the last chapter, is a more intractable problem.  
There were some questions about how he creates the value-added products, and he 
emphasized that he does not try to compete with large companies.  He is making a 
gourmet product out of high quality beans.  His customer has learned about the 
importance of quality and sustainable production, so they appreciate quality and are 
willing to pay a higher price.   
 One of the conference organizers asked the crowd if they thought they could 
accomplish something similar to Mr. Redikopp.  He suggested that they organize a 
group to build a farm for tourists.  In the past, tourism has not been a big industry in 
this region of Mexico.  Papantla was declared a “Magical City” by the U.N. in 2005 
and has begun making the necessary changes in infrastructure required by this 
designation.  Eco-tourism is attainable for some of these producers, but not likely for 
the majority.  Redekopp’s presentation did provide a unique perspective that 
generated some excitement and opened new ways of thinking not only about vanilla 
production but also about distribution.  Though the number of farms needed for 
tourism would be small, tourism might provide a larger market for products and 
create new access to the market. 
 A producer from Costa Rica, David Gardella, talked about his farm that 
conserves rain forest by planting vanilla in old growth forest without cutting.  He 
argued that this is one of Mexican producers’ greatest marketing tools, that their work 
can make a difference.  He introduced the idea of a “vanilla exchange” that would set 
grades for producers.  The idea behind the exchange is that because there is no 
166 
standardization in the vanilla industry, producers have no bargaining power.  Creating 
standards would help producers move towards a more stable market, where they 
could produce with some level of certainty.  This idea was not entirely new, as there 
had been a system of quality control in the past.  The idea that this system would 
create more certainty is an important concept with these producers, the more security 
they can build into the production and distribution process the better.  Mr. Gardella 
announced that he would begin the process of organizing a vanilla exchange through 
the International Tropical Farmers Network (ITFN).  The Vanilla Exchange will act 
as a registry for vanilla producers and buyers.  This method of consolidating the 
vanilla market will insure fair prices and quality product.    
 The next presentations offered different views of the business side of the 
industry.  The first was from the owner of a spice company from the U.S., the second 
was from the former spice buyer from McCormick, and the final presentation was by 
Patricia Rain.  The owner of the spice company had two primary messages for the 
producers.  First, he was embarrassed to tell them that he did not buy Mexican 
vanilla, because there simply was not enough.  He buys 100 tons of vanilla a year and 
has to go where the vanilla is produced in volume.  He repeated several times that he 
felt sad that he does not purchase Mexican vanilla, but that lack of product makes it 
impossible for him to purchase there.  Second, he assured the producers that he was 
dedicated to buying Mexican vanilla and encouraged them to concentrate on 
producing high-quality product and they would have a market.  His advice was to 
focus on organic production.  He suggested that organic production has the same 
production costs but yields over three hundred times more in profit.  
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           But even in the organic market, the company owner emphasized, Mexican 
producers would have to be able to produce a certain volume to satisfy buyers.  His 
parting words were twofold. First, he suggested that the producers talk to their 
grandfathers.  He said, “Ask your abuelos; the Totonac used good traditional 
techniques.  With their help, you’ll be able to produce the best vanilla in the world.”  
Second, he emphasized the need to organize.  The opportunity to build a new market 
is there, but depends on the ability of the producers to organize, get production costs 
down and increase the volume of dried vanilla.  Through strong organization, which 
includes alliances between the producers, curing houses and industry, Mexico has, 
according to him, a good position from which to build this new niche market. 
Hank Kaesthe, formerly of McCormick, had much the same message.  The 
majority of his presentation was a series of photographs from around the world of 
various vanilla plantations and accompanying stories of different ventures into new 
agricultural or processing techniques.  His final message was that Mexico must work 
to keep its production of high quality vanilla while increasing the volume.  He 
emphasized the need to fill a niche market for gourmet vanilla and that they must 
keep production costs low to accomplish this.  At this point, only one percent of the 
world’s vanilla is produced in Mexico.  He suggested that producers should use the 
publicity generated by the conference to create awareness of the origins of vanilla and 
capitalize on that for marketing purposes.  He recognized that the world owes a debt 
to the Totonac farmer for cultivating vanilla.  The farmers watched in disbelief as Mr. 
Kaesthe explained production and curing processes in far-away places: China, 
Indonesia, Uganda, India, Tonga, Comoros and Madagascar.  In this presentation the 
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local and the global were linked.  For many the idea of direct access to the market 
was a motivating factor in attending the conference and these presentations made 
concrete how global the market truly is.  The fact that so many other countries are 
producing vanilla did not seem to bother the farmers.  They were eager to seek out 
other producers and to learn from the ways in which vanilla has been marketed by 
other organizations. 
 The final presentation by activist, author and business-owner Patricia Rain 
was delivered by Norma Vallejo, daughter of Victor Vallejo.  Ms. Rain was 
undergoing cancer treatment and was unable to attend the conference.  She also 
prepared a video presentation which was played after the reading of her script.  This 
conference was in part the result of her efforts to organize networks between vanilla 
farmers on an international scale.  Her message was one of encouragement for the 
work they have already done and for the work to be done.  She is adamant that 
producers be paid fair prices and that companies make conscious product choices.  
She put together a workshop for the conference on how to market vanilla products, 
which was highly attended.  She organized her lecture around the rallying cry of 
Cesar Chavez, “Sí se puede.”  Though most of the audience was unaware of Chavez’s 
work in the U.S. for the rights of agricultural workers, they seemed to appreciate the 
enthusiasm Ms. Rain displayed for their industry. On the ITFN email group today, 
many contributors sign their messages with this slogan, “We Can Do It.” 
          Ms. Rain’s paper emphasized the role of developing a global network of 
farmers that would enable them all to establish just markets and direct access to 
buyers and consumers.  While there were not many non-Mexican producers at this 
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conference (only the American and Costa Rican), the hope is that the ITFN will host 
an annual conference in a different vanilla producing country each year, creating new 
relationships and sparking new programs.  Besides the network, Ms. Rain is helping 
to organize women’s cooperatives in Mexico and Uganda, beginning the initial steps 
for the next conference (to be held in Java, Indonesia), and continuing to educate the 
public through her website, business, lectures and book signing opportunities and 
letter campaigns aimed at important companies that buy vanilla (Starbucks, Nestle, 
Hagen Daz).   
Many speakers at the conference talked about the necessity of creating a niche 
market for Mexican vanilla. The lifestyles of the families currently engaged in 
production must be recognized as an asset and future programs should be developed 
to support these producers. 
   
Alternative Development:   “Betting” on the Producer 
 Today the ITFN continues to work to promote producers’ interests.  The 
Vanilla Exchange has now opened and is offering producers a price of $50 U.S. per 
kilo for quality vanilla.  This price represents a real watermark.  Mr. Vallejo has 
estimated that producers need to get this average to make vanilla production worth 
their investment of labor and capital.  The members of the ITFN use the web forum to 
keep abreast of news concerning weather and prices in producing countries.  They are 
organizing new projects, primarily in the form of women’s cooperatives in Mexico 
and Uganda to make vanilla ornaments and value-added products to market through 
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Fair Trade organizations.  Most recently, the members are organizing a meeting in 
Papantla for August 2007 to establish an agenda for building the vanilla industry.   
           Listening to the proposals for the ITFN, it became apparent to me that the 
alternative development agenda that had characterized the first phase of COVER was 
being recovered by this group. It was able to recover this early vision of Mr. Vallejo’s 
because its interests were not divided, or weighted, in favor of the buyers and 
industrialists. Small producers were to be its exclusive members. Being an 
international network, it is also able to “leapfrog” over state and national government 
pressures to conform to a more conventional development agenda.   
 
Local Knowledge and the Development Project 
 Anthropologists critical of development projects argue that these projects are 
hegemonic in nature. In this case study, it is undeniable that social inequalities have 
affected the course of development.  Local elites have controlled prices and limited 
producer’s access to outside buyers.  Government funds have often been wasted on 
grants to fake organizations, squandered in bureaucratic fleecing, and given to 
industry elites in what amounts to corporate welfare.  Stereotypes and 
misunderstandings of campesinos have been used to justify this system of inequality.  
Producers have been accused of not understanding capitalism because they save cash 
earned from vanilla sales.  They have also been accused of being dishonest when they 
do not sell their harvest to local buyers --though they do so only in order to look for 
higher prices.  In this case, it is not the producers that do not understand the 
complexities of the market, but the businessmen and government agencies that do not 
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understand the complexities of economics.  Producers still balance their production 
decisions between subsistence and commodity production while diversifying into as 
many other projects as needed to support their households.  Both the families that I 
spent time with were adept at diversifying their economic activities so that they could 
compete on the market and minimize their risk.  In the case of the Lopez family, they 
focused on subsistence production that provided enough sustenance for the household 
and commodity production to satisfy their cash needs.  They did not need to produce 
vanilla in order to buy corn, but they did need to have a commodity crop that they 
could integrate into their larger subsistence crops and did not require large amounts of 
capital to maintain.  The Ramirez family did not produce subsistence crops, but was 
equally dependent on a delicate balance of diversified activities. For the Lopez 
family, participating in only market driven endeavors would cripple their economy.  
For the Ramirez family, the inability to return to subsistence production made 
diversification even more crucial.  They do not have a problem understanding this, 
though outsiders (local elites and government employees) do not seem to have a clue 
how important this balance between subsistence economy, entrepreneur endeavors 
and market production is to these households.   
          But to make the analysis a merely critical one would be a disservice to these 
producers and their families.  For however corrupt a development project may be, it is 
but one component in a complex economic and social system. And the fact of the 
matter is these farmers do not have a problem with development programs as such.  
They are willing to innovate, and they are interested in new techniques and are 
motivated to intensify vanilla production.  What they are unwilling to accept any 
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more is corruption, whether it is in the form of price controls by local elites or 
government nepotism.   
 For development programs in Mexico, such as COVER, the best bet is to 
create a coalition between producers and local professionals that would enable them 
to develop programs that address local needs --in a sense a directed bottom-up 
agenda. This is the kind of alliance Olivier de Sardan is suggesting when he looks 
beyond the critical analysis offered by the “anthropologists of development” towards 
a development alternative based on “social logic” --a conjunction of professional and 
local knowledge.   To be fair to COVER, they did make important headway for many 
farmers.  They were able to garner government support for farmers that provided 
grants and materials.  They reinvigorated interest in production and helped to foster 
relationships between producers.  Farmers are still willing to work with COVER and 
are hopeful that these programs will work to their advantage in the end. 
Given new access to technology, it is also useful for producers to create 
international relationships that enable them to deal in more direct ways with buyers.  
In a way, these producers have been asking for direct access to the market for over 
two hundred years, since they filed formal complaints concerning monopolies by 
local business men.  One morning I rode along with Mr. Vallejo as he checked on 
several projects at his ranch.  A young girl, one of his many god-children, ran up to 
the car to chat with him about school.  Mr. Vallejo explained to me as we pulled away 
that he had made a new offer to his many employees that year.  He let them choose 
how they would receive a cost of living increase:  they could have an increase in their 
daily salary or they could enroll their children in internet/computer classes, which Mr. 
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Vallejo would pay their tuition and travel expenses.  All the employees choose the 
technology classes and quickly enrolled their children.  They are eager to build family 
resources in as many ways as possible. 
           As this study shows, producers will look for other options when a project no 
longer functions according to a social logic, or does not feel just to them.  If a 
program is well suited to the social milieu of a population, then those producers will 
work hard to incorporate new systems or technology into their larger production 
system.  Development projects are one subset of a larger diversification strategy, so 
when they don’t work, these producers move on.  In this case, they do not have the 
political power or the social mobilization to stop government corruption.  But they are 
willing to look for other organizing mechanisms. 
 Given the current administration of COVER, the producers’ best bet is to look 
outside the agency without severing ties altogether: to continue to intensify 
production at an appropriate level for their household, to build coalitions with local 
professionals and international organizations, and to create incentives for a more just 
development apparatus.  By creating coalitions with local professionals such as 
anthropologists Rocio Aguilera and Luis Luna and agronomist Erasmo Curti, these 
producers can overcome the problems experienced with COVER because the interests 
of these professionals are aligned with producers.  Given environmental changes, 
intensification of production does require technical changes in the production system.  
This can be addressed by agronomists that are willing to look at the context of 
production and help producers to choose and develop the most appropriate 
technology for each community or household.  Local anthropologists not only offer 
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ideological critique of programs like COVER but have experience integrating 
technologies into rural production systems.  
           There has to be incentive for change or, as this case shows, an unaccountable 
government bureaucracy will revert to corruption.  The survey shows that producers 
are no longer willing to sell their vanilla green.  They know that having a more direct 
relationship with foreign buyers would allow them higher profits.  The problem with 
this scenario is that while curing vanilla can be easily achieved in the countryside, 
assuring the quality of that vanilla is more difficult.  If the government is not careful, 
there will not be an industry to develop.  If producers do not learn to cure the vanilla 
in such a manner as to assure quality, Mexican vanilla will have a hard time 
competing in a market with already high quantities of low-quality vanilla.  The 
success of Mexican producers, and for a Mexican government interested in increasing 
export revenues, relies on the right balance of quantity and quality.  This challenging 
global context may be the producers’ best bet for encouraging less corruption in 
government programs, which would increase their access to funds, technical and 
marketing support.   
 Most recently, Mr. Vallejo has written to tell me that he is back on the board 
of directors of COVER.  He hopes to influence the direction of projects, but he is 
skeptical.  The make-up of the board remains the same, with only three producers 
represented and six business and industry representatives.  He fears the state 
bureaucrats have too much control now and that COVER will continue to be an 
instrument of nepotism and corporate welfare.  Though it was not inevitable that 
COVER be corrupt, previous experiences with government development projects 
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made this a rational fear.  For this reason, Mr. Vallejo is also working on several 
other projects to develop production and create markets.  He is more active in the 
national producers’ organization which, since the election of Sergio as president, has 
tried to minimize conflict of interest and focus efforts on producers’ needs rather than 
the industry as a whole.  This organization is a federally-funded group, so it is talking 
about breaking off to become private, in hopes of having more control over future 
agenda.  Mr. Vallejo is actively involved in the ITFN, working with Patricia Rain to 
organize international producers, assure a fair and consistent price for producers and 
market pure vanilla.  As Mr. Vallejo has repeatedly said (and the lives of producers 
illustrates) these farmers are not asking to become rich off vanilla.  They want to 
develop an industry that would assure consistent, fair prices.   
 The ITFN holds the most promise for many of these producers and has 
become an alternative development strategy.  They are asking questions about the 
relationship between the local and the global and looking for ways to integrate the 
two.   
Commodity Production:  Betting on Globalization  
The bet that these farmers are making is not unusual for rural producers.  Most 
producers must maintain a highly diversified economic strategy that works best when 
they minimize risk by remaining flexible.  This study is about the way they use 
vanilla as one option among many, but it could be any commodity.  That vanilla 
production has a long history in this region makes for a more complicated context for 
understanding new development projects, this situation is further complicated by the 
need to adapt old production systems due to environmental changes, rather than 
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simply introducing a new system.  This is true for the producers at the conference as 
well as for the Lopez and Ramirez families.  Though the Lopez family has a long 
history with vanilla production, they have also been willing to integrate other 
commodity crops into their system.  With renewed interest in vanilla, they have 
worked to find the best way to intensify production without creating too much strain 
on their capital and labor resources.  The Ramirez family does not have any 
experience with vanilla, they come to it as a result of COVER, but even they do not 
rely on vanilla for their livelihood.  Vanilla production, like migration for the 
Ramirez family, is a subset of the larger context of diversification.   
One of the paradoxes of globalization is that at the same time that it creates 
new relationships between people all over the world, it also causes people to work as 
individuals they learn to compete on a larger scale.  This contrast of unity and 
individuality is a constant source of tension.  One way these farmers are dealing with 
the difficulty of dealing with the market as individuals is to capitalize on new 
opportunities to organize on a larger scale.  Organizing locally has been a common 
approach, but when faced with long entrenched social structures they have not created 
the business opportunities they had imagined.  With the ITFN, they are seeking a 
global community in an attempt to equalize their access to the market.  In this way, 
they have reframed “the relationship in a global space” (Kearney 1995) so that they 
are able to capitalize on local knowledge and global markets.  They combine long 
held sentiment that their work is valuable with new ideas about fair trade.    
Fair trade as a marketing concept is fairly new but echoes beliefs these 
farmers have long held.  This marketing strategy creates the direct relationship they 
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have desired to build and allows farmers to capitalize on many of the key aspects of 
their lifestyle:  this commodity is produced by small scale farmers using sustainable 
techniques and family labor in such a way that households, communities and the 
environment are preserved.   
Development and globalization as phenomenon have been criticized for 
accentuating and accelerating inequality in the world.  But these producers are not 
ready to give up on either.  The global market is not without risk, it is one other 
option in a highly diversified economic strategy.  Producing commodities allows 
farmers to manage the risk. What is different about these producers is that they in 
many ways demand the right to develop on their own terms.  They are willing to 
“bet” on vanilla, but they want the government or any other development 
organization to play fair.   
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Appendix I:Vanilla Producers Survey: The First International Conference  
(English translation) 
 
Community:  State:   Age: 
Marriage status:  m  w  s Do you work with your spouse? Y n 
How many children do you have?      Do they work with you? 
What type of land do you work?  Communal  private other  How many hectares? 
Do you know how to read?   Do you speak an indigenous language? 
System of vanilla production:  acahual  pichoco  orange  shadehouse  other 
How many plants do you have?   How many years have you been growing? 
Do you have irrigation?   Do you have plans for an irrigation system? 
Do you use agro chemicals?  Have you received technical assistance? Do you want 
assistance? 
Are you a member of COVER?  If no, why? 
Are you a member of another producer’s organization? 
Have you received grants?   From which program or organization? 
Type of help:  irrigation   plants   shadehouse  other 
Money:  loans  other 
How much vanilla do you produce a year?  How much do you earn a year?  How 
much do you invest each year? 
How much time do you dedicate to vanilla?  Daily   weekly  monthly 
 
Do you grow corn?   Do you buy corn?   Regularly? 
What other crops do you sell? 
What are your household cash needs?  Food  medicine  education  consumer items  
other 
Do you (or someone in your household) work as a day laborer?  Where? 
Do you have other work enterprises? 
Have you (or someone in your household) migrated for any amount of time?  Where?   
Do you (or someone in your household) have plans to migrate?  Where? 
Do you hire day laborers?  How much do you pay daily? 
 
What are the principle problems faced by vanilla farmers? 
Labor   technical  financial  other 
Is this true in your case? 
What will you do with your vanilla?  Sell green   cure and sell     cure and create 
products to sell 
Do you have plans to change your current method?  How?  I want to cure my produce    
I want to make value-added products to sell 
If you plan to cure your vanilla, do you expect to receive higher prices? 
What is the highest price you’ve been paid for vanilla? 
In what year did you produce the most vanilla?    Why was that a good year? 
Are you interested in selling vanilla outside this region?  Are you interested in 
working with a cooperative? 
How can the government improve their services? 
What do you hope to get out of this conference? 
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Cuestionario para  productores de vainilla:  Primer Congreso Internacional 
Comunidad: _____________________ Estado_________ Edad:______ 
Estado Civil: casado  viudo/a soltero/a    Trabaja con usted su esposo/a?: si   no 
Cuantos hijos tiene?:_________Trabajan ellos con 
usted?:_______________________ 
Tipo de tenencia: ejidal  particular pequeno prop Otra___Cuantas hectareas tiene 
usted?:____ 
Sabe leer/escribir:   si   no    Habla alguna lengua indigena?_________________ 
Sistema de sembrar:  acahual    pichoco  naranjo  casa de sombra  otra___________ 
Cuantas plantas por ha.?:__________________ que edad tiene la plantacion?_______ 
Tiene riego?   Si   no  Tiene planes para riego?  Si    no   
Utiliza agroquimicos?  Si   no        Recibe asesoria  tecnica?  Si   no    Quiere asesoria 
tecnica?  Si  no  Es usted miembro/a de COVER?   Si    no-------porque no?  Es 
miembro/a de otra organizacion de productores?___________________________ 
Recibe apoyo?  Si  no   Programa o institucion que lo apoya?___________________ 
Apoyo:  proyectos:  riego      plantas       casa     otro___________________________ 
              Dinero:     prestamos        otro______________ 
Cuanto produces por ano?__________ Cuanto gana por ano_________Cuanto inverta 
por ano___________ 
Cuanto tiempo le dedica a la vainilla dia___  semana__________mes_____________ 
 
Siembra maiz?   Si   no     Compra maiz?  Si   no       Regularmente?  Si   no    
Que otras cosas cosecha para vender?__________________________________ 
Que compra su familia con dinero en efectivo?  Comida  Medicina  Educacion  
Articulos de consumo Otro________ 
Trabaja usted (o alguien de su familia trabaja) como jornalero/a asalariado/a? Si  no 
Donde? _____Otro trabaja?_____ 
Usted (o alguien de su familia) se migra por algun espacio de tiempo?   Si  no  
Donde? Vera  Mexico  EUA 
Usted o alguien de su familia tiene planes de migrarse?   Si   no   Donde?  ____ 
Usted contrata a jornaleros?  Si   no   Pago por dia?_____________ 
Cuales son los problemas principales que enfrentan los productores de vainilla?   
Mano de obra     Tecnicos     Monetarios     Ambientales    otro________________ 
Esto es verdad en su caso?  Si  no   
Que hace usted con su vainilla? Vender verde    Beneficiar y vender      Beneficiar y 
transformer el producto                             
A usted le gustaria cambiar esta situacion?  Si    no    Como?  Quiero beneficiar  
Quiero hacer productos 
Si usted beneficia la vainilla, la retiene en espera de precios mas altos?  Si   no 
Cual ha sido el major precio de su vanilla por kg?_____________  
Cual ha sido su mejo ano de produccion_______porque_______________________ 
Quiera vender productos afuera de region?  Si  no   Interes en trabajando en 
cooperative a hacer lo?  Si no 
Como puede el gobierno mejorar sus servicios? 
 
Que espera usted de este congreso? 
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Appendix II: Vanilla Producer Survey 2:  First International Conference 
(English translation) 
Community:   State:     Age: 
Marriage status:  m  w  s Do you work with your spouse? Y n 
How many children do you have?      Do they work with you? 
What type of land do you work?  Communal  private other  How many hectares? 
Do you know how to read?   Do you speak an indigenous language? 
System of vanilla production:  acahual  pichoco  orange  shadehouse  other 
How many plants do you have?   How many years have you been growing? 
Do you have irrigation?   Do you have plans for an irrigation system? 
Do you use agro chemicals?  Have you received technical assistance? Do you want 
assistance? 
Are you a member of COVER?  If no, why? 
Are you a member of another producer’s organization? 
Have you received grants?   From which program or organization? 
Type of help:  irrigation   plants   shadehouse  other 
Money:  loans  other 
How much vanilla do you produce a year?  How much do you earn a year?  How 
much do you invest each year? 
How much time do you dedicate to vanilla?  Daily   weekly  monthly 
 
What problems have you faced growing vanilla? 
 
 
What factors keep you from growing more vanilla? 
 
 
Why do you want to grow more vanilla?  What would motivate you to increase 
production? 
 
Do you think there will be a time in the future where you will want to produce more? 
 
To increase production, where will you have to invest the most? 
Labor:  family members    Money:  paid laborers        Technology 
             Self                                      capital                  Other 
                                                         Shadehouse 
 
What keeps you from producing more now? 
 
Is vanilla a business or a way of life?  Why? 
 
How could the government improve their services? 
 
How do you classify growers?  By the quantity of vanilla they produce, their lifestyle 
or the production methods? 
 
185 
Cuestioinario II para productores de vanilla:  Primer congreso internacional 
Comunidad: _____________________ Estado_____________________
 Edad:______ 
Estado Civil: casado  viudo/a soltero/a    Trabaja con usted su esposo/a?: si   no 
Cuantos hijos tiene?:_________Trabajan ellos con usted?:___________________ 
Tipo de tenencia: ejidal  particular pequeno prop OtraCuantas hectareas tiene 
usted?:____ 
Sabe leer/escribir:   si   no    Habla alguna lengua indigena?_________________ 
Sistema de sembrar:  acahual    pichoco  naranjo  casa de sombra  otra____________ 
Cuantas plantas por ha.?:__________________ que edad tiene la 
plantacion?_________ 
Tiene riego?   Si   no  Tiene planes para riego?  Si    no   
Utiliza agroquimicos?  Si   no        Recibe asesoria  tecnica?  Si   no    Quiere asesoria 
tecnica?  Si  no   
Es usted miembro/a de COVER?   Si    no-------porque no?  _ 
Es miembro/a de otra organizacion de productores?_________________ 
Recibe apoyo?  Si  no   Programa o institucion que lo apoya?_______________ 
Apoyo:  proyectos:  riego      plantas       casa     otro_________________________ 
              Dinero:     prestamos        otro______________ 
Cuanto produces por ano?______ Cuanto gana por ano_________Cuanto inverta por 
ano 
Cuanto tiempo le dedica a la vainilla dia________  semana______ mes__________ 
Que problemas ha enfrentado usted al cultivar la vainilla? 
 
 
Piensa usted incrementar su produccion vainillera? 
 
Que le animaria a usted a producir mas vainilla? 
 
Por que razon quisiera uno producir mas?  Que motiva el deseo de producir mas? 
 
Prevee usted momentos en el futuro en que vaya a querer producir mas vainilla? 
 
Para incrementar produccion, que suele inverter usted?   
Mano de obra   De la familia Dinero:  para pagar mano de obra 
 technologia 
                         Propia    para mejoramientos de capital             otro 
      para casa de sombra 
 
Que le impide incrementar la produccion ahora? 
 
 
Es la vainilla un negocio o un estilo de vida?  Porque? 
 
 
Como puede el gobierno mejorar sus servicios? 
